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Preface: After the “Speculative Turn”
Katerina Kolozova
Recent forms of realism in continental philosophy, habitually 
subsumed under the (not always coherent) category of “specula-
tive realism,” have provided grounds for the much needed cri-
tique of social-constructivist approaches in gender theory and 
of the authority with which various forms of post-structuralist 
critique have dominated feminist theory for decades.1 But the 
interest in realism and in the possibility of a universalism that 
would still remain post-metaphysical displayed in most of the 
feminist (speculative) realist or (new) materialist writings I have 
1 For an important critique of the idea that newer work in feminist realisms 
and “new materialisms” moves against the grain of an earlier feminist schol-
arship not concerned enough with matter and matter-ing, see Sara Ahmed, 
“Some Preliminary Remarks on the Founding Gestures of the ‘New Mate-
rialism’,” European Journal of Women’s Studies 15, no. 1 (2008): 23–39, where 
she writes that “the very claim that matter is missing can actually work to 
reify matter as if it could be an object that is absent or present. By turning 
matter into an object or theoretical category, in this way, the new material-
ism reintroduces the binarism between materiality and culture that much 
work in science studies has helped to challenge” (35). Ahmed’s intervention 
into work on newer feminist materialisms is important to take into account 
here, while also recognizing, as Ahmed herself does, that, “[g]iven the femi-
nist concern with understanding how gender and sexuality are reproduced 
in time and space, a key emphasis [in feminist critique] has been placed 
on language, culture, the symbolic, labour, discourse and ideology. This is 
because feminism needs a theory of social reproduction; of how particular 
forms become norms over time” (33).
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read so far has been purely epistemological. There is no political 
motivation in those writings and they have most certainly not 
been directed against cultural theory per se vis-à-vis its domina-
tion over questions of gender, sexual difference and other forms 
of social philosophy discourse. In 2014 Iris van der Tuin and 
Peta Hinton wrote that,
as well as being timely in its inquiry, the need to mark out a feminist 
politics of/within new materialism is also, and clearly, an ‘untimely’ 
project. And if we shift this focus on time to consider the contem-
poraneity of new materialist scholarship and its ethico-political de-
velopments, the need to address its feminist temperament (as well 
as the shapes that feminism assumes) becomes increasingly clear. 
A review of the field will show that, to date, most compendiums on 
new materialism seem more broadly oriented or implicitly feminist 
in their direction, without necessarily picking up with what feminist 
new materialism ‘looks like’ as a focus of inquiry. This is another 
way of saying that the question of the political in the context of new 
materialism has been asked in such a way that, while new material-
ist ways of conceptualizing positive difference/differing have been 
devised […] the question of the political has not yet been answered 
with specific regard to feminist politics.2 
The interest in new forms of realism is thus still largely ab-
stract, essentially epistemological and sparked by the relativ-
ism of “postmodern theory” as a philosophical impasse to be 
overcome, rather than motivated by the political implications 
of post-structuralist critique’s undisputed authority in most hu-
manities departments worldwide. I would argue, however, that 
new forms of realist materialism could have significant political 
ramifications that should be more owned by feminist scholars 
as a way to create new possibilities for an internationalist femi-
nist political language and action that would be geographically, 
2 Peta Hinton and Iris van der Tuin, “Preface,” Women: A Cultural Review 25, 
no. 1, special issue on “Feminist Matters: The Politics of New Materialism” 
(2014): 1–8, at 4.
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economically and in terms of nation-state politics, as varied and 
as multi-centered as possible. Such a new universalism must 
emerge at the economic and academic margins and provide 
the grounds for uncompromising comradeship worldwide. The 
universe it will establish is one in which power will be measured 
in materialist or realist terms and its chief categories will be also 
the most robust ones: economy and the power of the nation-
state as the main means of women’s subjugation. Identity, cul-
ture, sexuality, and all other major “real abstractions” (Marx) 
will be as relevant in such a worldview as any other issue that is 
plaguing women, but they will not be the norm that hierarchi-
cally structures all of our priorities. 
At this early point in the Preface, I must underscore that 
none of what is stated above, in my imaginary new world of 
feminist universalism, is either said or implied by the authors 
represented in the book at hand. What unites them in a sin-
gle book, following the initial conceptualization of this project 
by myself and its former editors Michael O’Rourke and Ben 
Woodard, is the significance of their feminist contributions to 
realist thought and to the building of possibilities for new uni-
versalisms regardless of their affiliation with “speculative real-
ism,” “object oriented ontology,” or other “new materialisms” as 
such. “New” here refers to non-reactionary, non-revisionist, and 
non-reformist stances with regard to any history of philosophy 
predating structuralism, a stance committed to re-inventing the 
possibility of a universal language for a feminist international 
movement of the twenty-first century. 
Although there is no unequivocal meaning behind the term 
“speculative realism,” the reference remains in the title. It does 
so because the name itself refers to a certain critical event in the 
intellectual history of the beginning of the twenty-first century.3 
3 Many sources could be cited, but a good touchstone vis-a-vis our own vol-
ume with regard to the recent advent of “speculative realism” would be Levi 
Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), a volume 
which featured only one woman (Isabelle Stengers) among its twenty-one 
contributors.
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It is an event that self-constitutes the need for a “realist turn” 
that will fundamentally reinvent the ideas of the real, reality, 
and realism as inherited from the Western philosophical tra-
dition. The theory, as well as the artistic and political practice, 
inspired by “speculative realism” display the need for a radical 
break with most of this philosophical tradition and declare the 
poststructuralist legacy fundamentally indebted to (if not a di-
rect continuation of) the classical philosophical traditions, and 
more specifically to the post-Kantian one. In other words, the 
attempts toward the creation of new realisms that go under the 
common name of “speculative realism” may have failed partly or 
fully, but what is important is that, in all of their heterogeneity, 
they constitute a radical break with the canonical philosophi-
cal traditions. “Speculative realism” has been especially marked 
by considerations of scientific practice. Its project is, however, 
fundamentally different from that of the philosophy of science 
or science of philosophy. In spite of the heterogeneity of the dif-
ferent strands constituting it, “speculative realism” is defined by 
a radical break with any form of philosophical spontaneity. The 
latter is a term often used by Laruelle in his critique of the prin-
ciple of philosophical sufficiency: philosophy always already 
and by definition establishes a relation of amphibology with the 
real, a relation of thought and the real co-creating one another 
whereby the former determines the latter. The new forms of re-
alism attempt to produce theory that acknowledges the asym-
metry between thought and the real while affirming that the 
determination in the last instance of any form of truth must be 
an instance of the real. It is precisely this stance they have in 
common with scientific practice.
Feminist philosophy, moving away from philosophical spon-
taneity, was founded upon several grounding gestures that have 
put into question philosophy’s pretension of placing itself be-
yond sociality and beyond patriarchal ideology in order to posit 
itself as superior to other forms of intellectual production based 
on its “non-contingent” constitution. Luce Irigaray has postulat-
ed that speculation is at the heart of Western rationality and that 
it is nothing more than an extension of the patriarchal Symbolic 
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and the language dictated by it. The “object” of philosophical 
study is but a reflection of the auto-referential subject. Further, 
also according to Irigaray, the philosophical subject of the great 
Western tradition of rational(ist) thought has legislated for it-
self the position of highest authority on the matters of truth and 
real/ity. Although other feminist philosophers have not used the 
same terminology nor have proposed the same or similar analy-
sis, many feminist scholars have shared the claim that the sub-
ject/object binary is informed by patriarchal ideology and that 
philosophy has never been ideologically innocent or beyond the 
Symbolic and its language. In spite of the numerous and signifi-
cant differences, such positions have been advocated by Donna 
Haraway, Judith Butler, Rosi Braidotti, and many others. In oth-
er words, for the feminism of the late twentieth century and the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, the claim that philosophy 
is essentially patriarchal and masculinist has extended beyond 
the post-Kantian epistemic condition and its prevalence in the 
era. The claim is not only that knowledge is “subjective,” but also 
that the access to the real, to the “out-there,” is a priori barred. It 
is also a claim that the transcendental, or the minimum struc-
ture of rationality and language, is fundamentally gendered. The 
subject of the speculative mind mirrors the object and posits it 
as the real instead of the real (referring to the issue of amphibol-
ogy explained above). Hysterical utterings, on the other hand, 
depart from the real or the physical (Irigaray). Biological dif-
ference becomes the fundament of a new language that moves 
away from abstract postulations detached from the physicality 
as essentially masculinist (Braidotti). The practice of grief be-
comes the material for a new political language (Butler). Sexual 
difference as materiality understood in Freudian terms precedes 
the social (Copjec). In short, the provocations of “speculative 
turn” philosophers (generally, all men) to post-Kantianism were 
already preceded by feminist philosophy. 
Therefore, after the “speculative turn,” whose interests seem 
(if unconsciously) to have converged with those of feminist phi-
losophy, the classical philosophical traditions remain relevant 
for feminist philosophy. The possibility that has been open for 
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feminism since 2006 is to pursue its radical critique of Western 
philosophy without the burden of maintaining fidelity to the 
linguistic turn, to the dogma of postmodernism and poststruc-
trualism and their ostracisms of the real and realisms as reac-
tionary. It has served as an occasion to reclaim feminist forms 
of realism without revisionism but rather as its (realism’s) rein-
ventions founded on the remnants of the history of the Western 
philosophical tradition. 
I claim that Foucault is not reducible to poststructuralism, 
and that poststructuralism is certainly not about social con-
structivism. I also claim that structuralism remains relevant for 
feminism, as do deconstruction and the ideas of Deleuze, but 
that they invite different languages and methodological possi-
bilities if situated critically with regard to the event of the so 
called “speculative turn.” Regardless of whether she adheres to 
the strand of thought that has labeled itself “speculative real-
ism” or not, each author that has contributed to this collection 
has demonstrated that the terrain of “postmodernity” has been 
fundamentally destabilized in the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. 
This collection brings to the fore some of the feminist debates 
prompted by the so-called “speculative turn” and also some that 
have remained untouched by it, but ultimately this volume dem-
onstrates that feminism has moved away from the “postmod-
ern condition” and its epistemologies. It also demonstrates that 
there has never been a niche of “speculative realist feminism.” 
But it also problematizes the designation of “speculative real-
ism” itself and of any pretension to assign to it an unequivocal 
meaning. 
Some of the essays featured here tackle object-oriented on-
tology while providing a feminist critical challenge to its para-
digms, while others refer to some extent to non-philosophy or 
to new materialism and new realism without necessarily per-
forming their “feminist version.” The majority, however, do not 
refer to any of the particular currents of “speculative realism.” 
Instead, they constitute a critical theory sui generis that invokes 
the necessity of foregrounding new forms of realism for a “femi-
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nism beyond gender as culture.” We have purposefully invited 
essays from intellectual milieus outside the Anglo-Saxon aca-
demic center, bringing together authors from Serbia, Slovenia, 
France, the UK, and Canada. In this way we are prefiguring one 
form of strategic mobilization for a feminist internationalism 
that will replace gestures of generosity and paternalism consist-
ing of “cultural inclusion.” The internationalism we propose will 
ultimately be in need of a reinvented feminist universalism that 
will hopefully be grounded in new forms of realism and (Marx-
ist) materialism for feminist theory and political practice.
In the end, I would like to thank Michel O’Rourke for the ini-
tiative to edit a book such as this one, and for providing the blue-
print for its concept with his seminal article “Girls Welcome!!!” 
which we have republished in this volume. Many thanks to Ben 
Woodard and Eileen Joy for contributing to the editing process, 
and to Vincent van Gerven Oei for the typesetting and wonder-
ful cover.  
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Philosophy, Sexism, Emotion, Rationalism
Nina Power
Something important is happening within and to Philosophy.1 
It is something that has happened a thousand times over, yet 
every time it repeats it happens as if for the first time. The dif-
ficulty is making this event stick. What is this event? The event 
of the disruption of Philosophy by its own outside, the outside 
that it pretends it does not have. Philosophy, by virtue of being 
the most universal subject, the most generic art, cannot imagine 
that there is something which it cannot capture or has not al-
ways already captured, one way or another. But things fall apart. 
They fall apart a lot, and very quickly. I want to focus here on 
Philosophy as a discipline in its academic form, particularly 
in the UK and US, before turning to some of the claims made 
in the recent Xenofeminist manifesto2 and the Gender Nihil-
ism anti-manifesto3 regarding the feminizing of reason and the 
abolition of gender. I will ultimately agree with the Xenofemi-
nist manifesto when it states that “[r]ationalism must itself be 
a feminism” and with the Gender Nihilist text when it argues 
that the subversion of gender is a dead-end. I want only to add 
1 I have capitalized the word “Philosophy” throughout where I’m referring to 
it in its disciplinary, academic sense.
2 Laboria Cuboniks, “Xenofeminism: A Politics for Alienation,” http://www.
laboriacuboniks.net/qx8bq.txt.
3 phoenixsinger, “Gender Nihilism: An Anti-Manifesto,” libcom, July 9, 2015, 
https://libcom.org/library/gender-nihilism-anti-manifesto.
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that what usually gets sidelined and undermined as “emotion,” 
and is frequently gendered as feminine or female, is also itself a 
rationalism, and that emotion and reason are in fact not mortal 
enemies, but rather inseparable branches of the collective ex-
perience of social and political life that Philosophy purports to 
address.  
I want to focus on Philosophy in particular, not only because 
it is the subject I have studied since I was 18, nearly half my life, 
and taught in for the past ten years, as PhD student then as a 
lecturer. It is a subject and a way, or rather ways, of thinking that 
I have never left since I encountered it and it is hard to imagine 
I will move too far away from it, in whatever form that will take 
in the future. However, there is no doubt that Philosophy has 
a serious and a series of problems when it comes to sexism. A 
recent high-profile case, among many, concerns an American 
PhD student who had a relationship with a very high-profile 
moral philosopher. Towards the end of her anonymous account 
of her relationship with the philosopher, she addresses fears that 
he could sabotage her future career in the field, and reflects on 
the context in which Philosophy is taught at universities: 
As a PhD student about to enter the world of professional philoso-
phy, I now know better what I’m getting into. My hero, who regu-
larly uses and condemns sexist practices in his lectures, said that 
Person N is not a real feminist, because she wears miniskirts when 
she gives lectures. He sat around with other renowned philosophers 
from the prestigious university in City Z, grumbling about how 
a stupid woman does not deserve her new prestigious university 
post. Now I understand better what they mean when they say that 
academic philosophy is a white boys’ club. I am barely starting my 
career, but my eyes are already wide open.4 
4 Anonymous, “I had an Affair with my Hero, a Philosopher who’s Fa-
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When we are talking about sexism in Philosophy, there are mul-
tiple ways of considering the issue: 
1. The subject itself: is Philosophy as a subject inherently sexist 
(and we could add racist: this is a “white boys’ club” as the 
student above notes)? 
2. Is Philosophy sexist by omission, i.e., accidentally sexist, rac-
ist and that with a bit of work “the numbers” could improve 
over time?
3. Is Philosophy only contingently sexist in a different way, be-
cause of misconceptions relating to what the subject is — too 
difficult, too belligerent, etc.?
In her important 1982 essay, “Woman as Body: Ancient and 
Contemporary Views,” Elizabeth Spelman accuses Philoso-
phy of a combination of somatophobia — that is, hatred of the 
body — and misogyny, as it is women who tend to be associ-
ated with the “loathed” body by male philosophers. Her focus, 
in part, is Plato and the mind/body distinction as it is this key 
division that sets the tone for much of what historically follows. 
She writes: 
How a philosopher conceives of the distinction and relation be-
tween soul (or mind) and body has essential ties to how that phi-
losopher talks about the nature of knowledge, the accessibility of 
reality, the possibility of freedom. This is perhaps what one would 
expect — systematic connections among the “proper” philosophical 
issues addressed by a given philosopher. But there is also clear evi-
dence in the philosophical texts of the relationship between [how] 
the mind/body distinction, is drawn, on the one hand, and the scat-
tered official and unofficial utterances about the nature of women, 
on the other.5 
5 Elizabeth V. Spelman, “Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary 
Views,” Feminist Studies 8, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 109–31, at 110.
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Here Spelman makes a conceptual connection between Phi-
losophy as a subject and misogyny — Philosophy as a subject is 
inherently anti-woman, because many male philosophers are. 
Women are implicitly or explicitly aligned with the body by Phi-
losophy, leaving the mind/soul to be elevated above its bearer. 
The conceptual is personal.
Can we bring Spelman’s argument about ancient thought to 
bear on today’s questioning concerning the discipline of Phi-
losophy and sexism? Can we explain why there are still so few 
women in Philosophy — numbers after undergraduate degrees 
(where 46% are women in the UK) drop off sharply with only 
around 29% of PhDs and 20% of permanent post-holders in 
Philosophy being women — putting it on a comparable level 
with maths, physics, and computer science — and very dis-
similar number-wise to English and History.6 So it is clear that 
women in the first place aren’t put off from studying the sub-
ject, but something happens at postgraduate level and beyond. 
Some have argued that Philosophy is off-putting because it is 
overtly combative, pedantic, and critical (although this wouldn’t 
explain why a large number of female students choose to take 
the subject in the first place). Jonathan Wolff, UCL Philosophy 
Professor, in an article entitled: “How Can We End the Male 
Domination of Philosophy?” makes this well-worn argument 
and concludes by suggesting that “if philosophy is to be more 
‘gender friendly,’ do philosophers have first to act, well, if not 
in more ‘ladylike’ fashion, then at least with greater decorum?”7 
I find this suggestion somewhat patronizing, and the assump-
tion that philosophers equal male in the first place unhelpful — I 
don’t believe that women are inherently interested in “greater 
decorum” and certainly not when it comes to engaging with 
6 See the careful report “Women in Philosophy in the UK: A Report by the 
British Philosophical Association and the Society for Women in Phi-
losophy,” Sept. 2011, http://www.bpa.ac.uk/uploads/2011/02/BPA_Report_
Women_In_Philosophy.pdf.
7 Jonathan Wolff, “How Can We End the Male Domination of Philosophy?,” 
The Guardian, Nov. 26, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/
nov/26/modern-philosophy-sexism-needs-more-women.
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philosophical arguments. Certainly, I have encountered many 
male philosophers who behave unpleasantly, but this is because 
they appear to believe that as Philosophers they have a get-out-
of-jail-free card regarding any kind of “normal” social behavior 
(civility, respect, compassion). But this has nothing to do with 
how we might argue within the discipline: it is perfectly possible 
to repeatedly enter a human bear pit and be a kind and gentle 
person as well — the problem is the social stuff, not necessarily 
the discipline stuff. But as someone who has never acted “la-
dylike,” nor do I think most women have, not least because it 
doesn’t mean anything, I wonder about the value of promoting 
decorum inside the discipline: more important, perhaps, would 
be not acting in a hostile and dismissive manner to anyone per-
ceived to be outside of it. 
Hovering in the background of all this is a murky conglom-
eration of stereotypes and received wisdom. The British Philo-
sophical Association and Society for Women in Philosophy 
joint report from 2011 suggests that 
The point here is not that women are somehow less able to cope 
when aggressive behaviour is aimed at them, and so should be 
treated more gently than men. It is rather that aggressive behaviour, 
whoever it is aimed at, can heighten women’s feeling that they do 
not belong by reinforcing the masculine nature of the environment 
within which they study and work.8 
This is a clever and more subtle way of addressing a key is-
sue — what does it mean to be constantly interpolated as an 
anomaly? What is masculinity in the context of Philosophy 
anyway? The problem here is less the stereotypes concerning 
women in Philosophy and more the unacknowledged, because 
faux-neutral, acceptability of tropes associated with masculin-
ity. What happens when you stick out in this context? As the 
report states: “Stereotype threat is likely to be provoked where 
one is from a group that is negatively stigmatized in a certain 
8 “Women In Philosophy in the UK,” 13.
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context, one is in that context, and one’s group membership is 
made salient,”9 i.e., being one of only a few women in a roomful 
of men is sufficient to make one’s group membership salient. 
Given that this is routinely the case in Philosophy departments, 
I think recent efforts to identify stereotypes working the other 
way serve a useful function. 
The jokey term “theory boy” has been around for a while, 
but serves to identify a specificity that usually passes itself off 
as a generality. As Toril Moi puts it in “Discussion or Aggres-
sion? Arrogance and Despair in Graduate School” from 2003, 
“Among graduate students there is often a feeling of depression, 
as if out of humiliation, or a feeling of disappointment, as if out 
of arrogance.”10 She writes: 
Every year some female graduate students tell me that they feel 
overlooked, marginalized, silenced in some seminars. They paint 
a picture of classrooms where the alpha males — so-called “theory 
boys” — are encouraged to hold forth in impossibly obscure lan-
guage, but where their own interventions elicit no response.11 
Moi describes this situation in terms of symbolic capital, and 
following Bourdieu, describes “the relentless fight to become 
‘consecrated’ as one of the legitimate heirs to institutional power 
and glory.”12 To become the heir of the concept appears to mean 
in practice the exclusion of those who are deemed to not belong 
to concepts as such — in this sense then, those marked out as 
“women” and non-white males are perpetually registered as be-
ing particular, rather than universal, even when making points 
in the “appropriate register.” They cannot be heard because no 
one wants to listen. There is a kind of “double bind” of the uni-
9 Ibid.
10 Toril Moi, “Discussion or Aggression? Arrogance and Despair in Graduate 




12 Ibid., 1. 
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versal at play here, where those deemed minoritarian (even if, 
in a global sense, this isn’t true) are encouraged to “play by the 
rules,” to become bearers of the universal, the enlightened, the 
conceptual, the theoretical, for their own good and for the good 
of humanity as a whole. However, if they do they are somehow 
both no longer minoritarian (as any particularism magically 
vanishes) but also not really true players either, because sud-
denly the person sitting on the other side of the board has dis-
appeared.   
The recent “Xenofeminism Manifesto” (2015) takes up the 
challenge of the relationship between rationalism and univer-
salism declaring that:
Xenofeminism is a rationalism. To claim that reason or rationality 
is “by nature” a patriarchal enterprise is to concede defeat. It is true 
that the canonical “history of thought” is dominated by men, and it 
is male hands we see throttling existing institutions of science and 
technology. But this is precisely why feminism must be a rational-
ism — because of this miserable imbalance, and not despite it. There 
is no “feminine” rationality, nor is there a “masculine” one. Science 
is not an expression but a suspension of gender. If today it is domi-
nated by masculine egos, then it is at odds with itself — and this 
contradiction can be leveraged. Reason, like information, wants to 
be free, and patriarchy cannot give it freedom. Rationalism must it-
self be a feminism. XF marks the point where these claims intersect 
in a two-way dependency. It names reason as an engine of feminist 
emancipation, and declares the right of everyone to speak as no one 
in particular.13
While both acknowledging rationalism’s male domination, and 
the way in which this holds science back, as well as the un-gen-
dering, de-gendering, or a-gendering qualities of science, the 
Xenofeminist Manifesto nevertheless hankers after the voice 
from nowhere represented by the final line: “the right of every-
one to speak as no one in particular.”  What is the relationship 
13 Cuboniks, “Xenofeminism,” 0x04. 
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between speaking “as” no one and speaking from a marginalized 
position? Can we not do both? Feminist scientists and feminist 
philosophers of science are no less universalist or rationalist 
than male scientists, but they do not pretend to be speaking 
from nowhere, and, indeed, it is their feminist commitments 
that often reveal precisely what has been overlooked in earlier 
research. Patricia Gowaty, to give just one example, revolution-
ized the way in which aviary sexuality was conceived in her 
work on extra pair copulations and intraspecific egg dumping 
because she focussed less on male birds’ cuckoldry and more on 
the strategies of the female birds she was studying.14  
Another recent piece, “Gender Nihilism: An Anti-Manifes-
to” recently appeared online.15 Like the Xenofeminist Manifesto 
it is anonymously authored (the Xenofeminist manifesto is per-
haps less anonymous than this piece, given the six-part collec-
tive name “Laboria Cubonics” and some high-profile associa-
tions with the text) and perhaps collectively written (certainly 
the use of “we” as authorial voice would indicate this). Like the 
Xenofeminist Manifesto, the Gender Nihilism Anti-Manifesto 
rejects essentialism of any kind, right through to the ontological 
realm: “Who we are, the very core of our being, might perhaps 
not be found in the categorical realm of being at all.”16 Both the 
Xenofeminists and the Gender Nihillists declare themselves 
“gender abolitionists,” but while the former argue that the actual 
eradication of “gendered” traits under patriarchy “could only 
spell disaster” and suggest instead, in a slightly techno-hippie 
way, that we should let “a hundred sexes bloom!,” the Gender 
Nihilists go much further, arguing instead that: 
We are radicals who have had enough with attempts to salvage gen-
der. We do not believe we can make it work for us. We look at the 
14 See Michelle Elekonich, “Contesting Territories: Female-Female Aggres-
sion and the Song Sparrow,” in Feminist Science Studies: A New Generation, 
eds. Maralee Mayberry, Banu Subramaniam, and Lisa H. Weasel (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 103. 
15 phoenixsinger, “Gender Nihilism: An Anti-Manifesto.”
16 Ibid.
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transmisogyny we have faced in our own lives, the gendered vio-
lence that our comrades, both trans and cis have faced, and we real-
ize that the apparatus itself makes such violence inevitable.17
And, as if in response to the Xenofeminists’ blooming of the 
sexes argument, suggest that in the current moment “it becomes 
tempting to embrace a certain liberal politics of expansion […]. 
We have heard the suggestion that non-binary identity, trans 
identity, and queer identity might be able to create a subver-
sion of gender. This cannot be the case”18 and furthermore, that 
“[i]nfinite gender identities create infinite new spaces of devia-
tion which will be violently punished.”19 There are similarities 
between the two texts, though, particularly around what the 
Xenofeminist text describes as “the right of everyone to speak 
as no one in particular.” As the Gender Nihilism text states: “it 
is not merely certain formulations of identity politics which 
we seek to combat, but the need for identity altogether.” While 
there may be subtle differences between speaking as the ge-
neric “nobody” and speaking from the position of the abolition 
of identity, there is a parallel need for an escape route from an 
overcoded set of identifications deemed to be partial from the 
standpoint of a universal that fails to recognize its own specific-
ity (for how else could we describe masculinity)?
How then can the gender nihilist and the Xenofeminist posi-
tions help us understand what happens in Philosophy? If we un-
derstand “gendered violence” to include what often takes place 
within the discipline, we can understand that to try to make 
the subject more palatable for other genders on the basis of ste-
reotypes about people gendered in these ways (women are less 
combative, let’s make the subject more approachable) are highly 
likely to fail, even where they are attempted, which is nowhere. 
Far better might be to operate under conditions of extreme 
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nance. As the anti-manifesto puts it: “The gender nihilist says ‘I 
am a woman’ and means that they are located within a certain 
position in a matrix of power which constitutes them as such.”20
But how does rationalism overall fare in the Xenofeminist 
and gender abolitionist universe? What would a rationalism 
stripped of its masculinist history look like? I want to claim that 
this rationalism must also be an emotionalism, that is to say, 
a neglect of the rational basis for anger, misery, hatred, love, 
care, and so on will likely end up reinstating old oppositions 
and with them, gendered presuppositions about where thought 
“belongs.” Spinoza in the Ethics already teaches us this. And this 
understanding, above all, a social question, a practical question. 
As Ericka Tucker puts it in “Spinoza’s Social Sage”: “Few, if any, 
communities are organized through reason alone. Affects and 
the imagination are the primary modes through which humans 
interact and join their power.”21 Gender is the violence done to 
both reason and emotion by virtue of separating the two along 
sexed lines. Philosophy need not be the victim of this. 
But where are we now? As the Xenofeminists suggest at the 
moment “the notion of what is ‘gendered’ sticks disproportion-
ately to the feminine.”22 It follows then, that Philosophy must not 
become more “ladylike,” whatever that might mean, but must 
abolish and overturn the oppositions (mind–body, emotion–
reason) that have sustained its endeavor as protector of a mas-
culinized set of knowledges and methodologies. Philosophy is 
not “hard” because it makes a particular subsection of humanity 
feel strengthened in their identity-that-pretends-not-to-be-one, 
but because life is hard, and Philosophy should address its dif-
ficulties openly and collectively. 
20 Ibid.
21 Ericka Tucker, “Spinoza’s Social Sage: Emotion and the Power of Reason in 
Spinoza’s Social Theory,” Revista Conatus (July 2015): 12. 




This is why we can’t have nice things.
— Anonymous
Not-So-Nice Things
Recent new realist theories intend to respect objects by leaving 
them to their own “weird” ways.1 However, in seeking to rethink 
how objects access each other, and how humans have access 
to the world, these philosophies consistently center on ques-
tions of having access to things or, put simply, having them.2 
Ultimately, there is something perversely exotic about objects 
 I am grateful to Irina Aristarkhova, Anne Pollock, and Trevor Smith, who 
offered feedback on early drafts of this paper, and to Angela Valenti and 
Lisa Delgado for their support of this project. I owe great thanks to Silvia 
Federici, for generously sharing her research archive, and to Arlen Austen, 
for his archival help. 
1 For a compendium of speculative realist thought, which often takes this ap-
proach, see The Speculative Turn, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Gra-
ham Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011). See also Graham Harman’s term 
“weird realism” in Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Alresford: Zero 
Books, 2012), and Timothy Morton’s “magical” take on realism in Realist 
Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 
2013).
2 Consider, for example, how noncorrelationism, Quentin Meillassoux’s 
founding gesture for speculative realism, claims the possibility of having ac-
cess to being in-itself, apart from thought. Quentin Meillassoux, After Fini-
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framed, through the language of object-orientation, as a form of 
alterity that is meant to be had even if from afar. This dynamic 
carries sexual undertones and is entangled in objectification 
and reification. Any fetishist will attest that weirdness can be 
sexy, and this holds true, it would appear, even in philosophy. 
Whether or not one chooses to read terms like allure and with-
drawal as flirtatious or frigid, attributing distant availability to 
objects produces what I call an exoticism of objects. As we will 
see, this exoticism troubles economies of access and having, 
which I contend are foundational for new realist philosophies.
In considering these ideas, I will be drawing on emerging 
discourses in object-oriented feminism.3 Like the object-orient-
ed philosophies that have proliferated in the wake of speculative 
realism, which collectively insist that the universe is composed 
of objects and that humans are objects like all others, object-
oriented feminism embraces nonanthropocentrism. It also pur-
sues a feminist ethical stake in the histories and implications of 
objectification, which today’s object-oriented theories may have 
occasion to renew. In “Treating Objects Like Women,” Timothy 
Morton states that the term object does “not stand for objectifi-
cation or reification.”4 His “weird essentialism” recuperates “the 
supposed biological essentialism of French and 1970s American 
feminism,” torquing an unfashionable phase of feminist analysis 
toward the worthy project of object-oriented feminist ecology. 
tude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (2006; 
rpt.London: Continuum, 2008).
3 Object-oriented feminism (OOF) is a new field of analysis that has been de-
veloping out of several years of panels I organized at annual meetings of 
the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts, and dialogues around a 
forthcoming edited volume, Object-Oriented Feminism, ed. Katherine Be-
har (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016). Among the authors 
in this volume, Patricia Ticineto Clough and Frenchy Lunning have been 
actively involved in developing OOF thought since its inception, and editor 
Eileen A. Joy was an OOF panel respondent in 2012.
4 Timothy Morton, “Treating Objects Like Women: Feminist Ontology and 
the Question of Essence,” in International Perspectives in Feminist Ecocriti-
cism, eds. Greta Gaard, Serpil Opperman, and Simon Estok (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 56–69, at 56.
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But perhaps Morton is too hasty in dismissing objects’ imbrica-
tion in objectification and reification. Object-oriented feminism 
is directly concerned with treating humans like things. Equally, 
it is engaged in extending intra-human feminist ethics to the 
object world and in cultivating posthuman solidarities.
In this context, an important aspect of object-oriented femi-
nism’s ethical challenge can be posed as an inversion of the spec-
ulative question of how humans have access to things. Instead, 
object-oriented feminism takes up a thing’s perspective and asks 
how things are had. This essay will address such questions of ac-
cess and having by way of a provocative human object, the “oth-
er woman,” to arrive at a proposal for object-oriented feminist 
erotics.5 An alternative to “aesthetics as first philosophy,” object-
oriented feminist erotics undermines the principle of value in 
aesthetics and in productivist relationships between objects. But 
first let us assess how having access to things, having things, and 
having one’s way with things have been playing out in new real-
ist philosophies thus far.
Having at Things
One way philosophers have at things is through metaphor. 
For example, in Graham Harman’s non-relational philosophy, 
metaphor summons real objects together toward access. Har-
man theorizes that objects have no access to each other because 
they are fundamentally “withdrawn.”6 Each object, he claims, is 
its own world, hermetically, ontologically, and prophylactically 
“vacuum-sealed.” Harman proposes a novel concept he calls “al-
5 This object of analysis, like the title of this essay, references Luce Irigaray’s 
Speculum of the Other Woman; however, beyond a rich point of inspira-
tion, Irigaray’s text is not a primary focus for this short essay. See Speculum 
of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (1974; rpt. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1985). On the connection between masculinist speculation as 
theorized by Irigaray and its significance for feminist philosophy “after the 
‘speculative turn,’” see Katerina Kolozova’s Preface to this volume.
6 Graham Harman, “On Vicarous Causation,” in Collapse Vol. II: Speculative 
Realism, ed. R. Mackay (2007; rpt. Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2012), 215.
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lure” to account for the reality of influence and dynamism in the 
universe, notwithstanding his notion of withdrawal.
Allure is the metaphoric process by which qualities from one 
object are applied figuratively to another. In the construct of al-
lure, reticent, “withdrawn” objects are coaxed into “connection” 
in order to fertilize change or “vicarious” incidents of causality, 
while still remaining wholly apart from each other. To add an 
analogy of my own, allure is akin to dressing in drag. An al-
luring object remains of-itself but with the addition of qualities 
borrowed from another object, which surface without making 
the first object’s core being any less withdrawn; in fact, these 
borrowed qualities even allude to something unknowable be-
neath that very surface.
This arrangement constitutes the foundation of Harman’s 
aesthetics, which he claims as first philosophy.7 Surprisingly, 
considering this prominence, the term allure is loaded with in-
nuendo. Among other things, allure is likely to summon sul-
try ads for a Chanel perfume, or feminine wiles instructed by a 
Condé Nast beauty magazine, both of which bear its name. Har-
man explains that allure involves allusion, so such associations 
with feminized products of patriarchy are not accidental; its 
connotation is itself an example of the process he has in mind. 
In other words, it is a function of allure when allure becomes as 
suggestive as the enticingly vacant gaze of a languorous model 
positioned beside a bottle of French perfume. 
Even setting aside Harman’s penchant for flamboyant prose, 
the scent of seduction and conquest permeates his terminology.8 
For Harman, allure “alludes to entities as they are, quite apart 
from any relations with or effects upon other entities in the 
world,” but some readers might conclude that allure also alludes 
7 Graham Harman, “Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-
Human,” Naked Punch 9 (Summer/Fall 2007): 21–30.
8 Numerous examples exist throughout his oeuvre. To take but one instance, 
in the main passage from which I draw in this section, Harman invokes the 
image that a real object surrounded by sensual ones “pierces their colored 




to sexual courtship.9 Against withdrawal’s surly non-relation, 
allure offers a bewitching whiff to suggest things could get in-
teresting as withdrawn objects beckon each other.10 Even Har-
man’s chosen example for the metaphoric transfer of qualities 
through allure is romantic: the poet’s pronouncement “my heart 
is a furnace.”11
For his part, Morton associates an object’s withdrawal with 
its essence, or irreducibility.12 Thus, an object’s withdrawn es-
sence accounts for allure. Objects are “essentially” alluring, 
and here we would do well to recall the biological essentialism 
Morton has evoked in his “weird” version, and its association 
9 Graham Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer: Object-Oriented 
Literary Criticism,” New Literary History 43, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 183–207, at 
187.
10 Different flavors of object-oriented philosophy speculate differently on 
the finer points of non-relation. For example, Levi Bryant describes a “de-
mocracy of objects” composing a “flat ontology” that stresses horizontal 
adjacency rather than separation; Bruno Latour conceives of objects as net-
worked actors; and Ian Bogost, like many object-oriented feminists, typi-
cally explores objects of a cultural, artificial nature, inherently tinged by or 
even arising from other objects’ meddling. Yet still in the title of a book like 
Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (riffing on Thomas 
Nagel’s 1974 essay, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”) Bogost maintains the air 
of alien foreignness and aloof unintelligibility in objects’ presentations to 
each other. Likewise, consider Morton’s account of objects’ self-differing 
as an internal “looping” structure. Twisting away from self-identification, 
Morton’s looping objects (and his rolling prose) are curvaceous and tan-
talizing — even while hinting at juvenile infatuation, evoked by a “Looney 
Tunes” overture. In object-oriented feminism, all objects are indeed set in 
such suggestive motion, wavering seductively between attraction and re-
pulsion. See Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open 
Humanities Press, 2011); Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An In-
troduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2009); Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s 
Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2012); and 
Timothy Morton, “All Objects Are Deviant: Feminism and Ecological Inti-
macy,” in Object-Oriented Feminism.
11 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 215–16.
12 Morton, “Treating Objects Like Women,” 59.
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with female bodies. For not only furnace-like hearts but bodies 
themselves can speak metaphoric volumes. 
Frenchy Lunning insightfully connects the shared use of 
metaphor in Harman’s notion of allure with Julia Kristeva’s 
concept of the abject to draw the body of an “other” woman, 
the menstruating and even postmenopausal body of the older 
woman, into the feminist fold.13 For Harman, metaphor consti-
tutes what Lunning calls a “come hither” gesture soliciting the 
otherness of withdrawn other objects. But if, as in a perfume 
ad, allure is associated with the pubescent, attractive young girl 
whose nubile body suggests her availability or have-ability, Lun-
ning perceives its complement in Kristeva’s metaphor for abjec-
tion as a “violent repulsing thrusting aside of ‘otherness.’” In this 
gestural reversal, alluring femininity becomes one of Harman’s 
severed qualities, shoved off and overcoded into abjection in the 
figure of the mother, “the defining subject/object position for fe-
males, which is necessarily thrust aside.” Lunning captures this 
inverted fusion of allure and abjection, and its significance for 
object-oriented feminism, in the following passage:
This leaves the emerging female subject/object in a rather sticky 
spot, especially under patriarchal conditions. For under the patri-
archy, women are reduced to various image objects of their singular 
and necessary function of reproduction: not just the mother, but 
also the bodacious babe who is codified and commodified in terms 
of breeding potential. As such, women are abjected and degraded as 
objects in all senses of the word, and so is any linkage with the ma-
ternal and feminine objects in the culture. The coded trappings of 
feminine objects — the notes of these objects — and especially those 
clustered around the extreme manifestations of feminine qualities, 
are thus regarded as cloying, obnoxious, and disgusting objects.14
13 Frenchy Lunning, “Allure and Abjection: The Possible Potential of Severed 




Of course, it is also the abject older woman, the madame, 
who provides access to another kind of “other woman”: prosti-
tutes. Not coincidentally, when Harman attempts to arrange the 
meeting of objects, he posits a third enveloping facilitator ob-
ject, which in effect assumes the role of the madame, providing 
a space where two objects can meet on neutral turf to engage. 
“My claim,” he writes, “is that two entities influence one another 
only by meeting on the interior of a third, where they exist side-
by-side until something happens that allows them to interact.”15 
Abject or alluring, this enveloping intentional object conjures 
the conspicuous interior of the madame’s abject environment.
Things to Have and Things to Hold
We cannot ignore the uneasy relations binding objects in ob-
ject-oriented philosophy to objectification and reification. In 
the red light district’s rosy glow, objectification, labor, gender, 
and class bathe in the same light. Here, object-oriented femi-
nism links Harman’s invocation of tools to biopolitical histories 
of use, exploitation, and resistance. In his reading of Heidegger, 
Harman explains that the world consists of two types of objects: 
tools, which are “ready-to-hand,” and broken tools, which are 
“present-at-hand.” By flouting the human intention of use, the 
latter confront their masters, hinting at the depths of their full, 
glorious, uncolonizable strangeness. What Harman calls “tool 
being” is distinguished by exploitation and resistance. In object-
oriented feminism, exploitation names the treatment of tools 
through use, misuse, and abuse, and resistance designates the 
opposing behavior of broken tools that defy being so treated.
If all objects are either tools or broken tools, let us consider 
two human objects of interest for feminist philosophy, the “wife” 
objectified as property, and the sex worker reified as the “other 
woman” in a most bare form. How are we to understand these 
women/objects as broken/tools? My purpose is not to reiterate 
a tired binary between Madonnas and whores. On the contrary, 
15 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 190.
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I want to seriously weigh the contention that all objects, includ-
ing humans, and hence including women, are at once captured 
in and resistant to confining systems of labor and possession.
The Marxist feminist movement Wages for Housework ex-
emplifies this predicament. Building on a history of women’s 
mobilizing for financial independence, the movement rose to 
international prominence in the 1970s, the same era when many 
feminists also adopted strategic essentialism. Wages for House-
work reasoned that it was unjust (and unsafe) for women to 
remain financially dependent on their husbands because wifely 
housework was indispensable reproductive labor without which 
the capitalist system could not survive.
Silvia Federici recounts how, in an 1876 letter to the editor, 
a Kentucky housewife made precisely this argument.16 The re-
sponse from the editor of The New York Times, reproaching the 
woman for so much as mentioning money, exposes the continu-
ity between a wife’s work, and an “other woman’s” labor.
If women wish the position of wife to have the honor which they 
attach to it, they will not talk about the value of their services and 
about stated incomes, but they will live with their husbands in the 
spirit of the vow cf. the English marriage service, taking them “for 
better; for worse; for richer, for poorer; in sickness and in health; to 
love, honor, and obey.” This it is to be a wife; and not to be this, and 
not to be willing to share a man’s fortunes and give him the respect 
and submission due to the master of a household, is to take on a 
perilous likeness to women in certain other relations, who do de-
mand stated incomes, or at least wages, and whose position is such 
that there is always at least reasonable doubt as to their right to talk 
to a man about their care of “his” children.17
16 Silvia Federici presented this material at “Wages for Housework,” a work-
shop held at The Commons Brooklyn on Saturday, March 21, 2015. 
17 See “Wives’ Wages,” The New York Times, August 10, 1876, quoted in Silvia 
Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist 
Struggle (Oakland: PM Press, 2012), 41.
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Tools behave nicely. They are demure. They present themselves 
for service retiringly, to be used without reward. We can have 
our way with tools because they don’t warrant our second 
thought. But there is something altogether wrong with the bro-
ken tool. It is not a nice thing at all. Broken tools disturb our 
contentment, stand out brashly, and demand our attention. So 
what kind of woman claims remuneration for her work? What 
insolence turns a woman from a useful tool, resigned to her cul-
tural role, into a broken one, requiring recognition? A sex work-
er is an easy target for being objectified and reified as a would-be 
human sex toy. But, is only the “other woman” used as a tool? 
Or, is the wife used as a tool until she “breaks” and demands her 
fair pay? Or, is her broken demand precisely what threatens to 
reclassify her as mere tool, as an “other woman” and no longer 
an esteemed wife? Clearly broken tools can’t account for these 
other women abounding, breaking things and the economy of 
being had. The tool analysis doesn’t fit nicely.
What We Can’t Have
Let us be clear: the unshakeable problem with viewing the world 
as tools and broken tools is that this thinking leaves the Hege-
lian dynamic of servitude intact. The real issue for object-ori-
ented feminism is not the difference between tools and broken 
tools but the power differential between users and tools, masters 
and slaves.18
To be a tool is to be in the service of another. And so, Harman 
protests what he perceives as the servile position of most con-
temporary philosophy, which he laments “grovels at [science’s] 
feet. ‘How may I serve thee, master?’”19 Harman’s refrain is that 
18 I explore the philosophic and sexual dynamics of mastery and servitude 
among human users and nonhuman tools in Katherine Behar, “Command 
and Control: Cybernetics and BDSM,” in Digital Arts and Culture 2009 Pro-
ceedings (Irvine: University of California Irvine, 2009), http://escholarship.
org/uc/item/42r1836z.
19 Andrew Iliadis, “Interview with Graham Harman (2),” Figure/Ground, 
http://figureground.org/interview-with-graham-harman-2/.
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philosophy should pursue reality in its own right and must not 
be the “handmaid” of any other discipline. Promoting aesthetics 
as first philosophy, he views recalibrating philosophic priorities 
to account for the significance of his concept of allure as a gal-
lant move, by which he stands ready to rescue aesthetics from 
scandalous, perhaps whorish, ruin. Here not only handmaids 
but also dancing girls populate his rousing calls to philosophers. 
“Until now,” Harman writes, “aesthetics has generally served as 
the impoverished dancing-girl of philosophy — admired for her 
charms, but no gentleman would marry her.” 20
Adding up these accounts, which seem to be overflowing 
with unacknowledged feminine metaphors (and patriarchal 
baggage), object-oriented feminists might easily arrive at erot-
ics, not aesthetics, as first philosophy.21 Harman maintains that 
his philosophy does not promote a method, but a counter-
method. But erotics might well be object-oriented feminism’s 
method, if only to lay waste to toolish propositions like these. 
Having One’s Way with Things
Erotics erodes boundaries between self and other, as well as 
the complementarity that upholds the master–slave dialectic 
by requiring the integrity of each of these figures delimited as 
humanist subjects. When object-oriented feminism advocates 
feminist solidarity across all objects in all manner of erotic coa-
litions, it is in order to recognize objects’ shared servitude under 
dominant relations of production. The work things do dissolves 
seeming separations between human sex workers and non-
human sex toys, as well as apparent oppositions between wives 
and “other women.” As broken/tools, sex workers, sex toys, and 
wives are all implemented in physical and affective labor in the 
service of social reproduction.
20 Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” 216.
21 I expand on this concept in “An Introduction to OOF,” developing the notion 
of erotics in object-oriented feminism through the work of Audre Lorde, 
Georges Bataille, and others. See Katherine Behar, “An Introduction to 
OOF,” in Object-Oriented Feminism.
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According to Jean Baudrillard’s concept of “seduction,” all 
three are reduced to masculine value, having lost the viability 
of feminine uncertainty, which here I would relate to the broken 
tool’s capacity to surprise when it refuses to be had. For Baudril-
lard, capitalism represents how relations of production replace 
relations of seduction (which is not the same as the sexual, 
which is itself productivist). As Baudrillard warns, “it is women 
who are now about to lose, precisely under the sign of sexual 
pleasure,” which is scrupulously productive, “mak[ing] every-
thing speak, everything babble, everything climax.” Baudrillard 
critiques the women’s movement for advancing a sexual logic 
in its “promotion of the female as a sex in its own right (equal 
rights, equal pleasures), of the female as value — at the expense 
of the female as a principle of uncertainty.”22 We could say the 
same for object-oriented theories that seek to elevate objects as 
quasi-subjects. Ironically, such theories of things’ agency and 
would-be weird volition will always be at the expense of erotic 
uncertainty. In economic positivity, things can be “had” in all 
senses of the word, so certainty also accompanies the exotic ob-
ject of desire, which can be positively counted upon to remain 
always alluringly unattainable.
Evelyn Fox Keller frames the erotic in opposition to similar 
dominant practices in the sciences that seek mastery of nature 
and its objects. Describing this productivist mastery over ob-
jects, which Federici, Carolyn Merchant, and others connect 
to the dual exploitation of women and nature throughout the 
history of capitalism, precisely as an engine of such produc-
tivity, Fox Keller identifies “a degree of control that one would 
not think of having in relation to a subject that one had a more 
erotic, more interactive, more reciprocal feeling-engagement 
with.”23 Mastery abolishes the possibility of erotic uncertainty 
22 Jean Baudrillard, Seduction, trans. Brian Singer (1979; rpt. Montreal: Cthe-
ory Books, 2001), 20.
23 Evelyn Fox Keller and Bill Moyers, “Evelyn Fox Keller: The Gendered Lan-
guage of Science” (transcript), World of Ideas, http://billmoyers.com/con-
tent/evelyn-fox-keller/.
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because it involves definitive “control in the Baconian sense of 
domination, that nature is there to be steered, to be directed.”24
Erotics lessens self/other distinctions. This means refusing 
the hierarchical separations of aesthetics, like the false separa-
tions that persist in the adjacent productivities of wives and 
mistresses, madames and dancing girls, philosophers and hand-
maids. In each of these couplings, ideological distinctions of 
not/niceness describe and generate value. Aesthetics functions 
on the same principle of difference, as do all systems of value. We 
value things for being nice instead of not — or vice versa — be-
cause value is always comparative, hinging on degrees of differ-
ence. Because erotics is an enemy of difference it is incompatible 
with value and all it entails. While master and slave reciprocally 
produce each other as discrete but productively intertwined 
identities, the erotic surrender of self-unto-other turns “having” 
an identity or “taking” a lover into “giving it up.” Erotics reaches 
its zenith in the giving up of self-sacrifice, a becoming one with 
the universe that is comparable to the devastating expenditure 
of potlatch and tantamount to the death of the individual.
In more mundane terms, erotics also means simply this: We 
must overcome the insidious distancing from which metaphors 
overreach and within which exoticism lingers. In the total onto-
logical scope of object-orientation, feminist struggle should not 
be about Hegelian recognition as becoming vis-à-vis the strug-
gle to become a subject instead of an object or a master instead 
of a slave. (Nor should it be about becoming a slave instead of a 
master or an object instead of a subject.) These distinctions only 
perpetuate productivism, reinstating capitalist systems of value 
generation, labor, and utilitarian possession. What remains for 




Libérer épistémologiquement le féminisme
Anne-Françoise Schmid
Introduction : des humain(e)s et de la science
Peut-on mettre en rapport la recherche des critères de scien-
tificité et les études sur le genre ? Y a-t-il des raisons de rapport-
er la façon d’identifier la science à un sexe plutôt qu’à un autre ? 
Les deux questions peuvent sembler éloignées, mais elles sont 
mises en tension par un fait général : les critères de la science ont 
été recherchés de façon systématique au siècle où la situation de 
la femme s’est, dans nos pays occidentaux, nettement améliorée 
du point de vue de l’accès à la connaissance et à l’exercice d’une 
profession scientifique. Dans le moment où l’on cherchait des 
règles pour reconnaître la science de ce qui n’est pas science, les 
femmes ont pris une place effective, non exceptionnelle, dans les 
études scientifiques et philosophiques. Y a-t-il un rapport entre 
ces deux mouvements ? L’échec de la recherche de ces critères 
universels, qui sont maintenant reconnus comme ayant une 
valeur locale, les modifications au concept d’objectivité qu’il a 
provoquées, peuvent-ils avoir des conséquences sur l’ouverture 
aux femmes de l’accès aux sciences ?
Il n’y a pas de réponse directe. Le « oui » et le « non » peuvent 
aller l’un et l’autre de soi en philosophie en fonction de la posi-
tion que l’on a et que l’on cherche à défendre. Oui, les femmes 
ont changé les choses par une pratique différente des scienc-
es — mais en quoi tient cette différence  ? Et qu’entend-on par 
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différence ? Non, les sciences ont une telle forme d’autonomie 
par rapport aux autres savoirs, que la différence des sexes ne 
peut y avoir de prise — mais qu’entend-on alors par autono-
mie ? Quelque chose qui résisterait aux différences ? Toutes ces 
argumentations s’appuient sur des données qui peuvent paraî-
tre « vraies », mais que l’on peut pourtant retourner. S’il n’y a 
pas de réponse directe, il est par contre possible de changer de 
logique et concernant l’identité de la science et les rapports entre 
hommes et femmes. Avec l’abandon des critères universels (vé-
rification, réfutation, programme de recherche, etc.), il est pos-
sible de mettre en rapport le concept de science avec les études 
sur le genre. Mais cela demande un changement théorique radi-
cal, celui de ne plus traiter philosophiquement les rapports de 
l’homme et de la femme en terme de différence et d’identité, 
mais de les combiner en tant que variables qui participent l’une 
et l’autre à la production d’une science déconstruite dans son 
approche épistémologique classique. La modification la plus 
importante est que la femme ne soit plus une surdétermination 
d’une science supposée masculine, avec toutes les protestations 
et les répétitions d’une lutte mutuelle et spéculaire.
Science classique et surdétermination par la femme
Les travaux féministes sur la philosophie des sciences ont en 
effet, la plupart du temps, ajouté des caractéristiques à la con-
ception classique des sciences pour faire une place aux femmes. 
Prenons le concept de science, son objectivité, son sérieux, son 
autorité et ajoutons la connaissance située, le contexte, le point 
de vue, l’empirique, la narrativité, le pluralisme, l’hétérogénéité, 
les valeurs et nous pourrons construire une philosophie des 
sciences compatible avec une certaine idée de la femme sans 
nuire à l’objectivité scientifique. Mais c’est supposer que la sci-
ence est masculine, et que sa mise en situation, en contexte et 
en récit est plutôt féminine. La femme ajouterait des caracté-
ristiques à l’origine considérées comme non essentielles à la 
démarche scientifique, puisque celle-ci semblait invariante 
lorsqu’on l’extrayait de son contexte historique et social. Ainsi, 
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la femme sur-déterminerait le concept de science en lui ajoutant 
des liens avec un milieu. Ce sont ces liens et leur diversité qui 
apparaîtraient comme féminins.
Notre approche est différente. La mise en tension des deux 
questions du début sur les critères et le genre est résolue de fa-
çon plus douce et plus large par une logique de sous-détermina-
tion que de sur-détermination. C’est la logique même de l’ajout 
de propriétés liées au genre que nous cherchons à modifier. Mais 
c’est également un mode de reconnaissance de la science jugé 
unique et objectif que nous transformons en vision partielle et 
locale de la science. Nous proposons donc un double mouve-
ment où seraient engagés à la fois les humain(e)s et les sciences 
de façon plus élémentaire et moins sur-déterminée.
Premier stade : un féminisme ouvert et sans opposition
Au début du féminisme, il y a avait sans doute sens à montrer 
l’aspect culturel des différences sexuelles et d’en faire un enjeu. 
Il y a eu bien des aléas dans la lutte des femmes, et sans doute 
les acquis ne sont jamais tout à fait définitifs. Cette lutte repose 
sur une souffrance, qui n’est jamais complètement adoucie. Elle 
reprendra sous diverses formes, sera parfois étouffée ou mise 
en retrait. Cela est normal. Ce qui importe est que cette lutte 
ait eu lieu, parce que, à partir d’elle, il est possible de poser les 
problèmes autrement.
Nous ne reprenons pas cette lutte dans sa continuité. Nous 
n’allons pas, en fonction de cette lutte et de ses suites historiques, 
argumenter pour l’homme ou pour la femme. Par exemple, 
nous n’argumenterons pas sur le nombre de femmes devenues 
scientifiques et ingénieurs, comme de très nombreux travaux 
l’ont fait et continueront à le faire de façon très utile et tout à 
fait nécessaire pour qu’une certaine souffrance ne retourne pas 
en sa caverne. Notre question est plutôt, du fait de cette lutte, de 
traiter sans opposition femme et homme vis-à-vis de la science 
et de défaire cette opposition de type philosophique. Notre lu-
tte, plutôt que contre l’homme, cherche à modifier une certaine 
idée de la femme, et donc en même temps une certaine idée 
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de l’homme, que nous ne considérons pas comme fixes. D’autre 
part, tout en admettant la pertinence des débats sur l’objectivité 
scientifique et la remise en cause des critères, il s’agit de traiter 
la science comme ayant malgré tout une forme d’identité, et ne 
se diluant pas dans les luttes sociales. Les concepts d’identité et 
de différence sont-ils les bons pour traiter de l’implication de ces 
deux problèmes ? Comment les transformer, les rendre apte à ne 
pas relancer la guerre ? Pour cela, il ne faut plus qu’ils puissent 
s’échanger les uns dans les autres. Il faut une distinction encore 
différente de celle proposée dans certaines études sur le genre, 
du sexe biologique et du genre, historique, social, psychologique. 
Nous ne voulons en effet pas traiter la question par touches psy-
chologiques, ajoutant des nuances à un donné déjà et trop bien 
connu. Nous proposons une autre distinction, plus radicale, 
parce que sans réversibilité possible, celle de l’humain(e) et du 
sujet, la première sans qualités, la seconde produite par les rap-
ports entre les qualités et l’humain. Si nous traitons l’homme et 
la femme comme variables de façon égalitaire, nous ne pouvons 
plus dire ceci est un homme et ceci est une femme dans une 
logique de l’attribution, où « homme » et « femme » sont donnés 
et connus. Par les variables, ils sont transformés en « X », qui 
ne détruit pas les données, mais les enrichit de mondes et de 
propriétés différentes, les environne de connaissances beaucoup 
plus variées et riches.
Il faut admettre qu’il y a des hommes, qu’il y a des femmes, 
sans relancer les hiérarchies, qu’il y a de la science, qu’il y a de la 
philosophie, sans que l’on puisse les mettre en continuité et en 
réversibilité. La question n’est plus entre l’homme et la femme, 
entre la science et la philosophie, elle est plutôt celle d’un mi-
lieu, qui ne dépend directement ni des uns ni des autres. Il faut 
créer des espaces d’invention de ces notions, et ne plus les pren-
dre comme définitivement données. Cet espace, que nous ap-
pelons générique, est construit dans ce rapport non réversible 
de l’humain(e) au sujet.
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Deux propositions qui déplacent la philosophie de « la femme »
Dans deux articles précédent, nous avons proposé deux idées 
dont nous ferons usage dans la suite de ce chapitre. L’un sur les 
femmes au temps des philosophes, où il était montré que la phi-
losophie occidentale avait besoin d’un concept comme celui de 
« la-femme » pour faire tenir ses jeux de contraires, et condense 
tout ce qui trouble l’exposé clair et transparent au réel de la phi-
losophie, ornements, passions, etc… La philosophie classique 
ne peut reconnaître la femme comme autonome, elle est une 
fonction qui résorbe les détritus de ce que la clarté et l’ordre ex-
cluent. Les affirmations des grands philosophes sur les femmes 
sont à peine croyables, elles tiennent de préjugés pour une part, 
mais ceux-ci sont pourtant nécessaires pour fermer le système1. 
Il faut donc faire éclater les bords des contraires et construire un 
espace générique pour que « la-femme » soit déconstruite2. On 
comprend alors que la femme soit apparue sous un autre jour 
chez des empiristes anglais qui tentaient de réduire le spéculatif 
dans l’empirique, et donc de défaire cette circularité du système, 
fin 19ème, puis au 20ème siècle dans les philosophies qui ont cher-
ché à mettre en évidence le geste de la philosophie (Jacques Der-
rida) ou la multiplicité des sexes (Gilles Deleuze, n-sexes).
Dans un second article, écrit avec François Laruelle3, 
L’identité sexuée, nous montrions que l’adoucissement des rela-
tions entre les sexes passait par la reconnaissance de l’antériorité 
de l’humain (des humaines) sur le genre, ce qui est une distinc-
tion différente de celle proposée dans les études sur le genre.
Nous partirons de ces propositions comme de deux acquis, 
1 Voir par exemple les textes réunis dans Françoise Collin, Evelyne Pisier, 
Eleni Varikas, Les femmes de Platon à Derrida. Anthologie critique (Paris: 
Plon, 2000).
2 «  Les femmes au temps des philosophes. À propos d’une anthologie cri-
tique », Natures, Sciences, Sociétés 12 (2004): 204–7.
3 François Laruelle et Anne-Françoise Schmid, « L’identité sexuée », Identi-
ties: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture 2, no. 2 (Winter 2003) (texte 
français avec une traduction en macédonien): 49–61. Réédité « Sexed Iden-
tity », Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 19, no. 2 (2014): 35–39, 
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1. la philosophie a besoin de « la-femme » pour faire tenir ses 
systèmes, et
2. l’humain(e) générique précède le genre, pour mettre en rela-
tion le genre et des critères des sciences.
Ces deux propositions ne sont pas exactement au même niveau. 
La plus générale est la seconde, elle marque une coupure et une 
irréversibilité. Elle est nécessaire pour manifester la première sur 
la fonction philosophique de « la-femme ». La logique philos-
ophique est, elle, réversible, en ce sens qu’elle donne quelque 
considération aux textes des philosophes sur les femmes, qui 
ne sont dans la brillance de l’argument, viennent des fonds de 
tiroirs des préjugés, mais sont les déchets de la brillance et de la 
clarté. « La-femme » n’est jamais le centre, elle est plutôt du côté 
des passions que de la raison, mais elle permet de suturer le jeu 
des contraires philosophiques. La mise en relation de ces deux 
propositions nous libère des présupposés sur les différences en-
tre hommes et femmes dans la philosophie.
Une demande méthodologique : ne pas interpréter les variables 
dans des continuums
De ces acquis, nous tirons une demande méthodologique : ad-
mettre des variables distinctes, mais ne pas les identifier à l’aide 
de continuum sociaux, historiques, culturels, philosophiques. 
Ne jamais interpréter une telle différence entre sexes en la fo-
calisant sur un thème précis même si on admet la diversité des 
variables. Traiter ces variables sans leur donner une identité, ne 
plus faire de relations continues et réversibles entre différences 
et identités.
Laisser aller les sur-déterminations
Par conséquent, nous n’allons pas traiter la question du genre 
et des sciences en usant de la surdétermination de différences 
par d’autres, c’est-à-dire en ajoutant des propriétés que l’on 
voudrait féminines ou en soustrayant des propriétés que l’on 
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voudrait masculines. Il ne s’agit pas d’admettre, par exemple, 
une objectivité des sciences admise et donnée des sciences 
classiques réputée masculine et d’y adjoindre après coup, au 
nom des femmes, la contextualisation, la mise en perspective, 
l’importance de l’émotion, le récit, la valeur éthique, la pluralité 
des sciences, en supposant que la première serait plutôt l’affaire 
des hommes et les secondes l’apport des femmes à la science. 
Une telle description serait contraire à notre demande de ne 
pas interpréter les variables à la façon philosophique, de ne pas 
leur donner de contenu fixe. On ne pourrait alors que déplacer 
des limites, exercice auquel les philosophes sont passés maîtres, 
mais sans les supprimer, ce qu’aucun philosophe ne sait faire. 
De la même façon, la description de l’objectivité scientifique 
a été faite de façon trop surdéterminée elle-même dans ses re-
lations entre théorie et faits, elle tend à exclure des pratiques 
que l’on pourrait très bien admettre comme scientifiques, ainsi 
que l’ont montré abondamment les travaux sur les modèles et la 
modélisation. Pour le voir, il faut revenir sur les hypothèses fon-
damentales de l’épistémologie. Le travail à faire est donc clair, il 
faut reconsidérer la question de la science, de son identité, pour 
pouvoir faire une place à la question du genre. Or ce n’est pas 
simple, car la science est silencieuse, ce sont les disciplines qui 
parlent pour elle. Le problème est en même temps éthique et 
épistémologique.
Comment l’épistémologie classique identifie la science ?
Ce qui fait classiquement le critère de scientificité est au croise-
ment de trois séries qui se sur-déterminent, celle de l’orientation-
théorie, celle de la déduction, celle de la mathématisation :
1. Celle qui va du fait à la théorie et vice-versa, qui fait que 
l’épistémologie classique considère leurs relations comme 
opposées ou complémentaires, même si bien des nuances 
sont apportées dans cette réciprocité, que ce soit par exemple 
la sous-détermination des théories par les faits par Quine, ou 
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encore le « Manifeste au cas où il n’y aurait pas de lois » par 
Baas van Fraassen. 
Mais alors que faire des données, qui ne sont pas des faits, 
ni des corrélats de théories ?
2. Celle qui met en relation la déduction, qui est une relation 
d’ordre partiel, et l’implication, forme des lois scientifiques, 
qui est une opération de V × V dans V, V = (1,0), telle que la 
combinaison libre de la valeur deux propositions P et Q ait 
pour résultat (1011), si P = (1100) et Q = (1010). La proposi-
tion P peut être comprise comme l’une des hypothèses de la 
déduction et Q l’une de ses conséquences. Démontrer que 
de P, il est possible de déduire Q, revient à transformer P 
d’hypothèse de la déduction en antécédent d’une implica-
tion. Démontrer consiste à supprimer les hypothèses. On 
voit alors clairement que lorsque le résultat de l’implication 
est vrai, il y a trois possibilités (et non pas une seule), P est 
vrai et Q est vrai, ou alors P est faux. Si bien que l’hypothèse 
de la déduction ne peut être traitée de vraie, mais de suppo-
sée vraie, ainsi d’ailleurs que sa conséquence par déduction. 
Mais alors que faire de la modélisation, de la simulation et 
des autres ingrédients de la science dont la logique n’est pas 
celle de l’hypothético-déductif
3. Celle qui va du plus ou moins mathématisé, du pur à l’appliqué, 
du fondamental au développement. Les sciences considérées 
comme les plus parfaites sont celles où les mathématiques 
sont constitutives des notions, et non réduites à traiter des 
données constituées sans elles. 
Mais alors que faire des sciences moins mathématisées ? 
Sont-elles des sciences ? Les sciences doivent-elles tendre à 
une maturité mathématique ?
La conjonction de ces trois séries permet à la fois d’avoir une 
structure de la théorie et de son rapport au fait, à la fois la struc-
ture et la vérification, et aussi la robustesse des notions qui, 
grâce aux mathématiques, restent invariantes le long des rai-
sonnements, et permettent d’identifier de façon plus rigoureuse 
ce qui est à expérimenter. Le problème majeur de cette conjonc-
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tion est que toute science est évaluée entre deux bornes, celle 
du théorique et celle de l’expérimental, et par un critère formel, 
celui des mathématiques. L’effet de cette opposition ou de cette 
complémentarité est que les autres ingrédients de la science sont 
strictement interprétés dans cet espace. Cette approche de la sci-
ence est évidemment très riche, elle a permis de comprendre ce 
qu’était un système hypothético-déductif, elle fait comprendre 
pourquoi un résultat d’expérience positif recouvre trois possi-
bilités et non pas une seule comme un des ressorts les plus im-
portants pour l’invention scientifique : il y a un X qui a presque 
toutes les propriétés de P, et qui n’a pas tout-à-fait celles de Q, si 
bien qu’il est possible de distinguer dans X deux « substances » 
(particules, etc…) qu’auparavant on ne distinguait pas. La dis-
tinction entre la démonstration (suppression des hypothèses en 
les transformant en antécédents d’implication) et la preuve ex-
périmentale (construction d’un modèle concrétisant la théorie 
permettant d’isoler et de faire varier un paramètre intéressant 
en le mettant en rapport avec la mesure et l’observation). Quant 
à la mathématisation, elle permet de réduire l’hétérogénéité du 
réel à l’intérieur d’une discipline. 
Néanmoins, par les questions posées sur les données, la 
modélisation, les relations entre mathématiques et sciences 
expérimentales, une hétérogénéité non réductible par les disci-
plines, on voit que l’on ne peut plus faire converger ces séries 
pour maîtriser une unité de la science. Chacune des séries a sa 
« vérité », mais locale. Il y a des morceaux de sciences qui sont 
théoriques, qui sont hypothético-déductifs, qui sont mathéma-
tisés, ce sont sans doute des morceaux remarquables, mais ils ne 
sont pas toute la science. Par hypothèse, la science postule un 
réel sans chercher à expliciter son rapport à lui, ce que fait au 
contraire la philosophie. Il n’est pas nécessaire de faire de ce que 
l’on a observé des théories classiques un point de vue autoritaire 
et excluant, il faut plutôt transformer ces distinctions de façon 
à ne pas fermer le concept de science sans perdre son identité.
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La sous-détermination du concept de science par ses ingrédients
Cette conception classique de la science ne recouvre qu’une par-
tie des phénomènes que l’on pourrait pourtant qualifier de sci-
entifiques. Deux voies s’offrent à nous. Ou bien on traite ceux-
ci d’éléments non scientifiques, en les considérant comme une 
« cuisine » sans fondement physique ou comme des échafaud-
ages disposés à disparaître dans le résultat final. Ainsi en est-il 
des modèles et de la modélisation, ou encore de la simulation. 
Par exemple, des climato-sceptiques utilisent cet argument qui 
semble aller de soi et qui finalement est très agressif que la sci-
ence est une alternance de théorie et d’observation, et que par 
conséquent il faut prendre avec précaution, voire méfiance, les 
nombreuses modélisations qui sont présentées autour du climat. 
On promeut une science 18ème siècle pour réfuter des ensembles 
de résultats, et la preuve c’est que lorsque l’on fait de la « bonne 
science  », les modèles ont disparu. A ce compte, on pourrait 
faire disparaître toute la biologie moderne — ou bien d’autres 
parties de la science où les mathématiques ne jouent pas exacte-
ment le même rôle « constitutif » (Bachelard) qu’en physique. 
Que reste-t-il de la science ? Juste celles à partir desquelles ont 
été élaborés les critères cités, géométrie, mécanique, physique 
mathématique, physique expérimentale — à condition de faire 
disparaître les modèles qui ont permis de construire les condi-
tions d’application. On pourrait reprendre beaucoup des ingré-
dients de la science et montrer comment ils ont été disqualifiés 
par cet usage. Nous pouvons prendre les exemples des concepts 
d’hypothèse ou de mesure. Une hypothèse est destinée à dis-
paraître, ou bien elle est confirmée, et devient une loi expéri-
mentale, ou elle est réfutée, et elle est abandonnée. On ne voit 
donc pas sa fonction, que seuls quelques très grands scienti-
fiques avaient aperçue, Leibniz, Russell, Poincaré. La mesure est 
comprise comme une mise en rapport d’une série de nombres 
et d’une série de phénomènes, on ne voit pas les modes de pré-
cision contemporaine qui supposent la mise bord à bord de n-
disciplines, et pas seulement des mathématiques et statistiques 
avec une série de phénomènes.
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Or là, nous sommes devant un choix théorique. Ou bien 
nous prenons le concept science tel qu’il nous est transmis par 
ces lignées épistémologiques et on y ajoute des ingrédients sup-
plémentaires par sur-détermination, ou bien l’on cherche une 
interprétation plus élémentaire de la science qui puisse rendre 
compte à la fois du classique et du non classique. Cette dernière, 
qui est la nôtre, consiste non plus à ajouter, mais à soustraire des 
hypothèses sur la science, il s’agira d’une sous-détermination 
et non pas de l’ajout d’une notion manquante. Cela est de con-
séquence pour notre sujet, parce qu’il ne s’agira pas d’ajouter à 
la conception des sciences classiques les « qualités » qui pour-
raient être celles de la femme, du type, montrons que les lois 
de la physique doivent être contextualisée, et pour ce faire, la 
femme trouvera sa place. La logique par ajout a évidemment son 
importance, car elle fait voir les limites d’un modèle, mais elle 
n’est utile que dans ce premier temps. Une fois ces limites per-
çues, il faut procéder autrement. Il ne suffit plus de comprendre 
la science comme une discipline connue prise pour paradigme 
+ un ajout. Cela est difficile, car la discipline est le mode de visi-
bilité des sciences, si bien que les trois critères semblent prendre 
une place toute naturelle. Une science « sans » discipline n’est 
pas immédiatement visible et elle reste silencieuse, pour repren-
dre un terme utilisé en un autre sens par des philosophes des 
sciences, Jean-Toussaint Desanti et Gilles-Gaston Granger. Elle 
ne signifie pas que les disciplines n’y aient plus de place, mais 
plutôt qu’elles ne sont plus nécessairement au centre de la créa-
tion scientifique. C’est ce que nous appelons la « dérive des dis-
ciplines », ou leur « translation ».
Une épistémologie générique est justement relativement in-
dépendante des disciplines, d’une certaine façon, elle soustrait 
les disciplines et, ce faisant, ouvre une espace générique, non 
pas au sens où ses ingrédients seraient les plus petits dénomi-
nateurs communs de celles-ci, mais dans la diversité et la rich-
esse des concepts. Elle ne prétend pas décrire directement la 
science comme les épistémologies classiques, sachant qu’une 
telle posture conduit à privilégier un cas paradigmatique de sci-
ence en fonction des champs d’étude choisis. Il nous faut une 
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conception de la science beaucoup plus élémentaire, non im-
médiatement repérable sur les cas empiriques. La science est 
silencieuse, contrairement aux disciplines, silencieuse au sens 
où elle respecte une opacité du réel. Nous ne pouvons la définir 
que par hypothèse, comme ce qui produit des connaissances sur 
un X qu’elle postule mais sans développer, comme le fait la phi-
losophie, le système des relations à ce X. De ce point de vue, une 
femme africaine qui observe la croissance d’une plante possède 
un regard scientifique, et ce qui la distingue de ceux qui font 
une ingénierie et une biologie de la croissance des plantes est 
leur volonté d’une universalité et d’une production systématisée, 
qui est encore autre chose qu’une volonté de science, quoi qu’en 
dise Aristote. C’est l’échelle qui change. Il peut y avoir de la sci-
ence à toutes les échelles, c’est une question de posture plus que 
de langage spécialisé. Cela ne disqualifie pas les sciences spé-
cialisées et en langage mathématique, elles combinent plusieurs 
sciences à la fois ainsi que des techniques. Les critères classiques 
ont toujours de la valeur, mais de façon locale. On peut alors 
les rendre indépendants les uns des autres selon les contextes 
et les cas. Il peut y avoir de la théorie sans fait — Quine avait 
déjà supposé la sous-détermination des théories par les faits. Il 
peut y avoir de science sans mathématiques. Il peut y avoir de la 
science hors la méthode hypothético-déductive –même en re-
spectant la recherche d’hypothèses. Mais on peut articuler aussi 
toutes ces dimensions, en veillant bien à garder à l’esprit qu’elles 
sont indépendantes, et qu’elles ne vont pas nécessairement en-
semble, que leur conjonction est également une création. Mais 
cette conjonction rend difficile l’interprétation des données, qui 
ne sont plus des corrélats des théories, comme le sont par con-
struction les faits, mais ce qui fait qu’elles sont interprétées par 
n-disciplines ou n-théories.
Cette façon de voir la science permet de se passer par hy-
pothèse des critères. Il y a un point où la science est réduite à 
une posture qui admet l’opacité d’un réel qu’elle postule. Il est 
possible de soustraire des hypothèses, tout en conservant la sci-
ence, celle que l’on retrouve aussi bien dans les théories que dans 
la modélisation. La seule exigence étant que notre démarche 
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soit à chaque pas compatible avec les connaissances fondamen-
tales sur lesquelles les reposent. On peut, bien entendu, par 
hypothèse, se passer de certaines d’entre elles, mais il faudrait 
conserver les exigences d’hyper-compatibilité.
Dans un espace générique, les propositions provenant d’une 
discipline ou d’une théorie sont décomposées, de telle sorte 
qu’elles puissent être mises en relation avec d’autres disciplines 
ou théories. On peut « détacher » toute proposition de sa théo-
rie, parce qu’elle comporte en elle l’hypothèse qui la reliait à la 
théorie. Si nous reprenons ce qui a été dit sur les théories hy-
pothético-déductives, on sait que si d’une hypothèse A, on peut 
déduire B, alors on peut poser la proposition « A implique B ». 
Cette nouvelle proposition supprime une hypothèse, et peut 
donc être détachée de son univers théorique, on peut alors en 
faire usage, en se donnant des conditions de compatibilité, voire 
d’hyper-compatibilité, on peut construire des modèles pour un 
phénomène qui reposent sur des hypothèses qui peuvent être 
contradictoires.
On peut alors voir le raisonnement scientifique non plus 
seulement comme le passage d’une proposition à l’autre, mais 
en épaisseur, comme superposition de savoirs de disciplines dif-
férentes. Dans le cas de la déduction, il peut y avoir de la logique, 
des mathématiques, ou de la physique, etc. Des travaux récents 
sur les démonstrations mathématiques (école de Michaël De-
tlefsen à Notre Dame, États-Unis) ont montré cette complexité 
du raisonnement de déduction. Dans les régimes interdisci-
plinaires contemporains de la science, dans les modélisations, 
cette superposition est clairement engagée. Même à l’intérieur 
des disciplines, on peut manifester cette épaisseur et cette hé-
térogénéité.
De l’hétérogénéité non-standard
On peut alors traiter de science sans ajouter des propriétés à celle 
que l’on identifiait classiquement. Cela fait que la question du 
genre ne se réduit pas à la différence de l’essence de l’objectivité 
et d’ajouts supplémentaires qui permettraient de rajouter son 
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contexte à la science comme étant ce qui départage le travail des 
hommes et celui des femmes.
Respectant notre demande de non-interprétation des dif-
férences, nous postulons une hétérogénéité aussi bien des pro-
priétés des sujets humain(e)s et des ingrédients de la science. 
Ces propriétés et ces ingrédients sont des « X » qui peuvent être 
distribués à chaque superposition de fragments de savoirs sci-
entifiques, en fonction de la discipline sous-déterminante qui 
fait « tenir » la superposition, épistémologie générique ou esthé-
tique, par exemple.
Cette hétérogénéité est non-standard, au sens où elle ne peut 
être réduite par une discipline ou par un genre. Et pourtant, ce-
tte hétérogénéité ne détruit pas les différences, mais elle permet 
de les interpréter avec plus de douceur et de jeu. Les disciplines 
et les genres ne sont plus au centre, bien qu’il soit possible et 
même nécessaire de leur faire des emprunts, mais des emprunts 
eux-mêmes traités dans un espace générique.
Des « communs » entre données et faits
On sait que l’épistémologie classique organise son image de 
la science dans la tension entre théorie et fait, celui-ci étant le 
corrélat d’une hypothèse théorique. L’émergence des données, 
qui ne sont rattachées de façon privilégiées par aucune théorie, 
mais peuvent être interprétées par toutes, ont modifié cette im-
age jusqu’à détruire l’idée de théorie, pensant que les hypothèses 
sortiraient elles-mêmes dans la multiplicité des données, dans 
une sorte d’immanence semi-empirique, ne laissant plus aucune 
place à une théorie indépendante, tout ce que l’on cherche étant 
des échantillons, des évaluations, voir des screenings plus ou 
moins exhaustifs. Cette image de la science qui commence à se 
répandre la fait disparaître dans ses propres réalisations, et elle 
devient tout à fait compatible avec une vision sociologique de 
la science, les groupes spécialisés, les échanges, devenant plus 
importants que les théories et les domaines d’objets. Les scien-
tifiques seraient alors ceux qui rendraient compte des données 
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en fonction des connaissances connues plutôt qu’en fonction du 
bien public.
Nous proposons une autre interprétation, épistémologique 
plutôt que sociologique, qui tient compte du fait qu’avec les don-
nées, les sciences expérimentales sont en train de changer de 
nature. Elles ne sont plus des sciences outillées par les mathé-
matiques et l’informatique comme les classiques, elles changent 
fondamentalement les flux de connaissance. Cela suppose une 
nouvelle autonomie entre les dimensions d’une sciences ex-
périmentale, il y a de la modélisation mathématique, il y a de 
l’informatique, théorique et d’ingénierie, il y a des fragments de 
sciences, toutes autonomes, elles ne sont réduites à des « outils ». 
Les sciences expérimentales ne sont plus ainsi « aspirées » par et 
dans les données, elles suscitent de nouveaux flux et trajectoires 
de connaissances, qui ne dépendent plus seulement de ce que 
l’on appelait théorie, mais de « pôles » distincts qui ne se con-
fondent pas avec les données, dont il faudrait faire un équivalent 
de théorie. Leurs « produits » peuvent se voir alternativement 
comme scientifiques ou technologiques. Le mythe unificateur 
de la « technoscience » ne suffit plus à comprendre les sciences 
contemporaines.
La question n’est plus de construire une théorie, elles sont là 
et elles sont de toutes façons enrichies, mais de créer des « com-
muns » ou « bien communs », à la façon d’Elinor Ostrom en 
économie, entre les dimensions des sciences, expérimentales ou 
non. Ce n’est pas une destruction des théories, elles sont là, elles 
s’enrichissent des avancées scientifiques,mais elles ne sont plus 
au centre, elles prennent un poids de garantie de compatibilité 
et d’hyper-compatibilité, et sont donc essentielles pour dessiner, 
mais de loin, comme d’un lieu géométrique, sans tenir compte 
de toutes les dimensions, le périmètre des sciences.
Ces communs à certains égards se forment tout seuls, au sens 
où ils échappent à l’ego de chaque participant. Même ceux qui 
travaillent de façon solitaire retrouvent dans les travaux d’autrui 
des problèmes et des morceaux de solutions qu’ils pensaient 
au départ dépendre de leur façon de les poser. Il y a une sorte 
d’objectivité de ces communs, qui n’est plus celle du noyau de la 
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science. C’est l’une des formes de ce que nous avons appelé en 
épistémologie générique « intimité collective », chacun, chaque 
groupe propose des avancées et les retrouve sous d’autres formes 
dans le travail des autres, sans que cela se réduise à des phé-
nomènes spéculaires. Il y a un moment où l’intimité collective 
transforme le sujet, au-delà de la variété des opinions. Cette 
intimité n’est possible qu’à dissocier l’humain(e) et le sujet, et 
donc à faire une autre place au genre que dans l’épistémologie 
classique, où les théories pouvaient encore dépendre des « ego », 
à la fois homme et sujet. Ce n’était pas l’homme sans qualité, 
mais l’homme ayant la maîtrise de la théories et de ses suites. 
Cette maîtrise n’est plus que locale dans les sciences contempo-
raines, et doit être relâchée pour comprendre la place des don-
nées et les transformations sur les sciences et les philosophies. 
C’est une nouvelle logique qui se met en place, plus générique 
qu’interdisciplinaire, mais où le générique ne se réduit pas aux 
plus petits communs dénominateurs, à des équivalences plates , 
statiques et sans orientation.
Mais il y a aussi une intimité collective de la science que l’on 
fabrique, celle qui donne la possibilité des trajectoires possibles 
dans l’espace générique, qui ne dépend d’aucune disciplines ni 
d’aucun ego particuliers.
Comment les communs sont-ils affectés par les genres ?  
La proposition des matrices
Accepter les différences et ne pas les interpréter autour d’un 
thème ou d’un autre, comment faire ? Ce n’est possible qu’avec 
une dynamique et une orientation, que l’on peut organiser aut-
our du concept de « matrice ». De même que la notion de « vari-
able » s’est substituée à celle de différence, ou de jeu entre dif-
férence et identité, celle de «  matrice  » se substitue à celle de 
système. Il s’agit de sortir des complémentarités philosophiques, 
de ne pas répéter les chemins toujours repris en fonction de con-
tinuités données. Par la matrice, nous avons une décomposition 
des thèmes et des termes, mais aussi une multiplication non-
commutative de leurs combinaisons. La matrice ne se réduit pas 
55
Libérer épistémologiquement le féminisme
à un tableau, mais chaque « case » est elle même dynamique, 
produit les idées qui n’étaient pas prévues, et qui ont des effets 
à la fois locaux et sur l’ensemble de la dynamique. Elle permet 
aussi de retrouver une assise lorsqu’une idée est inventée, et de 
créer ainsi une solidarité à la hauteur de l’inconnu. Il y a bien 
des façons d’inventer une matrice, de tableau, elle devient une 
sphère d’idées avec une orientation, orientation objet, orienta-
tion générique,… Nous pouvons alors inventer des formes de 
combinaisons des ingrédients scientifiques et de propriétés de 
genre. Les résultats ne sont pas prévisibles, il y a une dimen-
sion aléatoire à la matrice, mais les orientations « homme » et 
« femme » peuvent y apparaître selon des équilibres différents, 
qui ne sont pas interprétables en fonction de donnés.
Ces combinaisons ont quelque chose de libérateur. Par exem-
ple, la question de la pluralisme dans les sciences devient essen-
tielle, celle des valeurs également. S’il y a des sciences plurielles, 
si les relations entre le fondamental et l’appliqué se modifient , 
c’est bien que la question de la valeur entre dans les sciences, 
ce qui était difficile dans une conception objective et autoritaire 
de la science. Un pluralisme encourage d’ailleurs la co-optation 
plutôt que de l’autorité. Il se trouve que ces thèmes ont souvent 
été portés par des philosophes femmes. Mais est-ce à dire qu’ils 
résultent des propriétés des femmes  ? Ou d’un effet des com-
muns construits dans la multiplicité des dimensions de la sci-
ence ? Les sociologues pourraient bien entendu en dire quelque 
chose.
Mais comme philosophe, nous aimerions dire que la solution 
n’est pas donnée, qu’elle doit être à chaque coup reconstruite, 
de façon à faire des théories et des sciences un milieu où les 
collaborations autour des objets génériques, sortis de leurs dis-
ciplines, donnent lieu à des trajectoires inattendues, humain(e)s 
avant d’être une question de genre.
Reprise des deux propositions
1. « La-femme » est un mode de suture de la circularité philos-
ophique. L’espace générique et les communs supposent que 
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soit ouverte cette circularité, et que, du coup, la multiplic-
ité des philosophies apparaisse de droit. Fermer une phi-
losophie, c’est la présenter comme le dernier « progrès », la 
dernière raison de la tradition. Comment écrire en philoso-
phie, sachant que d’autres se constituent aussi sur d’autres 
hypothèses, parfois contradictoires  ? On peut transposer à 
la philosophie ce que Kant avait dit de la métaphysique, elle 
est une mer sans rivage où le progrès ne laisse aucune trace 
et sans aucun point de mire (Les progrès de la philosophie dep-
uis Leibniz et Wolff — 1791). Les philosophies ne seraient-elles 
alors que relatives les unes aux autres  ? Si nous reprenons 
les idées d’intimité collective et de commun construits dans 
un espace générique des philosophies, où les concepts, sortis 
de leurs logique d’origine, donnent à la fois la mesure de la 
richesse de celles-ci et la possibilité de la philo-fiction, et per-
mettent de traiter des communs inconnus, mais humain(e)
s ?
Un auteur, beaucoup cité par Deleuze, Charles Péguy, a mag-
nifiquement décrit ce problème et indiqué certains aspects de 
solution : 
Une philosophie aussi n’est point une cour de justice. Il ne s’agit 
pas d’avoir raison ou d’avoir tort. C’est une marque de grande gros-
sièreté (en philosophie), que de vouloir avoir raison : et encore plus, 
que de vouloir avoir raison contre quelqu’un. Et c’est une marque 
de la même grossièreté que d’assister à un débat de philosophie 
avec la pensée de voir un des deux adversaires avoir tort ou avoir 
raison. Contre l’autre. Parlez-moi seulement d’une philosophie qui 
est plus délibérée, comme celle de Descartes, ou plus profonde, ou 
plus attentive, ou plus pieuse. Ou plus déliée. Parlez-moi d’une phi-
losophie sévère. Ou d’une philosophie heureuse. Parlez-moi surtout 
d’une certaine fidélité à la réalité, que je mets au-dessus de tout4.
4 Charles Péguy, « Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne », Ca-
hiers de la Quinzaine (avril 1914): 82–83.
57
Libérer épistémologiquement le féminisme
Nous devons donc postuler une multiplicité de philosophies. Y 
a-t-il un sens à dire que certaines pourraient être plus féminines 
que d’autres ? Peut-être, mais, dans le débat purement philos-
ophique, cela serait toujours repris dans les disputes spéculaires 
connues. Il faut que la révolte sorte du spéculaire. Imaginons 
plutôt des communs, philo-fictions, où la part du masculin et 
du féminin soit réparti aléatoirement. La fidélité à la réalité est 
la fidélité à l’humain(e), avant d’être celle au genre. C’est ainsi 
que celui-ci pourra être respecté. Et l’humain(e) lui-même phi-
losophe par hypothèse, il n’est pas pris dans les rets de la phi-
losophie.
2. On le voit, la première proposition nous renvoie à la sec-
onde. On ne met pas en équivalence les philosophies sans 
traquer la confusion entre l’humain et le sujet. Il ne s’agit plus 
de faire uniquement la différence entre le sexe biologique et 
le genre construit, mais de faire une coupure plus radicale, 
entre le réel humain, celui qui vaut notre fidélité, et les su-
jets philosophiques, dont font partie les genres. Les sujets ont 
évidemment leur forme d’existence, mais s’ils sont postulés 
tout seuls, comme en isolation, la guerre des sexes ne peut 
que reprendre. Ce qui importe, c’est de conserver la force de 
l’hétérogénéité et de l’inconnu à la hauteur de la solidarité.
Conclusion
Nous avons proposé une mise en relation des questions de 
genre et d’identité des sciences en supposant qu’elle devient 
riche et pacifique à condition de ne pas sur-déterminer les sci-
ences par le féminin et de revenir sur les hypothèses générales 
de l’épistémologie, admettant une approche épistémologique 
plus élémentaire des sciences. La proposition n’est pas fermée, 
les communs construits sont des «  X  » inconnus, à inventer 
de façon continue. La création continue des vérités éternelles, 
comme disait Descartes, peut-être réalisée à l’aide des deux sex-
es, à condition de reconnaître l’humain(e).
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Notes for And They Were Dancing
Patricia Ticineto Clough 
For Randy Martin
The composition presented below, And They Were Dancing, is 
one of five such compositions that were created over the past 
nine years. During this time I have been engaged in rethink-
ing the question of the subject in terms of the ontological turn 
suggested by Deleuzian philosophy, speculative realism, and ob-
ject-oriented ontologies, as well as feminist theories including 
object-oriented feminism.1 Gaining attention in the academy in 
the early years of the twenty-first century, the ontological turn 
has encouraged a rethinking of human-centered thought in or-
der to take up the non-human, or the agencies and animacies 
of objects, things, and environments. It might be thought that 
the turn to the non-human turns away from the human subject, 
the human body, human consciousness, and cognition, which 
cannot but raise the question: who are the subjects of this turn 
of thought or who became engaged with it one way or another? 
To raise this question does not have to mean simply reducing 
1 I wrote three of the five compositions for presentation at the Society for 
Literature, Science, and the Arts on panels that were part of the founding 
of object-oriented feminism (OOF). The first panel was co-organized by 
Katherine Behar, Frenchy Lunning, and me. For an account of OOF, see: 
Katherine Behar (ed.), Object-Oriented Feminism (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, forthcoming). 
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thought to the personal — biography or autobiography. Rather, 
it may lead us to reflect on the personal catch of arising world 
sensibilities, the feeling of thought stirring in a psychic arrange-
ment, urging us to follow a subjective intuition.
There is an intuition expressed in my compositions.2 It is that 
the ontological turn to the non-human has been born in part of 
human subjects discouraged with what thought has given, dis-
couraged with the world not so much unchanged by thought but 
discouraged with the changes in the world with which thought 
has become, or for too long has been enmeshed. There is despair 
perhaps among those who most believed in the power of rea-
son and in their power in being reasonable. Yet, in this moment 
of despair there also is potentiality in reason’s giving way to a 
world sensibility, an awakening to the agencies and animacies 
of things, objects, and environments. Born of a felt despair and 
an intuited potentiality about thought itself, the ontological turn 
raises the question of the subject in the form of other questions: 
What is the representation of thought in philosophy, poetry, 
writing? What is the personal? What is the impersonal?
Are these questions nothing but versions of the perennial 
question of the woman: who is she? What does she want? This 
might well have been the case when the woman was seen to be 
the epistemological drive of modern thought, making it neces-
sary for feminists to recover her, restore her, turning modern 
thought to her own ends — what would become part of the over-
determination of postmodernity. But it is not now that time; it is 
not that time, even though women still suffer, albeit differently, 
violence to their minds, bodies, and souls, violations of their life 
capacities. It is not that time; the despair and self-blaming over 
2 My other compositions are: “The Object’s Affect: The Rosary,” in Timing of 
Affect: Epistemologies, Aesthetics, Politics, eds. Marie-Luise Angerer, Bernd 
Bösel, and Michaela Ott (Zurich: Diaphanes, 2014); “A Dream of Falling: 
Philosophy and Family Violence,” in Objects and Materials, eds. Penny Har-
vey et al. (New York: Routledge, 2013); “My Mother’s Scream,” in Sound, 
Music, Affect: Theorizing Sonic Experience, eds. Marie Thompson and Ian 
Biddle (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); “Praying and Playing to the Beat of a 
Child’s Metronome,” Subjectivity 3, no. 40 (2010): 1–17.
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the arrogance of modern thought now belongs to all of us, albeit 
unevenly. After all, postmodern thought demanded that every-
one have their representative, so that representation of differ-
ence and identity became the aim of one wave of feminism after 
another, one wave of criticism after another; and we have also 
seen difference and identity become the currency of biopolitical 
governance and financial capitalism. In this context, the com-
plaint we might raise against certain strains of the ontological 
turn as just more of the exclusions constitutive of modernist and 
postmodernist thought cannot give criticism enough psycho-
political traction. For criticism to have psycho-political traction 
at this moment, I think it is necessary to create, to intervene 
quickly and steadily, to make something of what comes from 
thought as it sparkles before us, alluring, beautiful, enlivening, 
and possibly terribly dangerous. This is not just to make do, but 
to do, to mobilize creatively. This is my effort in the composi-
tions I have been creating such as the one presented here. 
My compositions make use of poetic expressions of child-
hood memory of trauma and family violence, letting them serve 
as commentary on current philosophy and critical theory. The 
poetic expressions draw on my re-experiencing of childhood 
memories in a psychoanalysis that I have been undertaking dur-
ing the past nine years. Re-experiencing is an awkward word for 
conveying what happens to the subject of an analysis. This is be-
cause analysis is not so much about remembering childhood ex-
perience as much as it is experiencing with another the way ob-
jects — persons, things, environments — have become a psychic 
arrangement of forces and appetites, an infrastructure of (dis)
attachment, repetitiously reenacted with more or less tenacity 
but always with some quantum of difference that is distributed 
unconsciously, if not non-consciously, across the arrangement. 
My compositions, while about trauma and family violence in the 
personal aesthetic of psychoanalysis, also stretch psychoanalysis 
to sociopolitical trauma, putting me beside myself, as I dissipate 
into the surrounds to become with other bodies, things, objects, 
environments, the stuff of poetry, making beautiful speculation 
about these traumatic times of violence within and without the 
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family, the community, the nation-state, the colony, the camp. 
These are the times in which the philosophy and critical theory 
about which I write are occurring as symptom of these times or 
as creation against them — perhaps both. 
I say beautiful not sublime, as the objects, things, and envi-
ronments are not experienced as passive things; they are not only 
an effect of our doing. Rather, they demand something from us 
as if they had a liveliness of their own, a lively receptivity for a 
psychic arrangement. Our trauma also finds itself in the inten-
sity of the rhythms and vibrations of these things, objects, and 
environments. Writing becomes a critical method that is more 
than representational and necessarily compositional, a matter 
of piecing together as a practice of allurement or enthrallment, 
offering a resource both of stunning clarity and tantalizing ob-
fuscation. As such, the compositions are meant to entice those 
who read them, to seduce a participation in the question of the 
subject in the form of the other questions about philosophy, po-
etry writing, the personal, the impersonal of all things, human 
and nonhuman. To raise the question of the subject then is not 
to return, or to recover what has been excluded. It is to create, to 
compose, to intervene, to mobilize. It is to dance.
And They Were Dancing
And they were dancing: 
she in a salmon colored silk gown 
and he in black patent leather shoes. 
They were dancing to the big band music of those times, their times.
In waves of motion, they glide past me. Gracefully, 
practiced at the intricate footwork of the Peabody.
And they were dancing in those times, in time, seemingly carefree, 
until a bit off beat, a tangle of feet, she slips and falls.
He goes down with her, landing on his knee. 
Slow motion to dead time.
Then, suddenly 
she spits words of disdain directed at him
sending a spasm of violence 
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through the stylish choreography of the Peabody. 
My eyes shut tight.
My ears refuse to function. But something passes through:
the musical tones and the dance steps.
Sensibilities ingressing into actuality,
ghosting the present potentiality
Her afterlife and his: lingering lingering
If recently dance has captured the attention of critical theory, it 
is because its kinesthetic abundance not only instigates concep-
tual movement beyond the fixity of received categories. It also is 
because dance directly addresses what the body can do, and not 
only the human body but other bodies too — the choreographic 
body or object that tweaks the time of everyday movement, in-
viting movement to tend toward the time of the event and the 
experience of potential in the feel of the future in the present, 
when an object no longer seems to be quite what you thought 
it was, and the experience of time no longer feels as linear. And 
time slips and the choreographic objects dance: 
Her silk gown thrown on the bed 
and the white gardenias he gave her browning at the edge 
in my head playing like a black and white movie from 1934, 
before the fall, when they met in the glove factory. 
He always would say that he fell in love with her immediately 
hearing her sing over the din of the sewing machines. 
Did he whisper: I adore you
in her ear, as they danced the Peabody 
seemingly carefree,
in waves of motion gracefully past me? 
“Events are only events because they perish.” “Perishing is in-
evitable.” Events come and perish but not into nothingness. 
Perished events are like memories ready for reactivation that, 
64
after the “speculative turn”
nonetheless invent new movement.3And the violence too is re-
activated inventively, even more cruelly for that: the spasm of 
violence from them to me through the stylish choreography of 
the Peabody. 
The spasm begins “in stillness and crescendos to extreme in-
tensity and then dissipates.”4 But it reiterates its presence again 
and again unexpectedly; sometimes, its effects disappear imme-
diately and other times they linger indefinitely, corrosive and 
tenacious, impregnating everything that I am resolved to grasp 
bringing to ruin whatever beauty there might be. 
And she spits words of disdain and he to his knee again and again 
The spasm of violence from them to me 
I do not see. 
I do not hear. 
I do not know that I am there
The spasm happens from within as the body attempts to escape 
from itself. “It is not I who attempts to escape from my body; it 
is the body that attempts to escape from itself by means of…a 
spasm.” In dance, the spasm performs the body at the edges of 
representation at the limits of sense as it moves into sensation.5 
Sensations moving in both directions simultaneously 
disorienting exterior and interior, 
a motion that touches those who see
that touches me, 
making unclear what of this spasming flesh will come to be 
my body. 
3 I take these words and thoughts from Erin Manning, “The Elasticity of the 
Almost,” in Planes of Composition, eds. Andre Lepecki and Jenn Joy (Lon-
don: Seagull Books, 2009), 117–18. 
4 I take these words and thoughts from Jenn Joy, “Anatomies of Spasm,” in 
Planes of Composition, 71–122. She is quoting Gilles Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: 
The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 16. 
5 Joy, “Anatomies of Spasm,” from Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 16.
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It was five years before she would agree to marry him, pitying 
him, she said, for having waited each and every day for her to 
reply. And it is as if I were there to see from the start, even be-
fore the fall, a tear in the movie from 1934. What was he waiting 
for? The block against love was already there, tearing apart body 
from psyche, tenderness from sexuality, leaving only isolated 
moments of release, there on the ballroom floor, leaving an ex-
cess of energy entering me bodily. 
Their dancing, like a primal scene,
an event of violent agitation,
a spasm agitating the flesh of their bodies enmeshed
before I am me, if ever it is to be,
if ever there is to be a body for me
other than their bodies, laying there
I should not see. I should not hear.
I should not know what happens there.
So near to their bed I lay, 
the fingers of my left hand tracing 
a sensing without touching, 
a dwelling in the shaping of the flowers 
made of brownish-red mahogany on the foot board of their bed. 
It is said that it was to cure a spider’s bite that her female ances-
tors from Sicily first danced the tarantella, producing a trance-
like frenzy that also struck fear especially in men who should 
care but didn’t: fathers, brothers, husbands, doctors, priests. 
Later they would dance the tarantella when Sicily resisted the 
North’s imposition of the unification of Italy and throughout 
the massive migration at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
dance continued among women who were left behind or who 
were on their way to factories here, there and everywhere. Just 
as the dancing led to southern Italian women being character-
ized in Northern Italy as savage, superstitious or crazy, a genera-
tion later, when the women arrived in the glove factories, they 
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often still were seen as primitive, insane, promiscuous, and ra-
cially inferior.6
Was it the spider bite of history 
that made her spit poisonous disdain 
that made her female ancestors seem to others 
what she finally became: 
savage superstitious insane? 
Spider (or Tarantula): It is the spirit of revenge or resentment. Its 
power of contagion is its venom. Its will to punish and to judge. Its 
weapon is the thread, the thread of morality. It preaches equality 
(that everyone become like it).7
The Peabody was danced from the early decades of the twen-
tieth century to the years following a depression and a world 
war as consumerism was expanding and movies were giving 
ballroom dancing a wide-screened envisioning. But the dance 
would not be transmitted to the dancers’ children. They would 
move to the beat of rock-and-roll in years just before the onrush 
of postmodernity and after dance would take itself off the dance 
floor and outside to the streets in hip-hop, breakdancing, and 
skateboarding. The unity of technique and choreography bro-
ken, dance was opened to another sociality. 
If recently dance has captured critical attention, it may be 
for its excess energy, the in-excess of choreography. Dance no 
more than any other cultural practice is not simply produced by 
following rules. The dancing body, in “its kinesthetic specificity 
formulates an appeal […] to be apprehended and felt,” encour-
aging participation and a return to the scene of dancing again 
and again. This is “its own version of unabsorbable excess” that 
comes back to the body “overwhelms the senses” as a “dreaded 
6 I am drawing on the history of Southern Italian women in Jennifer Gugliel-
mo, Living the Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2010).
7 I take these words from Gilles Deleuze on Nietzsche. See Pure Immanence: 
Essay on a Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 94. 
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figure of contagion,” like a devil dancing jealously, spitefully, 
hatefully in and around the pieces of bedroom furniture of a 
brownish red mahogany.8 
She dreamed that he would purchase them for her. 
Mirrors, chairs, dressers and the bed,
where they lay just beyond mine, 
a cot with an iron frame 
cold to the touch 
of my fingers counting out the beats 
fingers like dancing feet. 
And I begin to wonder about the numbers in my head 
that could be orderly 
ordering the excess of energy 
made into a choreography 
Only in name primal, the scene was always meant to be blind-
ing, deafening, stupifying so that its time seems to be forever 
after some past pleasure, etching in flesh the very definition of 
pleasure as endless guilty longing for what has actually never 
been.
The child left there only to see, 
hungrily, awaiting what cannot be. 
Yearning turning into the bitter haunting 
of an abstract power, 
the power of the past randomly 
to drain the potentiality of the present 
again and again, differently. 
Yet always starting with a choice, 
not made by me alone 
but also by some force 
8 I take these thoughts from Randy Martin. See Knowledge LTD (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 2015), 160. He is drawing on Susan Leigh 
Foster, Choreographing Empathy: Kinesthesia in Performance (London: 
Routledge, 2011). 
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of an arrangement of feet, of sheets, 
of the metal frame of my bed 
of my fingers tracing brownish red 
feeling again for potentiality in the mahogany 
feeling for the wild probabilities in a body 
of artistic experimentation 
for the proliferation of sensibilities 
in-excess of choreography
now, more commonly realized digitally 
in a program for calculating reality 
but other species of actuality too
other genres of humanity. 
“The program is bound up in the materialization of […] a nor-
mative field.” It is “a scrim of expectation overlaid upon the real” 
which all the actants uphold in “a web of influence, and motiva-
tion,” defending against the violation of an expressive outburst 
or physical act. But “the event is a violent exception or amplifi-
cation, an object of fascination or concern that destabilizes a sta-
bilized field.”9 As such, the event is also the bearer of potentiality 
in excess of the program, in excess of choreography. 
This is dance as it assembles the gestures of actual bodies 
with those of virtual bodies, with virtual movements. In this 
sense to dance is to experiment. “Dance operates as a kind of 
pure experimentation” with the body’s capacity to be whatever 
it assembles.10 
I catch the gestures mid-flight immobilizing them in the 
night by means of “an ontological measuring” that nonetheless 
is receptive to the pressure of potentiality: “a living relationship 
9 I take these thoughts and words from Jordan Crandall, “The Geospatializa-
tion of Calculative Operations: Tracking, Sensing and Megacities,” Theory 
Culture Society 27, no. 6 (2010): 68–90.
10 I take these thoughts and words from Jose Gil, “Paradoxical Body,” in Planes 
of Composition, 96–97.
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that intermingles intensities with two extensive quantities,” a 
mother and a father right there near my bed where I lay.11
I am looking back at them. Still looking back for them in 
the analysis of psychic memory and in a research in philosophy, 
studying that impossibility of fleeing in those moments when an 
extreme tension, a pain, a sensation of uneasiness surges toward 
an outside that does not exist, something that is so constituted 
as to make fleeing impossible while also making it necessary. It 
is necessary to flee this impossibility of a no outside, no else-
where. Like the drive of sexuality, this specific excitation cannot 
find its discharge outside psychic memory but may never cease 
in its efforts to do so. To dance.
And they were dancing. In my head like in a movie from 
1934, they criss-cross the ballroom floor. Their bodies facing 
each other, each slightly to the side of the other, they dance with 
some speed the intricate steps of the Peabody, indicating which 
steps next to take through eyes looking furtively and fingers 
pressing with certainty in the curve of the back or in the fold 
of the arm. 
Like Ginger Rogers and Fred Astair 
they were dancing gracefully 
until a bit off beat, a tangle of feet 
They fall 
They fall 
They fall together forever. 
The experience of falling, falling forever, is thought to have no 
language and rather be a wordless bodily memory of a body be-
ing without any relation or orientation and instead being in an 
ongoing, near complete dissociation as profound anxiety dances 
free in bodily memories.12
11 I am drawing on the thoughts and words of Gilles Châtelet’s Figuring Space: 
Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics (Berlin: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2000), 20.
12 I take these thoughts from Donald Winnicott, “Fear of Breakdown,” Inter-
national Review of Psycho-Analysis 1 (1974): 103–7.
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Yet in its backward-looking glance, the history of dance turns 
the error of the fall to insight about what has come to ruins and 
what can arise out of ruins: bodies dancing against destruction, 
with hope against despair, cutting through the verticality, falling 
to horizontality, a laterality of movement. If modern dance still 
is vertical while opening to the contraction, the spiral and the 
rapid fall to the ground, in postmodernism, there is a clearer 
break from the vertical, as the hinge between inside and outside 
is at least partially undone: dancing feet up the side of building 
walls and bodies flying down from high above. There is a release 
from being taut and vigilant. From responding in an upright 
position to the body’s being on the floor and more, the body 
moves through elegant yet disjointed, unexpected articulations 
that call forth a reorientation of bodily spaces in relation to the 
forces of gravity. Traumatic drops to the knee and falling down 
to the ground become ordinary for bodies used to dangerous 
situations where risking may be the only relief. But there is 
more, as the body, still moving, may seize the moment where 
minor differences can make all the difference, where wild prob-
abilities still prevail as forces of the real.13 





An old accusation, resurrected by Foucault, held that Freud was 
a “pansexualist,” that he talked too much about sex and seemed 
to find it everywhere. I return to this charge not to deny but, 
once again, to confirm it.1 Yes, it is true that Freud discovered 
what we could call the promiscuity of sex, as long as we are clear 
that this promiscuity defined for him the nature of sex itself and 
not a moral judgment regarding an abuse of it. But if the charge 
of pansexualism, which aims to segregate sex, to confine it to 
its proper place, misses its target, it is because sex is not con-
ceived within psychoanalysis as having a proper place, one it can 
claim as its own. Sexuality names not a discrete domain of life 
but the disjoint relation of speaking beings to their bodily exist-
ence. Isolatable neither from meaning nor biology, sex does not 
belong to either realm and is manifest only in the disruptions, 
divisions, displacements, and distortions that affect both. This 
basic point has a history of getting lost, going back to the time 
when psychoanalysis was first invented. Freud was constantly 
forced to parry not only the squeamish objections and outright 
1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, trans. Robert Hurley 
(New York: Pantheon, 1978); for example, “the postulate of a general and 
diffuse causality […] may well appear fantastic to us, but the principle of sex 
as a ‘cause of any and everything’ was the theoretical underside of a constant 
confession that had to be thorough, meticulous, and constant, and at the 
same time […] scientific,” 65–66. 
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rejections of his theory of sexuality, but also the more insidious 
problem of its facile, and equally squeamish, acceptance. Too 
often enthusiasm for his ideas relied on an effacement of their 
complexity and rendered them anodyne.
It is gratifying therefore to read “On the History of the Psy-
cho-Analytic Movement,” in which Freud, in high dudgeon, 
rises up to confront some of the most irritating sterilizations of 
his ideas then in circulation. He picks out for particular censure 
two formerly close colleagues, Adler and Jung, whom he labels, 
lips evidently curled, “neo-Zurich” secessionists, charging them 
with selecting “a few cultural overtones from the symphony of 
life and […] fail[ing] to hear the mighty and primordial melody 
of the instincts.”2 Freud regarded these colleagues as perpetra-
tors of a cultural plot to concoct for psychoanalysis a “family 
romance” in which all its major ideas of “lowly” — that is to say, 
sexual — origin were assigned a “higher,” more elevated pedi-
gree.
In the case of Adler, Freud focused his attack on this col-
league’s wildly popular notion of “masculine protest” in order 
to expose it as the sorry distortion of psychoanalytic thinking it 
was. Masculine protest is the hypothesis that both sexes recoiled 
from the feminine position, renouncing the passivity which that 
position supposedly entailed. Hopelessly confusing the “bio-
logical, social, and psychological meanings of ‘masculine’ and 
‘feminine,’” the idea of masculine protest reposed on the absurd 
claim that “a child, whether male or female, [c]ould found the 
plan of its life on an original depreciation of the female sex and 
take the wish to be a real man as its ‘guiding line’”; and this de-
spite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, to wit: “children 
have, to begin with, no idea of the significance of the distinction 
between the sexes […] the social underestimation of women is 
completely foreign to them.”3 This sharp reprimand will strike 
2 Sigmund Freud, “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement,” The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
trans. and eds. James Strachey et al. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953–1974) 
[henceforth, SE], 14: 62.
3 Ibid., 14: 55.
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many of us who were too quick to understand Freud’s conten-
tion — that little girls, upon noticing “the penis of a brother or 
playmate, strikingly visible in large proportions, at once recog-
nize it as the superior counterpart of their own small and incon-
spicuous organ” — as itself such a conflation.4 Without having to 
accept the problematic notion of penis envy, we can still appre-
ciate Freud’s crucial point. Superficially, it seems to maintain the 
innocence of children with respect to sex’s significance, but the 
innocence at issue is more radical: it is attributed directly to sex. 
It is sex itself that is innocent of meaning. The corruption enters 
when we try to assign meaning to it or accuse Freud of making 
it the meaning of everything. 
Adler’s notion of masculine protest functioned as the ful-
crum from which the principle of pleasure was dislodged from 
psychic life; it led, as Freud put it, to the complete “ejection of 
sexuality from its place in mental life.” The displacement of the 
principle of pleasure in favor of a principle of power dispensed 
precisely with the conflictual nature of pleasure (which is never 
met with in “just measure,” but always experienced, rather, as 
deficient or excessive) and put forward a no less conflict-free 
notion of power. Adler installed at the center of the psyche a 
principle of power that took account “only of those instinctual 
impulses which [were] agreeable to the [individual] and [were] 
encouraged by it […] all that [was] opposed to the [individual] 
[…] [lay] beyond [its] horizon.”5 Eschewing the antagonistic 
principles of sex and pleasure as mundane and trifling, Adler 
reached for a “grander” and more “virile” principle and thus 
robbed himself in the process of psychoanalysis’s considerable 
resources. Nothing was left for him after this initial move but to 
adopt an old stand-by for thinking the contestations of power; 
he ended up accepting the default notion of an abstract opposi-
tion that set the individual subject outside and against every-
thing that was foreign and thus opposed to it. 
4 Sigmund Freud, “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinc-
tion between the Sexes,” SE 19: 252.
5 Freud, “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement,” 14: 55.
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Jung fell prey to a similar charge of family romancing. His 
way of dissolving the conflictual nature of sex and pleasure was 
to offer a monistic, de-sexualized concept of drive, one that 
transformed the archaic, inhuman, insistent pressure that char-
acterized Freud’s concept into an infinitely flexible and trans-
formable theory of “interest.” If wherever Freud said sex, Adler 
said power, wherever Freud said libido, Jung substituted abstract 
ideas that remained “mystifying and incomprehensible to wise 
men and fools alike.”6 The most infamous of these was no doubt 
the idea of archetypes, which defined an eternal, cosmological 
struggle between opposing terms but left each, individually, in-
tact. If one were to convert Freud’s various criticisms of Adler 
and Jung into a single insight, it would probably sound like this: 
whenever one finds two terms locked together in external op-
position, you can be sure that another exorbitant term is being 
evaded. 
If it is tempting to read Foucault’s The History of Sexuality 
alongside Freud’s “On the History of the Psychoanalytic Move-
ment,” it is because the former is well-situated historically to 
lift some of Freud’s burden by detailing the way the too rapid 
dispersion of psychoanalysis acquired its wings from a sanitiz-
ing betrayal and distortion of its concepts. The problem, how-
ever — as everyone knows — is that Foucault had no intention of 
tracking this betrayal but set out, instead, to confound Freud’s 
concepts with their aseptic reception. He had no interest in 
pointing out — quite the contrary — that if Victorian society was 
not reticent about sex, but talked about it endlessly, this did not 
mean that this society adopted Freud’s pansexualism. Sex did 
not in this moment suddenly emerge as ubiquitous — or, again, 
as promiscuous — in psychoanalysis’s profound sense of being 
irreducible to any stable point or position within the symbolic. 
On the contrary, all the endless discoursing about sex during the 
Victorian period was pressed into the service of making it over 
into the ideal point of the subject’s cohesion, the elusive and al-
luring core of her identity. That this was a terrible distortion of 
6 Ibid., 14: 62.
75
no: foucault
Freud’s notion of sex does not dawn on Foucault, who launches 
into a critique of Freud’s “repressive hypothesis” on the grounds 
that it sets up an invitation to transgressions that eventuates 
in the propping up of the very law they purport to transgress 
and tether subjects to the endless searching and safeguarding of 
their identities. Here is the obvious flaw in Foucault’s argument: 
it reduces Freud’s theory of sexuality — and, indeed, Freud’s 
theory simply — to the monarchy of a single “no,” prohibition. 
Not only does this leave entirely unexamined the variety of ne-
gations invoked by psychoanalysis — its multiplication of Ver-
words: not only Verdrängung (repression), but also Verneinung 
(another term for repression), Verleugnung (disavowal), Verw-
erfung (foreclosure), and Versagung (refusal), to name the most 
notable — it also loses sight of the profound dimension of the 
unconscious. Freud knew well that prohibition is temptation 
and never confused it with the barrier that separated the un-
conscious from consciousness. The unconscious is unavailable 
to consciousness not because the unconscious is prohibited but 
because it is radically foreign to consciousness. What separates 
the unconscious from consciousness is not prohibition — its not 
being allowed — but something more original, an impossibility.7
“An obstacle is required,” Freud wrote, “in order to heighten 
libido.”8 How might the Foucauldian critique of psychoanalysis 
parse this and numerous statements like it? We know that The 
History of Sexuality was composed as a refutation of the “often-
stated theme that sex is outside of discourse and that only the 
removing of an obstacle, the breaking of a secret, can clear the 
way leading to it.”9 This refutation takes place through an inver-
sion of the logic of that supposedly Freudian theme: it is not the 
removal of the obstacle but its emplacement that leads to what 
Foucault refers to as the “mirage” of sex.10 In his argument, the 
7 See Jacques Lacan, Anxiety: Book X, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. A.R. 
Price (Malden: Polity Press, 2014), 75.
8 Sigmund Freud, “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere 
of Love,” SE 11: 187.
9 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 38.
10 Ibid., 157.
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obstacle is simply a lure set up by power and always in the same 
way, via prohibition. Far from casting sex into the shadows, 
power thrusts what it designates as sex under the bright lights of 
scientific scrutiny. Interdiction incites and proliferates discours-
es about sex, all of them designed to ferret it out, examine it and, 
in this way, perpetuate power. Saying “no” to sex, power merely 
increases the fascination, the frenzied obsession with it; the ob-
stacle is thus necessary to the incitement of its own overcoming, 
it motivates our desire to transgress the law. Thus, it is through 
its supposed overcoming that the obstacle can be said to swell 
the tide of libido. This relation manifests itself in what Foucault 
describes as the “perpetual spirals of power,” wherein “the pleas-
ure that comes from exercising a power” and “the pleasure that 
kindles at having to evade this power” circle around and incite 
each other.11 Prohibition kindles desire for evasion and sexual 
excitement attaches itself to the exercise of power. The “circu-
lar incitements” of this relation, the clinging harmony of their 
pas de deux, can hardly disguise the dreary monotony of the 
bad infinity they represent. Sex becomes an elusive ideal that 
perpetually recedes from grasp, and this advantages power by 
perpetually expanding its territory. Limits are liquidated, there 
is always one more step to be taken, one more turn of the spiral, 
but nothing really changes. Pleasure and power, pleasure and 
power: why only these two terms?
It has often been acknowledged that Foucault came to feel 
“slightly uneasy about” the argument of The History of Sexual-
ity, to sense that he had “trapped himself with [his] concept of 
power relations” by failing to “cross the line,” that is, by failing to 
think past the impasse of a power that permitted no escape from 
it. He opted always for the side of power, unable to think from 
the other side, from “the power of the outside.”12 This trap was 
set, I am arguing, by Foucault’s assault on negation, which ends 
up being far too sweeping. If the targets of his attack, Freudian 
11 Ibid., 45.




sexuality and the juridico-discursive notion of power, go hand 
in hand, this is because in his understanding both only ever es-
tablish a negative connection between power and sex. And this 
is so, Foucault claims in a surprising moment of what looks like 
candor, even when psychoanalysis conceives law as constitutive 
of desire. That is, even when law is supposed to act affirmatively, 
it acts –in this psychoanalytic instance — negatively. Why? Be-
cause in affirming desire law prescribes it, restricts it to what 
it says it is; sex becomes a discursive construct; it is made into 
something intelligible, and it is thereby lost, dissolved in the vat 
of language. Prescription becomes, Foucault will argue, a new 
form of proscription. 
Now, this moment of the argument is riveting for a number 
of reasons. First, because it arrives so belatedly in a text that 
has thus far seemed to ignore Lacan’s contributions to psychoa-
nalysis in favor of a vague, hearsay version of Freud that has no 
recourse to any actual text. Foucault’s reference to the “theory 
of the law as constitutive of desire” sticks out because it is more 
accurately attributable to Lacan than any proposal vaguely at-
tributed to Freud has been and acknowledges (minimally, inad-
vertently) that the position of psychoanalysis is more complex, 
less homogeneous than Foucault has admitted. This moment 
is also surprising because the position he condemns in Lacan 
sounds eerily similar to the one he wants to advance, the one 
for which he would become celebrated: power produces and af-
firms; it is constitutive rather than negative. We are, moreover, 
caught off guard by what looks at first like self-reproach. Fou-
cault admits that it may seem that he has thus far proceeded 
in an “obstinately confused way…as [if he] were dealing with 
equivalent notions, of repression, and sometimes of law, of pro-
hibition or censorship.”13 Here he seems to have his finger on 
the pulse of a problem plaguing his own argument. Yet it turns 
out that this is no confession, but the preface to another accusa-
tion. If he has collapsed a Freudo-Marxist notion of repression 
and the Lacanian notion affirmation, this is because they do not 
13 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 82.
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merit distinction. “Rejection, exclusion, refusal, blockage, con-
cealment, or mask,” the differences among these various modes 
of negation, like the differences between Freud and Lacan are 
negligible since they all, ultimately accomplish the same task.14 
They all say “no” to — or post limits on — sex.
By now the repetitive nature of Foucault’s reproach — that 
psychoanalysis relies on a juridico-discursive notion of power 
that operates monotonously through the single mechanism of 
saying “no” — has become such a lulling refrain that one almost 
fails to notice how much weight “saying ‘no’” has accumulat-
ed, all of it negative and all of it attributed to language as such. 
The problem with psychoanalysis in Foucault’s view is that it 
misconstrues power’s power as poor, as insufficiently resource-
ful. “Underlying both the general theme that power represses 
sex and the idea that the law constitutes desire, one encounters 
the same putative mechanics of power,” which define power in 
a strangely restrictive way, as “poor in resources.”15 The charge 
with which Foucault confronts psychoanalysis is, at base, the 
same as the one Freud had to confront in his battle with the Zu-
rich school: the charge of intellectualism. But while Adler and 
Jung opposed Freud’s intellectual elevation of sex, for which they 
preferred to substitute more worthy notions, such as power and 
interest, Foucault opposes the elimination of sex that supposedly 
results from psychoanalysis’s appeal to language. Unlike Adler, 
who wanted to replace sex with power, Foucault seeks to replace 
language with power, this in order to turn toward rather than 
away from the matter of sex — in order this time to approach it 
as independent of language, as de-intellectualized.
On one level my observation says nothing new. Everyone 
knows that, unfurled, the Foucauldian banner reads, “Not lan-
guage, but power.” My point, however, which I will continue to 
push, is that Foucault’s neglect of the nuances of “no” has it-
self been critically neglected and left unchallenged. Much of 





its restriction of power to saying “no,” invokes individual utter-
ances. In saying “no” to something, we say it, we name it in an 
utterance that implants in us a desire we might not otherwise 
have had. Tell a child not to touch something hot and the min-
ute your back is turned you can expect to hear a squeal of pain. 
Draw up a list of “thou shalt not’s,” ten or however many you 
choose, and you can be sure that they will become “the chapter 
and verse of our transactions at every moment of our life.”16 It is 
clear that interdiction is still a kind of saying. But with the men-
tion of the Lacanian thesis that law constitutes desire, Foucault 
launches into an indictment of language as such and not merely 
individual utterances and in this case he maintains that the ob-
verse is also true: affirmation through putting into language, 
saying as such, is also a kind of interdiction. The only differ-
ence between prohibition, which comes in the form of a negative 
utterance, and censorship, which is put in place by the law of 
desire — that is, by language as such — is that the first encour-
ages the false hope of liberation, while the second admits the 
truth outright: “you are always already trapped.”17 The false hope 
of liberation thrives on the ruse that sexual drive is external to 
power, while the law of desire declares that there is nothing out-
side language/power. Yet Foucault suggests that this difference 
is not material when he reverts to the exclusive term prohibition 
shortly after distinguishing it from censorship. The law of desire 
is, in his consideration, a mere subset of the general “repressive 
hypothesis.”
Let us stay with the distinction a little longer, however, to 
examine how it works. Foucault sets apart the cycle of prohi-
bition from the logic of censorship. The cycle begins with his 
own list of commandments, seven of his own “thou shalt not’s”: 
“thou shalt not go near, thou shalt not touch, thou shalt not con-
sume, thou shalt not experience pleasure, thou shalt not speak, 
thou shalt not show thyself, […] though shalt not exist, except 
16 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: Seminar VII, trans. Dennis Por-
ter (London: Tavistock, 1992), 69.
17 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 83.
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in darkness and secrecy.”18 These commandments address them-
selves to the sexual drives, which are commanded to renounce 
themselves or else become subject to suppression. Here, there 
is first something — a sexual drive — that must deny itself or be 
forced to disappear. 
The logic of censorship is different; it is simultaneous rather 
than sequential or cyclic. There is not something that first exists 
only to be forced later to disappear; rather “what is inexistent” is 
deprived of “the right to show itself, even in the order of speech 
where its inexistence is declared.” 19 Foucault is not arguing that 
language, the order of speech, necessarily declares in an utter-
ance the inexistence of what does not exist, nor that an utterance 
prohibits what is inexistent, which would be redundant in either 
case. He is arguing rather that language as such, conceived as 
the law of being, performs three operations at once. The empha-
sis is equally on language, law, and being and thus submits sex 
simultaneously to a “form of intelligibility”; a binary legislative 
system that distinguishes the “licit from the illicit”; and a deci-
sion as to its existence or nonexistence.20 Foucault is charging 
Lacan with radicalizing Freudian negation by making it bear on 
existence itself and with producing thereby a triple injunction 
against sex. Language as such negates sex as such; it consigns 
sex to a “paradoxical logic” of “nonexistence, nonmanifestation, 
and silence.”21
Ironically, the new historicism that launched itself in the 
name of Foucault embraced the idea that sexuality is a linguistic 
or discursive construction and ignored his primary point, the 
actual object of his quest, namely: “sex without law” or sex with-
out language.22 Sex is not, he insisted, of the order of language 
or intelligibility, or: reduced to intelligibility, sex is annulled. It is 
not. While psychoanalysis would agree with Foucault that sexu-








tion of language as anemic, as “poor in resources.” At the same 
time, insisting that there is no metalanguage, psychoanalysis 
also contests the characterization of language as monarchical, 
as a law that dominates the oppositions between the existent and 
the insistent, the licit and the illicit, the sayable and the unsay-
able. 
The Funnel of Time and the Tide of Libido
It is fruitless to continue berating Foucault for his unapologetic 
conflation of forms of negation and for his characterization of 
language’s resources as limited and limiting. Let us begin re-
sponding to his charges and discussing the way psychoanalysis 
views language and its relation to sexuality. We will need to re-
start the discussion from the place where we first spied a fork in 
the road, precisely in the Freudian assertion that “some obstacle 
is necessary to heighten libido.” If we decline to follow Foucault’s 
path by regarding the obstacle as a lure fabricated by power how 
then can we see it?
I attempted elsewhere to cast Foucault’s interpretation of the 
“repressive hypothesis” into doubt by citing the Freudian dis-
tinction between the repression of ideas and the displacement 
of affect, but failed to develop my counterproposal very far 
and so I want to return to it.23 The context from which I bor-
rowed this distinction is significant, for the precise formulation 
I cited came not directly from a text by Freud but from an ad-
dress by Lacan to students who were voicing discontent with 
their overly intellectualized, overly abstract, university educa-
tion, which in the face of global issues then unfolding seemed 
to them anemic and irrelevant. Lacan responded that he was in 
a good position to answer the concerns of these students, since 
Freud had led the way when he was obliged, in his day, to an-
swer to similar complaints about the “’intellectualization’ of the 
23 See my essay, “The Sexual Compact,” Angelaki 17, no. 2, special issue on 
“Sexual Difference between Psychoanalysis and Vitalism” (June 2012): 31–
48.
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analytic process, on the one hand, and the maintenance of the 
repressed, on the other.”24 Lacan goes on to argue that Freud’s 
response — which grounded itself on its formulation of the con-
cept of negation (Verneinung) — is what ultimately gave psy-
choanalysis the weight it needed to stand up to the misgivings 
concerning its consequentiality, that is, its real world effective-
ness. It is the reference to negation that introduces and accounts 
for the distinction I mentioned a moment ago: although ideas 
can be repressed, “Freud explicitly stated that […] affect is [not] 
repressed […]. [A]ffect […] is effectively displaced, unidenti-
fied, broken off from its roots — it eludes us.”25
Because it is pivotal for the claim that the resources of lan-
guage and psychoanalysis are more robust than Foucault war-
rants, and enable them to intervene in the world, we will want to 
take a detailed look at the concept of Verneinung. But before we 
do, a couple of preliminary remarks will help flag and thus hold 
firmly in mind the stakes involved. 
1. That the absence of any mention of affect from Foucault’s ac-
count of sexuality did not ignite outrage or even mild surprise 
in readers only confirms the message Lacan was attempting 
to get across: those who were blinded by his emphasis of the 
linguistic dimension of psychoanalysis from seeing there any 
evidence of affect were surely laboring under a distorted no-
tion of affect as independent of language. For Freud and La-
can, affect is unapproachable except via language. This means 
that the direct access to bodies and pleasures Foucault hoped 
to achieve could only remain a pre-critical pipe dream; for 
by setting out to bypass language, one loses affect — which is 
sited in the body — in the bargain.  
24 Jacques Lacan, “Response to Jean Hyppolite’s Commentary on Freud’s Ver-
neinung,” Ecrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 
2006), 322.
25 Jacques Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Book XVII, ed. Jacques 




2. The impasse in which Foucault found himself makes plain 
the roadblocks we have to clear. The problem, as mentioned 
(and not only by us), was his inability to conceive an out-
side of power even as he accused psychoanalysis of the same 
crime by tethering every resistance to the short leash of law. 
In the juridico-discursive model, so says Foucault, power just 
is this tethering of outside to inside, is the very guarantee 
of their articulation; every resistance remains under the ju-
risdiction of power. Opposing this model, Foucault sees no 
other way out than to deny power an inside. Since power, 
in its productive rather than negative capacity, is endlessly 
ramifying, without boundaries, we need not fear the prison 
doors of power closing around us. 
The way in which Foucault declares his position on this score is 
memorable: “On needs to be nominalistic, no doubt.”26 With this 
he rejects, as nominalists do, all universals, every all-embracing 
institution and structure, insisting rather that although the myr-
iad of specific, local, and capillary techniques may be integrated 
or consolidated these processes of coagulation are always only 
secondary and unstable. But nominalism is not just a rejection 
of universals; it is also a conception of language that wants to 
reduce it to its denotative function. It believes language sticks 
names on things. In the hands of an oppressive power, language 
can be diverted from its proper function of naming actual things 
to name things that had no actual existence. If nominalism was 
once considered a radical position, this is because historically it 
performed the role of demystification, denouncing entities such 
as the Church and the infallible authority of the Pope as baseless 
fictions. Believing that language is irreducible to its denotative 
function and that universals are not so easily dismissed, Lacan 
rejected the “danger of idealism” lurking in the nominalist tradi-
tion outright. “I am not a nominalist,” he declared, for it is not 
26 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 93.
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the case that “the symbolic system is […] like a piece of clothing 
which sticks to things.”27 
The History of Sexuality regards language as a sovereign 
power ruling over its own sovereign acts of division between 
existence and inexistence, the licit and illicit, the sayable and 
the non-sayable. We can make a preliminary approach to the 
contrary view of language held by Lacan by taking a look at his 
discussion of a sign in the Encore seminar. There he insists that 
smoke “always is” the sign of a smoker; there is “no smoke that 
is not the sign of a smoker.” Strange, because according to the 
common saying, smoke is the sign of fire. What point is Lacan 
trying to make by substituting the smoker for the fire? In the 
strict sense, a sign is correlated with a presence outside lan-
guage, that is, with something that denotes an exterior. But La-
can alters the strict sense to claim that smoke is “not the sign of 
something, but of an effect [which] is [supposed] as such by the 
functioning of the signifier.”28 It is evident that he is redefining 
signs here less in opposition to signifiers (which function in re-
lation to other signifiers rather than to something outside) than 
as a special effect of them. A sign is a signifier whose “meaning 
effect” has been suspended, but which has this other “special 
effect,” as I am calling it, not of denoting a presence but of “sup-
posing” it. Lacan has often spoken of the subject as “supposed” 
by the signifier; here it is again a question not of something but 
of someone (a subject) who is supposed. The smoke, observed 
on a deserted island, is taken as a sign that there is someone 
else present, “another man.” Yet this supposition can no longer 
be understood according to the logic of denotation since it is 
associated, as we said, with this new function, which suspends 
meaning. We should think then of this other presence as spec-
tral, not in the sense of a mere illusion but in the sense in which 
27 Jacques Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique: Book I, ed. Jacques-alain Mill-
er, trans. John Forrester (New York and London: Norton, 1988), 265; and 
Jacques Lacan, Le séminaire XVI. D’un autre à l’Autre (Paris: Seuil, 2006), 28.
28 Jacques Lacan, Encore: On Feminine Sexuality and the Limits of Love and 
Knowledge: Book XX, ed. Jacques Alain-Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York 
and London: Norton, 1998), 49; translation altered.
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Marx thought spectrality: as something produced but not con-
tained by the system. Lacan is arguing that language produces 
an outside that it does not dominate. How should we think of 
this spectral outside? As a disturbance of the solitariness of our 
existence, a surplus that calls into question our solitary and sov-
ereign perspective on the world. The sign, and thus the implica-
tion of another presence is “capable,” Lacan says, “of arousing 
desire.”29 And as desire is, for Lacan, always primarily desire of 
the other, we can begin to see that this question of the sign bears 
on the subject’s relation to the other rather than her sovereignty.
As it turns out, it is precisely in the direction of relation that 
Foucault wants to take his defined notion of power, which he 
wants to put in the place of language. Power is omnipresent not 
because it issues from a central, sovereign point, he maintains, 
“but because it is produced from one point to the next, […] in 
every relation from one point to another.”30 Foucault dons the 
nominalist mantle in order to substitute relations among a mul-
tiplicity of strategies for universals that might otherwise over-
hang and distribute them. The difficulty is that relations are for 
him a solution without first being a problem. Foucault never 
problematizes, never attempts to provide a theory of relations, 
which are not one of the strategies or things related, but some-
thing other. Do things precede relations or do relations precede 
the things they relate? If nominalism asserts that there are only 
things in their particularity, how does it account for relations? 
Lacan, on the other hand, is well known for his problemati-
zation of relation and for inaugurating his conceptualization of 
it in a negative manifesto, “There is no sexual relation.” It is the 
universality of this negation, which forbids the unification or 
fusion of man and woman into an all, a positive universal, that 
is the condition of the possibility of sexual relations. This is not 
the place to pursue this argument further, but it should draw at-
tention to the fact that relation is a dormant term in Foucault; it 
is a simply non-functional. If the assurance he offers — namely 
29 Ibid., 50.
30 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 93.
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that while power comes from everywhere, it does not embrace 
everything — rings hollow, it is because we soon realize that his 
ramifying notion of power as being without boundaries, barri-
ers, or doors is also without exits. The difference between the 
“pansexualism” of psychoanalysis and Foucault’s insistence that 
“power comes from everywhere” lies precisely here with their 
conception, in the first case, lack of any conception, in the sec-
ond, of the boundaries or limits that allow relations to be forged.
From this point we can turn back to the concept of Vernein-
ung. While Foucault acknowledges that there is a more radical 
form of negation than prohibition, the one with which he chiefly 
deals, he attributes the radical form to Lacan, without acknowl-
edging that Lacan based his position on the radical concept of 
negation developed by Freud in his brilliant essay, “Negation.”31 
This is, as we said, the concept on which Lacan relied to refute 
the charge of intellectualism with which Foucault tried to tar 
psychoanalysis. This charge was not only not new, it plagued 
Freud in his day, but was enjoying a new vogue in Paris at the 
time Foucault wrote. Verneinung is not subject to the dynamic 
force of repression that enables the famous “return of the re-
pressed” to consciousness and bears less on a particular pro-
hibited act or object than on reality itself. If, indeed, this fact is 
alluded to by Foucault, it is badly caricaturized by his claim that 
Lacan’s constitutive notion of law “denies existence” to particu-
lar acts or objects. “Denies” is weak. Foucault intends it to be. He 
prefers to underestimate the boldness of the Freudian hypoth-
esis, which posits that there is from the very beginning a primal 
deduction, a radical expulsion of reality by language. Psychic life 
does not simply suffer this loss, it is founded on it; from here 
on out “nothing exists except against a supposed background of 
absence.”32 From the moment she is born, the subject is denatu-
ralized and objects no longer appear to her in their immediacy.
31 See Michel Foucault, “The Mesh of Power” (1976), Viewpoint Magazine, 
Sept. 12, 2012, https://viewpointmag.com/2012/09/12/the-mesh-of-power/.
32 Lacan, “Response to Hyppolite,” 327.
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This thesis is manifest in various ways in Freud, but we see it 
most clearly in his positing of one primary lost object: the moth-
er, or das Ding, the Thing, as Freud refers to it in Project for a 
Scientific Psychology (1895). The prohibition of incest operates in 
psychoanalysis at this level of irrecoverable loss. Prohibition is 
therefore unfortunate in terms of the argument Freud develops, 
for it invites confusion with its false friend, prohibition, as in 
saying “no” to or forbidding something, as in all the “thou shalt 
not’s” of the commandments, whether the Biblical ten or the 
Foucauldian seven. Foucault clearly falls prey to this confusion 
when he speaks about incest in The History of Psychoanalysis, 
for he makes its so-called “prohibition” the paragon of prohibi-
tion, the nay-saying “rule of rules” occupying the threshold of 
all cultures, societies, and individuals.33 In reality, he contests, 
this prohibition functions merely to consolidate a particular 
historical form, the bourgeois family, which emerged at a spe-
cific moment as a hot-bed of forbidden desires, which family 
members were incited to examine and confess. “By devoting so 
much effort to […] the transcultural theory of incest, anthro-
pology […] proved worthy of the whole modern deployment 
of sexuality.”34 The reference to anthropology is designed to ring 
the bell of truth, immediately to call to mind Lévi-Strauss and 
the complaints against structuralism then being voiced. Lévi-
Strauss secured his structural anthropology, Foucault intimates, 
less on the study of particular cultures than on a supposedly 
universal but in reality quite parochial claim that culture as such 
is founded on the taboo against incest.
Foucault does not mention the fact that the psychoanalytic 
concept of the incest taboo differs from Lévi-Strauss’s, which 
bears primarily on the relation between fathers and daughters, 
on the admonition against the hoarding of women. By way of 
separating culture from nature, accounting for the emergence of 
culture, Freud focuses, rather, on the son’s incestuous desire for 
the mother, but nowhere claims that this desire follows from a 
33 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, 109.
34 Ibid., 109–10.
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prohibition of the mother. Not even in the ten commandments is 
it specified, Lacan points out, “that one must not sleep with one’s 
mother.”35 The prohibitions enunciated in the commandments 
are part and parcel of culture itself, which is evident in the fact 
that they are broken daily. What is at work in the founding of 
culture is something stronger than a prohibition of the mother. 
The mother, or a dimension of her, is quite simply deducted, 
subtracted; that is, the natural relation or relation to nature she 
implies is lost to speaking beings. Thus, contrary to Foucault’s 
complaint that the repressive hypothesis attains its highest form 
in the incest taboo, which sets itself up as the unvarying law 
of all cultures and restricts the forms it may take, Freud’s de-
duction hypothesis subtracts the natural ground of cultures, the 
universal good union with the mother-who-gave-birth-to-you 
implies. Rather than restrict the form cultures may take, this 
subtraction makes it impossible to posit a necessary relation be-
tween nature and culture. It cuts the link between them.
Yet there is no avoiding the fact that this last statement can 
appear to run into a different kind of trouble; it can seem to 
court idealism. This is where a fuller discussion of Verneinung 
must begin. To student grumblings about the ineffectiveness of 
mere intellection and Foucault’s charge that psychoanalysis in-
scribes sex in an order that “operates […] as a form of [mere] 
intelligibility,” Verneinung remains prepared to give an an-
swer, even as it gives the opposite impression. A crucial point 
of Freud’s essay is that even if analysis sometimes succeeds “in 
bringing about a full intellectual acceptance of the repressed [by 
the patient]; […] the repressive process itself [will] not [be] […] 
removed.”36 Now, is this ineffectiveness of the “intellectual ac-
ceptance” brought forth by analysis not the very criticism (as per 
Lacan’s claim, quoted earlier) against which psychoanalysis had 
35 Lacan, Ethics, 69.
36 Sigmund Freud, “Negation,” SE 19: 236. My reading of Freud’s essay relies 
on the superb, classic readings by Hyppolite and Lacan (cited above) and 
the equally excellent recent reading by Alenka Zupančič, “Not-Mother: On 




to defend itself? Does not this failure to remove the repression 
condemn psychoanalysis for putting too much stock in its poor 
resource, language? At the opening of the essay, “Negation,” a 
patient blurts out the following, “You ask who this person in the 
dream can be. It’s not my mother.” But, Freud continues, “We 
emend this to: ‘So it is his mother.’ In our interpretation, we take 
the liberty of disregarding the negation.”37 This little ur-scene of 
psychoanalysis seems to set it up as the butt of jokes: not only 
is psychoanalytic interpretation lacking in effectiveness, it also 
appears to be arbitrary, even despotic in the “liberties” it takes. 
Let us take care, however, for precipitous criticism will fail mis-
erably here.
The fact that the patient’s repression is not eliminated, but 
persists, does not invalidate Freud’s insistence that the analyst 
is somehow licensed to count the patient’s negation as affirma-
tion. On what grounds? Because psychoanalysis does not con-
ceive repression as entirely reducible, it does not seek simply to 
abolish it; the point of psychoanalysis lies elsewhere. As we have 
noted, we pay a ransom for our access to language; something is 
deducted, permanently, from what can be said. It is as if some-
thing were, from the beginning, subtracted from existence; as 
if every speaking subject were subject to a pure or lost past that 
was never present, never experienced. To this extent, we can 
agree with Foucault when he insists, in his charge against psy-
choanalysis, that language does not simply affirm, make intel-
ligible, but also negates, casts “into oblivion, [into] inexistence”; 
language, it is true, “denies existence.” For this very reason the 
analyst who reads her patient’s negation as affirmation does not 
demonstrate pure arbitrariness, our capacity to say whatever we 
please — you say “no”; I say “yes” — as if nothing more were at 
stake. Counting the patient’s negation as affirmation, the ana-
lyst acknowledges, rather, that there is something that does not 
serve at our pleasure and that this has undeniable consequences 
for understanding psychic functioning. The patient’s blurted 
out denial, “It’s not my mother,” negates a prior negation, the 
37 Freud, “Negation,” 19: 235.
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one that surrenders the mother, as das Ding, to inexistence, to 
an irretrievable, primordially lost past. Eurydice-like, she will 
forever remain behind, repressed, in the strongest sense. The 
patient’s denial does not negate that negation or primordial re-
pression; it does not lift the repression, in this sense. The mother 
remains under the pall of repression, inexistent. And yet, in 
proper Hegelian fashion, the negation of the negation is not for 
nought. For, by means of the symbol of negation, something is 
affirmed, accepted; the Freudian concept of Bejahung (primal 
affirmation) means just this: the symbol (of negation) affirms 
(the negation that is) primary repression, that is to say, it affirms 
the existence of the unconscious as such.
Freud’s argument regarding the effectiveness or resourceful-
ness of language does not yet address, however, Foucault’s full 
charge that language, which governs the order of intelligibility 
only, excludes or is antithetical, by its very nature, to the order of 
bodies and pleasures, that is, to sexuality. At first glance, Freud 
appears to confirm this accusation when, immediately after 
admitting that the patient’s negation of the idea that his dream 
was about his mother does not bring an acceptance of what’s 
repressed, he states simply, “We can see how in this the intel-
lectual function is separated from the affective process.”38 In his 
commentary on Freud’s essay, Jean Hyppolite warns that that it 
would be a “gross oversight” to take Freud at his word here, for in 
fact, in carrying out his analysis of the intellectual function, “he 
does not show how the intellectual separates from the affective, 
but how the intellectual is [a] sort of suspension of content.”39 
Responding to this commentary, Lacan seconds Hyppolite’s 
contention that the affective “preserves its effects” through the 
intellectual rather than being separated from it. If this point is 
obscured it is because “backers of the new psychoanalysis” make 
the mistake of conceiving the affective as “a psychological quali-
tas occulta to designate that ‘lived experience’ whose subtle gold, 
38 Ibid., 19: 236.




they claim, is only rendered through the decanting of a high 
alchemy.”40 It would be hard to miss how closely Lacan’s mock-
ing tone and vocabulary mimic Freud’s dismissal of the “Zurich 
secessionists” for their inability to conceive the link between the 
intellectual and the sexual. 
The 1924 essay, “Negation,” is a compressed “critique of judg-
ment” that carries through the insight Freud first sketched in the 
“Project,” namely that intellectual judgment is tied to das Ding, 
the never experienced object of a primordial pleasure. That is, 
Freud was from the start intent on articulating a link between 
pleasure and intellect, not their absolute separation. “Negation” 
describes the emergence of judgment as unfolding in two stages. 
While he at times began from the premise that there was first a 
hallucinatory interiority that was later breached, or opened to 
an outside, here he asserts that the beginning is marked by a 
division, created by the ego’s taking into itself what is pleasur-
able and spitting out or expelling what is unpleasurable. Judg-
ment proper only begins at a second stage that seems at first 
to reinforce this division by affirming or negating the existence 
of what is pleasurable, on the one hand, unpleasurable on the 
other. But in fact the second process is not as symmetrical to 
the first as it looks at first. For, as Hyppolite keenly observes, 
affirmation is described by Freud as a substitute (Ersatz) for the 
ego’s “taking in” or “uniting with” presentations, while negation 
is said to be a successor to or consequence (Nachfolge) of the 
ego’s expulsions.41 
What is the significance of this asymmetry? The quickest 
way to answer is to say that the psyche is shown not to be domi-
nated by opposing forces of affirmation and negation. Foucault’s 
claim that psychoanalysis submits sex to a binary system that 
separates the licit and illicit, the intelligibility of what it calls sex 
and the unintelligibility of actual bodies and pleasures is invali-
dated by Freud’s introduction of a third term that brakes these 
compulsive oppositions. Listen to the way Freud says this: “the 
40 Lacan, “Response to Hyppolite,” 320.
41 Hyppolite, “A Spoken Commentary on Freud’s ‘Verneinung,’” 752.
92
after the “speculative turn”
symbol of negation […] endow[s] thinking with a first measure 
of freedom freedom from the consequences of repression and, 
with it, from the compulsion of the pleasure principle.”42 Freud 
had begun making this argument a couple of years earlier in 
“The Ego and the Id,” where he wrote about a “resistance to the 
compulsion [of a repressed drive], a hold-up in the discharge re-
action” that allowed “‘something’ […] [to] become conscious as 
unpleasure.”43 Rather than compulsively spitting out, attempting 
to destroy, all that is non-recognizable and therefore unpleasur-
able, the ego, through the intervention of the intellectual sym-
bol of negation, allows “something” unpleasurable to come to 
consciousness. 
The quotation marks indicate that what comes to conscious-
ness is nevertheless held at a distance from it. This is because 
we becomes conscious not of an idea, but precisely of an affect, 
which had formerly been unconscious. Yet even as conscious, 
affects remain foreign to consciousness, which is unable to tran-
scend them. This means that all affects are in some sense un-
pleasurable in that their alterity disturbs the ego, which is un-
settled by the awareness of a larger economy than the one over 
which it purports to rule. This unpleasure is what shoves think-
ing forward or, as Freud puts it, “decides the choice of motor 
action, which puts an end to […] postponement […] and […] 
leads over from thinking to action.”44 At this point we are able 
to discern a non-Foucauldian reading of the psychoanalytic dic-
tum that “some obstacle is necessary to swell the tide of libido,” 
for the symbol of negation resists or, puts up an obstacle to the 
appetite for destruction, gives rise to affect (or, in the vocabu-
lary of “The Ego and the Id,” to the emergence of unrepressed 
id). The symbol of negation reaches back, sending the subject 
through a “temporal funnel,” as it were, to the never experienced 
42 Freud, “Negation,” 19: 239.
43 Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id,” SE 19: 22.
44 Freud, “Negation,” 19: 238. 
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Thing, the pure past of das Ding, and remembers it forward, “re-
finds it” in the very disorientation of affect.45
I cited earlier Hyppolite’s hypothesis that despite what Freud 
says, he does not in fact separate the intellectual from the affec-
tive, but demonstrates rather that the intellect has the power to 
suspend content. I stopped short, however, of citing the hypoth-
esis fully, lest it provide fodder to complaints against psychoa-
nalysis’s intellectualism. Hyppolite goes on to say that it would 
“not be inappropriate” to use a “somewhat barbaric term” for the 
relation Freud establishes between intellect and affect, namely 
sublimation.46 According to the common reading, sublimation 
is a kind of “high alchemy” by which raw sexuality is transmuted 
into some refined, de-sexualized form. In this context, however, 
we suddenly see that rather than efface or replace libido with 
something less libidinous, sublimation is that process which gives 
us access — through the intervention of the symbolic — to libido. 
Simply put, we would have no affects without symbolization. We 
also see, at the same time, that affect — bodies and their pleas-
ures — are not available to us as immediate “lived experience,” 
but rather as an experience of the unlived. That which does not 
exist for the subject, non-being, is converted by the symbol of 
negation to an experience of radical otherness. The concept of 
affect that emerges in Freud is certainly not that of an imme-
diacy at which we could arrive by leaping out of language. Affect 
is, rather, the phenomenon of an exposure from within and by 
means of language to what is outside it. 
I cannot claim really to know what Foucault is looking for 
at the end of The History of Sexuality when he calls for a differ-
ent concept of bodies and their pleasures, but I suspect that this 
qualitas occulta is nowhere to be found. 
45 I borrow this term from Lacan who invents it his discussion of the Wolf 
Man case, “Response to Hyppolite,” 326.





Although words such as feminism, gender, women are not in-
cluded in the title, and are hardly mentioned in the whole 
text — they are at the very heart of it. It is only through feminist 
theory that I have realized what it means to have a non-smug 
theory that is not all about self-satisfaction, self-promotion, and 
self-preservation as is the case with most Western theoretical 
projects; it is only through feminist politics that I have discov-
ered what it means to have politics that is not translated into the 
preservation of the status quo and/or reduced to an instrument 
of power. 
Generations of feminists are showing us how being politi-
cal always calls for one’s own undoing; it involves re-imagining 
and re-inventing our own positions, locations, and belongings. 
And finally, it is a life of experiencing the invisibility of women’s 
thinking and doing that teaches us — if we want to make a dif-
ference, if we are looking for a change — not to rely on what is 
visible, thinkable, sayable, audible, or generally, on what is given 
or taken for granted. 
1. The Art of Voluntary Insubordination
The question “What, therefore, am I, I who belong to this hu-
manity,” the one that Foucault poses in “What is Critique,” in-
dicates the rethinking of the present and involves the necessary 
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radicalism of the practicing critique1: It asks what’s going on just 
now? What is happening to us? What is this world, this period, 
this precise moment in which we are living? All these questions 
account for ways of rethinking the present, which does not al-
low us to posit ourselves outside of the possible answers. There 
is no epistemologically, ethically, ontologically, and politically 
pure or neutral ground to ask any kind of critical question with-
out being desubjugated and thus self-transformed by that very 
gesture.
A critique does not consist in merely making a value judg-
ment in accordance with  criteria or ideals already in place, that 
is, saying that things aren’t good the way they are. It would be 
too simple. It is more about looking into various assumptions, 
familiar notions, established and unexamined ways of think-
ing upon which the accepted practices of our time are based. 
Critique, in these terms, would necessarily involve being — un-
timely, out of synchronicity, while speaking from a position an-
chored in the present and its regulating conditions. Thus, to do 
criticism means to make it harder to be governed, as Foucault 
would say. To do criticism involves the “art of not being gov-
erned or better, the art of not being governed like that and at 
that cost — or the art of not being governed quite so much.”2 It 
means not accepting as true what an authority tells us is true, 
or at least not accepting it because an authority tells us that it 
is true.
Foucault’s distinction between government and governmen-
tality points to the ways how the apparatus denoted by the for-
mer enters into the practices of everyday life of those who are 
being governed — how it enters in our very ways of thinking, 
doing, and being. To be governed is not only to have a form 
imposed upon one’s existence, but to be given the terms within 
which existence will and will not be possible. Therefrom, the no-
1 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?,” trans. Lysa Hochroth, in The Politics of 





tion of critique demands, requires, calls for self-transformative 
practices.
If the I who is thinking is not endangered, destabilized, 
shaken, undone by the process of thinking itself — such way of 
thinking one could not call a critique at all. And it is precisely 
this self-transformation that makes every step that we take be-
ing possibly the invention of the unthinkable. Critique, or “the 
art of voluntary insubordination,”3 as Foucault would call it, has 
to insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of the 
politics of truth. Therefore, insubordination to the political con-
ditions of the present demands the insubordination of one to 
oneself. 
There is no possibility of non-demagogical thinking, think-
ing which merely preserves the status quo and as such is an in-
strument of power — within the field of thinkable, sayable, vis-
ible, or audible — or generally — within the field of what is given 
and taken for granted. 
2. Non-Thought
The thought, if we are to pursue the Foucauldian notion of 
critique, pushes toward the direction of non-thought, but that 
non-thought is “not external to thought but lies at its very heart, 
as that impossibility of thinking.”4 Non-thought is thus a con-
dition of thinking precisely because it cannot be thought, yet 
it simultaneously represents that which calls for and demands 
thinking. 
Allow me to make a digression now:
On the various internet sites where Woody Allen’s quotes are 
listed, one of the most popular one says: “I believe there is some-
thing out there watching us. Unfortunately, it’s the government.” 
What makes us laugh in this statement of Allen’s can probably 
be rephrased like this: you, funny people, you believe there is a 
3 Ibid., 32.
4 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Séan Hand (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988), 97.
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God somewhere out there watching and protecting you, but it is 
much more trivial and obvious — it is only the government, the 
disciplinary mechanisms of power and its micro-physics. 
Unfortunately, however, Allen is aiming to reveal the crude 
truth about the fact of who or what is settling our “outside” — the 
point that we can make about the world that we live in is much 
more scary: there is no outside at all. We live in a world in which 
the “outside” as a possible horizon of the change has been hi-
jacked and stolen. As a result, today, almost everything appears 
equally thinkable — the sufferings, horrors, and tortures, the 
end of the life on Earth, market-oriented everyday life, proprie-
tary structures in capitalism, the militarization of the world, etc. 
It appears that the problem of the relation between think-
ing and politics is not only, as we used to think, that the inner 
logic of thinking preserves the absolute privilege of the exist-
ing dominant social order (by not questioning it) and its nor-
mative aspects by rendering unthinkable, and thus by casting 
outside the political domain, the possibility of a resistance to 
this “unquestionable” organizing principles of social relations, 
some of them being family, nation, religion, but also patriarchy, 
heteronormativity, etc. What late capitalism has produced is the 
claustrophobic maneuver of positing that everything is always 
already included, calculated, possible, thinkable: so, what it took 
from us is precisely the notion of the “outside” that has been, for 
a long time, linked to the domain of madness, to the domain of 
literature, or to that of revolution. We live today in the world 
without outside and we are thinking without an “outside.” On 
the other hand, in order for thinking not to be a mere repetition 
of the already known as an “unquestionable” organizing princi-
ple of social relations, it has to be the thought of the outside, it 
has to come from the outside, to stretch in relation to the out-
side, to be towards the outside, belonging to the outside. 
In his book on Foucault, Deleuze has pointed to several cru-
cial aspects in relation to the question of Foucault’s “Thought of 
the Outside,” and his efforts to search for the ways it would be 
possible to think otherwise: first, the task of thought is to liber-
ate the forces that come from the outside; secondly, the outside 
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is always an openness to a future; (“In this way the outside is 
always an opening on to a future: nothing ends, since nothing 
has begun, but everything is transformed”5); the thought of the 
outside is a thought of resistance (to a state of affairs); and fi-
nally, the force of the outside is Life.6
Thought demands from us to make fiction a necessity and 
to fictionalize order’s unquestioned status of being reality, to 
invent new relationships, new possibilities of being-together, 
solidarity and sharing, that is, modes of being-in-common out-
side the sentimentalized logic of protection, and the mirroring 
and self-reflective narcissistic claims of identity. It demands, 
I would argue, thinking and enacting modes and practices of 
communality which would be capable of engaging us in order to 
question power regimes as such and open futurity towards dif-
ferences not yet anticipated in the normalized frames of present 
political horizons. 
To think is obviously to think “something,” but at the same 
time to think the specific place where this thinking occurs. 
Those who think are necessarily put into question by the very 
act of thinking. Those who think are the double folded side of 
the object of their thought. If this is not the case (if there is no re-
sponse to this political, ethical and epistemological call to think 
oneself thinking), thinking is reduced to a peaceful pace, to the 
“pre-given,” to that “something” being demogogically offered to 
thinking — the thought of the familiar. Thinking understood in 
this demagogical way means to be assigned to think, expected 
to think, demanded to think — properly — in accordance to the 
law, to the imperative of common thinking. This imperative 
states: don’t just think, but think properly — and, we might add, 
think normatively, be obedient in thinking.
In line with Foucault’s notion of pensée du dehors, we can 
surely state that there is no proper side of thinking, some deter-
mining criteria that would guarantee us that we are thinking 
properly. Thinking implies wanderings and deflections, de-
5 Ibid., 89.
6 See ibid., 89–95.
100
after the “speculative turn”
tours — thinking is always seductive. It is not on the “right path,” 
it can never be. It is misleading, and involves demanding task of 
turning from the “right path,” from the political and ideological 
pattern that gave birth to the normative notion of the “proper” 
side of thinking, or of the practice of taking sides in thinking, of 
“sides” as such.
As Foucault argues: 
It [critique] must be an instrument for those who fight, resist, and 
who no longer want what is. It must be used in processes of conflict, 
confrontation and resistance attempts. It must not be the law of the 
law. It is not a stage in a program. It is a challenge to the status quo.7 
Accordingly, critique would always mean a certain re-composi-
tion, an invention. It means that being political today demands 
from us an effort of re-imagining, re-inventing our thinking and 
doing, as well as rethinking the limits and possibilities within 
which our existence will and/or will not be possible.
3. I Don’t Say the Things I Say Because They Are What I Think
At the very end of his interview for Dutch TV — which, as the 
story goes, was lost — Michel Foucault (with his mystical, se-
ductive smile) says: “I don’t say the things I say because they are 
what I think, I say them as a way to make sure they no longer 
are what I think.”8
One of the possible ways to understand this seemingly non-
logical, puzzling, and paradoxical statement follows the certain 
tradition of thinking in the history of the so-called “Western” 
philosophy in which thinking is understood as something that 
7 Michel Foucault, “Table ronde du 20 mai 1978,” in Michel Foucault: Dits et 
écrits II, 1976–1988 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001).
8 An interview which was made with Foucault by Dutch philosopher Fons El-
ders was preceeded by discussion “Human Nature — Justice versus Power” 
between Foucault and Chomsky on Dutch TV in 1971. The interview was 
published in Michel Foucault, Freedom and Knowledge, eds. Fons Elders 
and Lionel Claris (Amsterdam: Elders Special Production BV, 2013), 25–47.
101
thinking without
cannot be “objective.” Should it be assumed that one of the aims 
of thinking is the achievement of a certain kind of compre-
hension, a holistic, stable, and coherent thought intending the 
object of thinking — as we already said, that very thought will 
necessarily encompass the one who is thinking, which might, 
furthermore, cause a specific vertigo in which the thinker and 
the object of thought are integrally intertwined. 
Foucault’s sentence “I don’t say the things I say because they 
are what I think, I say them as a way to make sure they no longer 
are what I think” seems to imply that when we are thinking, 
we never think what we actually think we think, but instead 
we are caught in this endless, dizzying shifting of thinking and 
non-thinking, between thinker and the object of thought. This 
oscillation occurs in a manner which indisputably — for even 
the tiniest interval or moment in time — excludes the possibility 
of identification, stabilization, or determination of the positions 
(between the one who thinks and what is thought) — except in 
their eternal and dizzying shifts and exchanges. 
This Nietzschean view of knowledge as a product, result, and 
effect of power struggles, that Foucault adopts, has important 
consequences for the understanding of the “subject” of knowl-
edge. Foucault does not understand the subject as universal, 
timeless or abstract, as being the source of how one makes sense 
of the world, and the foundation of all knowledge, thought and 
action. For Foucault, the knowing subject, the one traditional 
epistemology speaks about, does not exist in his/her autonomy 
and universality. Foucault explicitly rejects the subject of the 
Enlightenment understood as an a priori subject of knowledge: 
“What I refused was precisely that you first of all set up a theory 
of the subject. […] What I wanted to know was how the subject 
constituted himself in such and such determinate form.”9
The subject is an effect, the product of specific power and 
knowledge constellation. That subject is not prior the history, 
and not pre-given. It is created and changed by outside events; it 
9 Foucault quoted in Margaret McLaren, “Foucault and the Subject of Femi-
nism,” Social Theory and Practice 23 (1997): 109–27, at 112.
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is constantly dissolved and recreated in different configurations 
along with other forms of knowledge and social practices.10 This 
conception of the subject of knowledge as an effect of power and 
knowledge networks, or this dismissal of the traditional subject 
of knowledge as one of the central epistemological categories is 
probably the most radical of Foucault’s epistemological moves 
in his genealogical works. To put it simply, epistemology is 
not based on the concept of the knower, and knowledge does 
not have a cause in independently existing knower opposite to 
the world and other knowers. Foucault rejects the constituting 
knowing subject of the Enlightenment epistemology. However, 
Foucault does not reject or abandon the subject completely but 
he does reject the “philosophy of the subject,” the One, univer-
sal, disembodied subject, out of space and time, and outside 
power relations. Foucault’s conception of the subject of knowl-
edge displaces the traditional dichotomy between the constitut-
ing Cartesian subject, who possesses agency and autonomy, and 
constituted subject that is entirely determined by social forces. 
For Foucault, the subject is constituted but it is at the same 
time the locus of agonism, a permanent provocation to power/
knowledge constellation that defines its subjectivity.11 
By following the similar line of thought, with the idea of the 
subject created and changed by outside forces and events, in his 
essay “The Thought of the Outside [La pensée du dehors],”12 Fou-
cault advocates for the way of thinking which accounts for the 
experience of the “outside”; the way of thinking, which is, ac-
cording to Foucault, possible 
10 See also Clare O’Farrell, Michel Foucault (London: Sage Publications, 2005).
11 See Katarina Loncarevic, “Foucault’s Genealogy as Epistemology,” Belgrade 
Philosophical Annual 24 (2013): 65–81, at 75.
12 The article written in homage to Blanchot, “La pensée du dehors,” was origi-
nally published in Critique in June 1966. In most of Foucault’s essays that 
are usually recognized as the ones that belongs to his early works and called 
his literally phase, he is concerned with transgression of the boundaries of 
language. They almost all share similar concerns: the notions of exteriority, 
self—reflexivity and the relation of language to madness and death.
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[p]erhaps through a form of thought whose still vague possibil-
ity was sketched by Western culture in its margins. A thought that 
stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as though from with-
out, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine forth, taking 
in only its invincible absence […] a thought that, in relation to the 
interiority of our philosophical reflection and the positivity of our 
knowledge, constitutes what in a phrase we might call “the thought 
of the outside.”13 
In this essay, but also in the sentence “I don’t say the things I say 
because they are what I think, I say them as a way to make sure 
they no longer are what I think,” Foucault shows how the utter-
ance of the phrase “I speak” or “I say” problematizes the idea of 
the supposed interiority of an “I think”: “the speaking subject is 
also the subject about which it speaks.”14 
For him, the work and responsibility of thinking involves an 
effort to reflect “outside” the already established, limited and 
codified, historically constituted structures of thinking. This 
new way of thinking which accounts for the experience of the 
“outside” — or the “thought of the outside” as opposed to think-
ing in relation to the interiority of our philosophical reflection 
and the positivity of our knowledge which always already re-
peats what is already known — is a kind of unthinkable thinking 
or the thinking of the unthinkable. The term unthinkable usually 
refers to the incapability of being conceived or considered, to 
something that escapes symbolization and representation, to 
something that is not comparable or that cannot be believed. 
It can also mean the incredible, inconceivable, or unimagina-
ble — extremely improbable in a way that goes against common 
sense. The unthinkable is what is beyond the common sense, 
rationality and generally accepted norms of thinking and doing. 
The unthinkable thus equals to non-normative, non-legal, or 
13 Michel Foucault, “The Thought of the Outside,” in Foucault/Blanchot, trans. 
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even to non-constitutional. The unthinkable is something that 
cannot find its own name and its own meaning.
In other words, it might also mean that thinking as such 
makes and reproduces the normativity — that thinking is nor-
mativity. Does it mean that we can think only about the things 
that we already know? How do we think of change? How do we 
conceive the political? How do we think the unthinkable? 
Coming back to Foucault: 
Thinking about the being of language, he claims, opens the 
subject in the direction of a radical “outside,” which destabilizes 
it and brings it into question. Understood in this manner — ac-
cording to his interpretation and against the Cartesian tradition 
of understanding the subject as self-sufficient, self-identical cog-
ito, which as such is capable of granting the Truth — the subject 
is revealed as nothing more than the process of its own disap-
pearance and cancellation. In that sense, the utterance “I don’t 
say the things I say because they are what I think, I say them as 
a way to make sure they no longer are what I think,” indicates 
that the subject is no longer the sovereign carrier of meaning 
and significance, but represents a place of opening, exposure 
and void. 
Or, as Jean-Luc Nancy explains, the opening can be under-
stood two ways: “as a wound or as an access route — of entry 
and exit,” and goes on to engage the French notion of “being 
beside oneself [être hors de soi]” in unrecoverability from being 
exposed to “everything that removes ‘us’ from ‘ourselves,’” that 
“opens, quite simply, an outside-of according to which we don’t 
come back to ourselves, we don’t recover ourselves, nor do we 
find ourselves.” Nancy further concludes that this place of open-
ing, exposure and void is a detour “to that of the other which is 
outside or is done outside, that is, not the presence of another 
before me (with its own ‘inside’) but non-closure, non-return to 
the self, neither of the other, nor of me.”15
15 See the interview with Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Real Outside Is ‘At the Heart’ 




The being of language can appear only if the subject is dead 
in all of its forms. According to Foucault, this, however, as it 
was already mentioned before, requires a novel model of think-
ing, perhaps through a form of thinking which is “outside” of 
subjectivity and which articulates and announces its own end; a 
thinking that recognizes its own disappearance as inevitable and 
its contours as the thought of the outside. This thinking is about 
the absolute, radical outside as opposed to the “inside” of the 
traditional understanding of the subject, but at the same time 
also as the radical outside of every possible “inside.” 
This radical outside contains no inner essence whatsoever, 
and neither does it have presence in any positive sense which 
would allow a sovereign subject to master over it or to posses it 
within its own subjectivity. Also, the subject cannot appropriate 
the outside; the very idea of the appropriation of what is outside 
of the subject, according to Foucault, would imply one of the 
two disputable understandings of the notion of the inside: first 
one of them implies some sort of the inner nature of the outside 
which could be appropriated, and the second one implies the 
idea of the inside of this “I” which could gain its integrity pre-
cisely through appropriation of the outside. “I” forever remains, 
argues Foucault, that irreversibly outside of the outer.
The inside as the operation of the outside: in all his work Foucault 
seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold 
of the outside, as if a ship were a folding of the sea.16
Thinking of/as the experience of the outside is thus the experi-
ence of/as (one’s own) undoing, which exposes the subject to 
everything that might threaten or question it; that might change 
it. 
Thinking understood in such a manner, Foucault argues, 
could be considered as dangerous act since the outside can only 
be experienced in the process of one’s own doubling, undoing, 
becoming the other. 
16 Deleuze, Foucault, 81.
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But the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, 
it is an interiorization of the outside. It is not a doubling of the One, 
but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, 
but a repetition of the Different. It is not the emanation of an I, but 
something that places in immanence an always other or a Non-self. 
It is never the other who is a double in the doubling process, it is 
a self that lives me as the double of the other: I do not encounter 
myself on the outside, I find the other in me (“it is always concerned 




Who is the Other Woman in the Context of 
Transfeminist, Transmigrant, and Transgender 
Struggles in Global Capitalism?
Marina Gržinić 
I will attempt to answer the question of who the other woman is 
in the context of transfeminist, transmigrant, and transgender 
struggles in global capitalism while addressing the status of new 
realism in philosophy in the same context.
Introduction
I want to elaborate on the above questions in the light of the dis-
cussion on decolonial feminist thought while addressing some 
of the geopolitical spaces outside of Europe, or, more precisely, 
spaces outside the European Union (EU). I want to argue that 
this provincial, racist, colonial, and anti-Semitic space of the Eu-
ropean Union that consists of a long list of “former” West states 
as Germany, Austria, Spain, Great Britain, etc. (the list of all the 
“former West” states, as they like to call themselves, is too long), 
is in urgent need of a radical transmigrant, transfeminist, and 
transgender decolonial approach. 
It is therefore necessary to intensify the political vocabulary 
used in our analysis of what the theoreticians of the decolonial 
turn (theoreticians formed by Latin American and US/Latin 
American context at the beginning of the year 2000) propose 
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as their point of departure. They rightly argue that the colonial 
matrix of power gallops on the back of modernity, or even more 
precisely, that there is no modernity without coloniality. 
The colonial matrix of power, a term coined by Anibal Quija-
no, should be understood, as exposed by Joaquín Barriendos in 
his article “Coloniality of Seeing: Visuality, Capitalism and Epis-
temological Racism,” as a hierarchical power machinery that 
works inside capitalism, but under an explicit form that Quijano 
names “historical-structural heterogeneity”1; in other words, co-
loniality is a series of inconsistencies, referrals, and reformula-
tions of the hierarchical model of power, which interconnect in 
its dis-continuity, from the fifteenth to the twenty-first century.2 
This is the position I take when analyzing the European 
space, arguing that those analogous categories of race, class, 
gender, sexuality, nation, etc., continue to fundamentally struc-
ture our lives, labor, and epistemologies. The most important 
question here is: in what way?
Sayak Valencia argues that we have to recognize the struc-
tural logic and practice of violence necessary for the functioning 
of capitalism today, and that because of such logic and practice, 
we could refer to contemporary capitalism as gore capitalism.3 
This consists in a constant production of subalterns that do not 
exist per se. In this respect, we could state that subalternization 
is a continuous process, meaning that we have to escape from 
positions of victimization or from the colonial identity that 
underpins the threatening presence of the abject. Therefore in 
agreement with Barriendos, let me say that I do not accept as 
1 Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 
Nepantla: Views from South 1, no. 3 (2000): 533–80, at 545.
2 Joaquín Barriendos, “Coloniality of Seeing: Visuality, Capitalism and Epis-
temological Racism,” in Desenganche: Other Visual Elements and Sounds, 
ed. La Tronkal (Quito: Tronkal, 2010), 137.
3 Sayak Valencia Triana, Capitalismo Gore (Barcelona: Melusina, 2010), 10. 
Gore describes particularly vivid and realistic acts of violence and brutality 
in visual media such as literature, film, television, and video games. It may 
be real, simulated live action, or animated.
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true the presence of the “‘bad savage’ that should be visible only 
as a form of denial of a proper existence.”4 
Moreover, global capitalism imposed a process on biopolitics 
that showed — in the last decade, but definitely after 2001 — that 
it is simply not enough to talk about biopolitics in order to un-
derstand the relation between capital and life, but that it is also 
necessary to introduce the concept of necropolitics. In “Nec-
ropolitics,” Achille Mbembe describes the spatial demarcations 
of the state of exception as the geopolitical demarcation of zones 
and the more recent mobilization of the war machine.5 Mbembe 
concludes his essay by arguing that the concept of biopolitics 
might be better replaced with that of necropolitics. Therefore, 
instead of talking about biopolitics, we should talk, in Mbembe’s 
words, about necropolitics. On such a basis, it is possible to de-
mand a firm historicization of biopolitics with necropolitics. For 
both Mbembe and Giorgio Agamben, the German Nazi state 
is a perfect example of the sovereignty of death, or, necropoli-
tics; Mbembe also identifies the system of slavery as one of the 
primary spaces for the enforcement of biopolitics. Mbembe has 
also shown that, within the colonies, biopolitics as a form of 
governmentality worked as necropolitics.
In the logic of gore capitalism, as argued by Valencia, the 
goods are no longer single, undifferentiated bodies and human 
life. Here it is no longer the body, but rather its destruction that 
has become a commodity, and capitalism is “only possible by 
counting the number of dead (bodies).”6 Within this, there is a 
“necropolitical marketing” that produces a change in the trans-
formations undergone by the concept of labor in the last forty 
years, that is, in the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. 
In fact, when production is directed towards the production of 
death (necropolitics, necrocapitalism, and necropower), it is 
difficult to understand the global production system within the 
4 Joaquín Barriendos, “Coloniality of Seeing,” 145
5 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture 15, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 
11–40.
6 Valencia, Capitalismo Gore, 16.
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known analytical frameworks. This new relation between labor 
and production of death, reduces, as maintained by Valencia, 
countries like Mexico to “factories producing gore goods for 
consumption while meeting international practices and recrea-
tional demands.”7This shows that in neoliberal necrocapitalism 
the apparent exercising of freedom can only be understood, ac-
cording to Valencia, in the form of one power seizing the other. 
This creates a parallel power to the state that does not fully sub-
scribing to it, as it is the case in Mexico, where the narco-cartels 
and the State live an almost parallel life. 
Valencia notices that in necrocapitalism the two dystopian 
figures of necropolitics, context and performativity, seem free 
or “traveling” in hyper and post-humannarratives, while non-
subjects are restrained, exploited, and dispossessed by milita-
rized capitalist economic dynamics.8 
In the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we witnessed 
a blossoming of identity politics, one of its most prominent 
forms being that of multiculturalism, which was seen as a purely 
cultural phenomenon. Looking back at that period from a ne-
cropolitical point of view, I would argue that there is a forma-
tive feature to it that has been systematically overlooked: the 
emergence of the idea of multiculturalism entailed a process of 
racialization, which functioned as a classificatory matrix that 
sustained a monopoly on violent classifications by deciding who 
lived and who had to die. In all these processes, the concept of 
the “new” human — as outcome of capital’s humanization is 
subsumed under the unfinished project of Western moderniza-
tion — stays mostly untouched. The West does not want to deal 
with it, and, accordingly, engages in all imaginable post-human 
modes of instituting discourses of authority, while leaving the 
7 Ibid., 61. We know that Mexico is not only a state of death but also a hype 
tourist destination.
8 Cf. Sayak Valencia Triana, “Transfeminist Theory for the Analysis of Male 
Violence and the Nonviolent Reconstruction of the Social Fabric in Con-
temporary Mexico,” univ.humanist 78 (2014): 65–88, http://www.scielo.org.
co/pdf/unih/n78/n78a04.pdf.
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present and the historical modes of Western colonial de-hu-
manization largely undiscussed.9
New Realism
In order to answer the question of the status of new realism 
in philosophy — which I connect with speculative realism and 
object-oriented ontology (and, perhaps the “new materialism”) 
as new, powerful and omnipresent trends in philosophy these 
days I will refer to Sophie Hoyle’s “Collapse: Contemporary Art-
ists Works Exploring Global Divisions of Labour.” Here, Hoyle 
rethinks the question of materiality in what is an evermore per-
vasive dematerialization of the present moment of capitalism.10 
Consequentially, she uncovers that we are witnessing a new 
boom of discourses on materiality within strands of contempo-
rary philosophy known as speculative realism and object-ori-
ented ontology. Today, these strands are very influential in the 
way they view the “new” human and agency. 
I side with Hoyle’s point when she claims that speculative 
realism is antipolitical in relation to several critical questions. 
Or, to paraphrase Svenja Bromberg, to whom Hoyle references, 
speculative realism orientation “towards accepting or even em-
bracing objectification as in itself emancipatory can be nothing 
more than a bad joke.”11 In response to Hito Steyerl’s claim to 
embrace “objectness,” Bromberg exposes that Steyerl 
problematically sidelines the classed, racialised and gendered op-
pressions of capitalist reality. Within this, masses of people have 
9 Compare with Marina Gržinić’s section in Marina Gržinić and Šefik Tatlić, 
Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global Capitalism: Historicization of Bi-
opolitics and Forensics of Politics, Art, and Life (Maryland: Lexington Books, 
2014).
10 See Sophie Hoyle, “Collapse: Contemporary Artists’ Works Exploring 
Global Divisions of Labour” (2014), https://www.academia.edu/8210923/
Collapse_Contemporary_Artists_Works_Exploring_Global_Divisions_
of_Labour
11 Svenja Bromberg, “The Anti-Political Aesthetics of Objects and Worlds Be-
yond,” Mute Magazine (July 25, 2013), cited in Hoyle, “Collapse.”
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never been granted any “subject status” in the first place and are, 
instead, rendered mere objects or even superfluous, because not 
productive, for capital.12 
Hoyle argues that, although speculative realism asks for realism 
within what is seen as an accentuated dematerialization, it is ac-
tually possible to see the opposite. She states that the space that 
is built in such a way is not outside of judgment, but is instead a 
space of elevated critique and insider knowledge of art and aca-
demic circles, which predominantly tend to be Western, white, 
and male. Giorgio Cesarale also states that, in addition to being 
institutionalized and branded, current speculative realist theo-
ries present themselves as “weird” and as “other” despite being 
a mainstream subject matter for a lot of contemporary practices 
and theories.13
In Hoyle’s view, it is clear that 
Object-Oriented-Ontology and speculative realism have been taken 
up by artists in an attempt to find a new means of re-orienting back 
to the physical, and though it has great potential, it currently mani-
fests many contradictions: as a relatively insular academic term that 
remains in the realm of the cerebral, and being recuperated by con-
temporary art [these days].14 
Furthermore, Hoyle in reference to Maria Walsh exposes that 
Artists such as Mark Leckey, Hito Steyerl, Ed Atkins and Andy 
Holden are keen to dissolve their subjectivity in order to exist in 
a non-hierarchical network of things. But could this desire “to get 
unalienated” be seen as an infantile abdication of responsibility and 
even, paradoxically, a narcissistic impulse? Object-oriented phi-
losophy insists on the life of objects, a life they deem no more or 
12 Ibid.
13 Giorgio Cesarale, “The ‘Not’ of Speculative Realism,” Mute Magazine (Feb. 
19, 2014), cited in Hoyle, “Collapse.”
14 Hoyle, “Collapse.”
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less valuable than our own. Does this new materialism offer more 
equitable relations between subjects and objects?15 
Hoyle concludes that 
recent discourses concerning online and digital media and the 
physical self tend to be user-focused and Western-centric, not look-
ing at global divisions of labour, where if cognitive labour is an ex-
port from the West, primary production takes place in areas in the 
non-West, as well as ignoring technology divides by socioeconomic 
class within the West itself.16 
To put it more simply, a possibility for a proposed new remateri-
alization exists only within a discourse that would take into ac-
count the international division of labor and brutal exploitation 
that is geopolitically and racially distributed. That means that 
in the international circuits of labour and exploitation, the us-
age of poisoning technologies and chemicals for the extraction 
of precious materials are those that are at the center of all our 
“immaterial” digitalized technologies. Therefore, such processes 
of racialization, exploitation, and poisoning have to be at the 
center of any form of new rematerialization. 
The Other Woman
Contrary to the problematic and stiff conceptual opposition of 
the two complementary, simultaneously exclusive categories of 
men and women, the concept of transfeminism brings possibili-
ties for transformation. Moreover, homosexual and queer po-
sitions in correlation with transmigrant positions offer further 
upturns for a transformative and transgressive discourse. The 
possibilities for different constructions of gender and sexuality, 
as elaborated by Tjaša Kancler in their writings based on the 
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work of Beatriz Preciado, take distance from the hegemonic dis-
courses of the heteronormative regime, in particular the power 
regime of whiteness.17 According to Beatriz Preciado, sex, spe-
cifically, persists as the last remnant of nature, even after tech-
nology has completed its task of constructing the body. Con-
sequently, Preciado indicates that in the sense of technological 
intervention (technologies of gender) this relation unties the 
contradiction of essentialism and constructivism. Thus, we can 
replace, as she points out, sex and gender with the word “tech-
nogender,” because the bodies can no longer be isolated from 
the social forces of sexual difference. 
It becomes clear, as argued by Kancler, that in the last dec-
ade we have witnessed a process of disidentification with the 
category of “woman.” In other words, the category of “woman” 
as the subject of the historical feminist struggle is being ques-
tioned. This also asks for the deconstruction of masculinity and 
male gender (“One is not born man but rather becomes one,” 
or “Gays are not men”). Kancler uncovers processes that were 
triggered by the fact that lesbians, gays, transgender, intersex, 
transsexuals, women of color, and Chicanas took the stance that 
the formation of identities is not a fixed category but rather a 
process of constant becoming. Moreover, Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty exposes that terms such as “Third World” and “First 
World” are very problematic, since they can be seen as oversim-
plifying methodologies; however, they do refer to a given world 
that traces its own condition of formation and develops differ-
ent strategies of empowerment.18 This last point is particularly 
important for what we develop here. 
In her talk “In the Mix: Race, Whiteness and Gender in Pop-
ular Culture,” Viennese theoretician Rosa Reitsamer exposes 
what is crucial for the new theory performativity and racializa-
17 Tjaša Kancler, “Tongue Untied, Tongue with Tongue: Mining the Binary 
Matrix,” Identities 10, nos. 1–2 (2013): 14–19.
18 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship 
and Colonial Discourses,” Feminist Review 30 (1988): 61–88.
115
notes for and they were dancing
tion that has the modality of a hyper-social racism.19 However, 
what is central to see (in a paradoxic way), regarding antiracism 
by and within the regime of whiteness, is the two relevant mo-
ments at work: on the one hand, there is a demand for us to con-
duct an analysis of the power and performance of that regime, 
but, on the other, we see that white anti-racism is disturbingly 
changing into a paradoxical instrument of “white self-love.”20 
This is today heavily criticized by black and migrant positions; 
white anti-racism is increasingly acquiring a form of grandi-
ose anti-racism that goes into the direction of self-promotion, 
which also transforms into what is termed “charitable anti-rac-
ism,” that is just a different form of unreflected racism.
A new perspective is necessary for the future, as well as a 
new context in order to rethink the position of the other woman 
today in relation to new realism. The term transfeminism is, as 
presented by Triana, attributed to Diana Couvant, who used it 
during an event at Yale University in 1992.21 Along the same con-
ceptual lines, Couvant and Emi Koyama launched a website in 
2000 called “transfeminism.org,” created to promote a proposed 
anthology of transfeminism, with the aim of introducing the 
concept into academia and connecting people in order to work 
on projects and issues related to the concept. Hence, in such a 
context, transfeminism can be understood as a migrant and re-
lational movement and as the articulation of both thought and 
social resistance, which remains a firm response to dominant 
systems of representation and repression in relation to feminist 
struggles and the fight for equal rights in certain geopolitically 
diverse spaces.22 
Triana reports that transfeminism can be drawn into four 
major lines of agencies, movements, and demands: 
19 Rosa Reitsamer, “In the Mix: Race, Whiteness and Gender in Popular Cul-
ture,” a paper presented at a public lecture held in the framework of The City 
of Women Festival in Ljubljana on October 13, 2005.
20 Derek Hook, “Retrieving Biko: A Black Consciousness Critique of White-
ness,” African Identities 9, no. 1 (2011): 19–32.
21 Cf. Triana, “Transfeminist Theory.”
22 Ibid.
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1. The US feminisms of color from Third Worlds, composed 
of Chicana feminists, African American, Native American, 
Asian American and postcolonial positions.
2. Sexual dissent and epistemic geopolitical shifts from the 
South that effectuate a reading from queer to cuir [kvir], a 
wrongly accentuated pidgin pronunciation by the minorities, 
which is consciously employed.
3. The movement which asks for depathologization of trans 
identities (STP, International Campaign Stop Trans Patholo-
gization) and the pro-fucking motion in favor of de-stigma-
tization and legalization of sex work.
4. A key element is to become minority, while being included in 
migration economic insecurity circles.23
Consequently, transmigrant, transfeminist, and transgender 
struggles have to be put at the center of investigation and con-
testation of the relations of capital, power and labor, expropri-
ated surplus value and created superfluous populations, the in-
tensified militarization and deprivation of capitalism, and, last 
but not least, the Western, occidental, white matrix of power, 
which is the matrix of pure colonial violence.
To conclude, departing from the most influential book in 
academic feminism and queer theory, Gender Trouble: Femi-
nism and the Subversion of Identity by Judith Butler, and taking 
into account the ideas I have tried to develop regarding realism, 
wo/man, racializations and necrocapitalism on one hand, and 
transfeminism and transmigration, materialism and agency, on 
the other, I will propose another platform of insurgency for the 
new decade of the twenty-first century.
The title of this platform will be Race Trouble: Transfeminism 
and Dehumanization, still to be rewritten in order to discuss the 
place of wo/man, race, and class in the violent dispossession 
processes within global necrocapitalism, while also rearticulat-
ing political agencies for the future.
23 Ibid.
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The Crush: The Fiery Allure of the Jolted Puppet
Frenchy Lunning
O you whom I often and silently come where
you are, that I may be with you, 
As I walk by your side, or sit near, or  
remain in the same room with you, 
Little you know the subtle electric fire that  
for your sake is playing within me.—
—  Walt Whitman, Calamus X1
As an adolescent, I could mark time by the incessant epistemes 
of crushes I had experienced as I careened through junior high 
school, and beyond. Only a very small percentage of these emo-
tional junkets were actualized as relationships, and most were 
only a subject of extreme embarrassment at the erotic obsession 
with an entirely inappropriate, or horrifyingly inexplicable, and 
thankfully, unsuspecting subject. The whole phenomenon of the 
crush puzzled me as it was always completely out of my control 
and never fully explained, except for a “wink-wink” moment in 
the special girls-only classes on menstruation and “love” that 
were de rigeur for young schoolgirls of the 1960s. But using the 
very particular apparatus of object-oriented ontology and its ex-
cellent mechanism of “allure,” I feel I can perhaps abolish some 
1 Walt Whitman, “Calamus X,” in Walt Whitman: Poetry and Prose, ed. Justin 
Kaplan (New York: Library of America, May 1982), 286.
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of the mysterious shame of my youth, and explain its periodic 
persistence. It is these ephemeral, inexplicable phenomena that 
are such excellent subjects for this speculative realistic mecha-
nism: those things in the existence of subjects that defy all rea-
sonable explanation. 
I will use Graham Harman’s explanation of allure,“a special 
and intermittent experience in which the intimate bond be-
tween a thing’s unity and its plurality of notes somehow par-
tially disintegrates,”2 as the staging ground for this discussion 
of the crush, and indeed, in setting up a rather special case of 
allure. The crush, which is defined as “a brief but intense in-
fatuation for someone, especially someone unattainable or 
inappropriate”3 — to which I will add the conditions of “unre-
quited,” “unaccepted,” and hopefully, “unbeknownst by the be-
loved” — to further set the proscenium for this special perfor-
mance of allure. 
Caught in this tragicomedy, are two actor/objects: the “lov-
er-object” and the “beloved-object” who fatefully come into a 
proximity in which the lover-object “recognizes,” then obsesses 
over, the beloved-object. The crush may be an immediate and 
intense moment that dissipates just as quickly by a change of 
venue; or worse yet, it may come as an entirely unexpected bolt 
of lightning after knowing the beloved-object over a longer pe-
riod of time in which the beloved-object was simply part of a 
quotidian landscape, and an unknown (by the lover-object) 
buildup of passion simmering to a slow boil, which lasts for a 
very long time. 
This “recognition,” is a recognition of the qualities that exude 
from the object, that is, the “visible symptoms,” beyond which 
a second layer of qualities appear, which Harman contends are 
born from a “strife between an object and its own qualities, 
which seem to be severed from that object,” further, that “if 
2 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry 
of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 143.




objects are what exude from us, qualities are simply defined as 
whatever does not recede, allowing us to bathe in them at every 
moment.”4 Harman’s sensual description of a “bathing” in the 
severed qualities of the beloved-object, certainly goes a long 
way in describing the initial experience in the real world of the 
lover-object’s erotic desire that becomes — through this initial 
visual and sensual proximity — the “production designer” of the 
crush. Harman also typifies these severed qualities as entities 
that break off as “dark agents” operating below the surface quali-
ties of normal visual perception; they are the actors who enter 
the stage from the side, as the condition of allure directs the lay-
ing out of the backstage rigging for the complex ballet to follow: 
“Yet in normal perception, these objects” — for now the severed 
qualities have themselves become objects — “are bound up so 
directly with their carnal surfaces that we sense no distinction 
between the two realms.”5 Alas, the pathetic lover-object is clue-
less to the hidden caper that allure and its “enchanting effect not 
found in normal experience”6 is now putting into action. 
It is helpful to conceive of the stage area of allure as filled with 
layers of notes and qualities that progressively recede from the 
highly visible footlights at the far front edge of the stage, where 
these visible surface qualities perform the initial lure to the ac-
tion of the play behind the footlights. These surface qualities are 
very particular aspects of the beloved’s body — the nice lips, dark 
hair, and good “buns” — but it can also be an aspect of their per-
sonality or good humor. Yet as we move deeper into the playing 
area of the stage, behind the footlights, a complex drama ensues 
as those dark severed qualities begin to confront other objects 
exuding from the beloved-object, such as the notes. The notes, 
in Harman’s view are distinguished as “the traits of a thing”7 or, 
as “qualities of the objects themselves, quite irrespective of our 
contact with them.”8 That is to say, notes are qualities that maybe 
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visual, but also may be aspects of the beloved’s conjunction of 
these qualities and notes, the mélange of known and unknown 
aspects of the beloved’s unity of objecthood. And at the very 
back of the stage withdrawn behind layers and layers of quali-
ties and notes, lies the “shadowy master-object concealed in its 
inner sanctum,” the so-called “withdrawn object,” who Harman 
suggests “can never be touched,” yet its qualities that precede 
it “seem tangible.”9 And Harman describes this process as “the 
chain of sensual categories [that] is not a single pattern stamped 
into shapeless matter […] but resembles an endless knotted 
rope in which each thing is tied into its nearest neighbor, each 
form successively locked into further forms.”10 
Yet in a rather poetic section of his book, Harman develops 
this “knotted rope” to be the “style of things,” which furthers an 
understanding in how these qualities are greeted at the moment 
of recognition in a crush. He begins with placing the erotic tinge 
of allure at the level of the fleshy body: “Through our physical 
bodies and their extension in the form of tools, we are folded 
into the world in almost lascivious fashion. Our physical bodies 
represent “a communication with the world more ancient than 
thought.”11 And further, that at that level, there is the substan-
tial attachment to a sense of realness to our perception and re-
ception of the sensual qualities that extend out into the ether, 
like feelers on an insect, reaching out in a receptive quest for 
attachment. This undeniable and inescapable sensual attach-
ment to the real, makes “Our bodies […] the ultimate form of 
sincerity.”12 Harman quotes Merleau-Ponty extensively in his ex-
planation of this sincere position within the sea of qualities: “To 
have a body is already to be folded into the things rather than 
stand at a distance from them […] Flesh is the intertwining, in-
terlacing, interfacing of I myself with the sensible world: ‘the 







flesh.’”13 And this “flesh-object” that presents a unity of specific 
notes and qualities that for the self, represents “the self,” and 
other objects as well — then become recognizable as exuding a 
specificity of those qualities that Harman denotes as style: “We 
can say of any object that it is not a bundle of specific qualities, 
nor a bare unitary substratum, but rather a style […] A style is 
never visibly present, but enters the world like a concealed em-
peror and dominates certain regions of our perception.”14 That is 
to say, that although some of those qualities that extend visually 
from an object might present a certain set of related elements or 
aspects; style, as a sensible condition and recognition, made in 
the cognition of those visual severed qualities, seems to form a 
unifying linkage of resemblance, or at the very least, a sense of 
cohesion that becomes in allure, recognized as a “style,” or as 
Harman puts it, “a stylistic unit.”15 Style is not just visual quali-
ties, but also a performative note. In the entirety of the perfor-
mance of the object-unit as it intersects with the world-object, 
that unity of style is “a symbolism in the thing [object] which 
links each sensible quality to the rest […] the style of a thing 
animate[s] its multitude of distinct and isolable qualities.”16 It 
is precisely that perception of the style of the beloved-object 
that is mis-recognized or mis-interpellated as a “match” for the 
“fool” — the pathetic lover-object in our drama, who is tricked 
into believing that she recognizes a style from her own script of 
desired erotic types. And unfortunately, the performance of this 
tragicomedy follows certain reproductive priorities as Harman 
describes this inevitable process:
The world is flesh or element, an electrified medium in which all 
entities, as elusive styles, generate surfaces of qualities that fuse to-
gether or signal messages to one another. In other words, the world 
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such styles and the flesh by means of which they come into con-
tact, and which thereby serves as the only causal medium between 
them.17
Thus this description of the stylistic unit of the beloved-object 
as made up of a series of stylistic “parts” that are qualities, notes, 
and objects radically enmeshed in the electrified medium, form 
the appearance of a cohesive stylistic unit. This sets up these 
“parts” as “players” in the drama on the stage for the perfor-
mance of allure. 
However, I propose that the crush represents a special case of 
allure — a “crush-allure” if you will — wherein the cohesion of 
these stylistic parts is imagined, “costumed,” and projected onto 
the beloved-object by the lover-object. This imaginary costume 
of the beloved-object’s style structurally resembles Metz’s notion 
of a “scopic regime” — in which “general systems of visuality 
constructed by a cultural/technological/political apparatus me-
diating the apparently given world of objects in a […] perceptual 
field.”18 In our case, this regime is mediated by the desiring lover-
object, whose own notes construct phantom severed qualities of 
an erotic ideal which is produced from an excess of desire, and 
are then as “masked-severed qualities” fused onto the beloved-
object’s notes in the play of the crush-allure. Harman describes 
something similar, paradoxically as an element of humor, as a 
“splitting apart of the typical immediate fusion between a liv-
ing creature” and its “adaptable contact with their surroundings 
and fold back into special private destinies.”19 That is to say, the 
splitting apart of the beloved-object into its notes and severed 
qualities, which then disassembles and deterritorializes its unity, 
thus leaving it open for the lover-object’s consequent reassem-
blage and reterritorializing of a phantom unity according to the 
17 Ibid., 58.
18 Martin Jay, “Scopic Regime,” The International Encyclopedia of Communica-
tion: International Encyclopedia of Communication Online, ed. Wolfgang Dons-
bach, 2008, http://www.communicationencyclopedia.com/public/tocnode? 
id=g9781405131995_yr2013_chunk_g978140513199524_ss20–1.
19 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 151.
123
the crush
lover-object’s script of desire and expectations.20 But under the 
conditions of a crush-allure, the lover’s scopic regime of desire, 
whose own notes appear like costumers rushing in for a quick 
change, masks the unsuspecting beloved’s notes to suit the ideal 
character it needs to play. Harman states that at this point, “al-
lure contends with objects and notes in separation rather than 
through the usual fusion of the two,”21 and this holds true, for 
the beloved-object is unaware that their notes are now actors 
in a drama that only the lover-object beholds, as “allure, with 
its severing of objects and qualities, is the paradigm shift of the 
senses.”22 
But what is the nature of this desiring regime whose drama 
is so profoundly experienced by the lover-object, and although 
the drama of the crush can extend for years, yet — so fickle — it 
can also be over in a day? It is tempting to position the crush as a 
fetishizing of the beloved-object, and perhaps, that can happen. 
But fetish as a practice has specific realms of object worship, 
that is, objects as parts divorced from their unity that operate via 
constriction, character, or effectuation,23 and whose adulation 
centers around that object as a locus of sexual gratification. It 
rarely engulfs an entire human object, and generally does not 
disappear with time. Yet the obsessional character of the fetish 
is apparent in a crush. And there is something so specifically 
personal in that obsession, which Harman suggests as an experi-
ence of beauty: 
A similar cutting of the bond between an agent and its traits occurs 
in beauty, in which a thing or creature is gifted with qualities of 
such overwhelming force that we do not pass directly through the 
sensual material into the unified thing, but seem to see the beauti-





23 Frenchy Lunning, Fetish Style (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 79–105.
24 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 142.
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In fact, Harman earlier refers to the lover-object who is “envel-
oped in helpless or unthinking routines” of obsessive behavior 
as a “jolted puppet,” and a “universal stock figure of comedy,”25 
which is an excellent description of the lover-object in the throes 
of the crush-allure, staring in the face of the constructed and 
costumed beauty of the unsuspecting beloved-actor-playing-a-
part-object.
Also in this description, Harman acknowledges this split and 
inference as the reterritorialization of the beauty onto the en-
tity lying beneath all of its marvelous qualities above.26 Timo-
thy Morton describes this mask as an aesthetic dimension: “In-
tense yet tricksterish, the aesthetic dimension floats in front of 
objects, like a group of disturbing clowns in an Expressionist 
painting or a piece of performance art whose boundaries are no-
where to be seen.”27 The reterritorialized qualities of the belov-
ed create through the illusion of style an aesthetic mirage, as a 
trickster who is a known crosser of boundaries, and overwhelms 
the perception of the bedazzled and jolted puppet-lover-object, 
matching its desire and longing to such an extent that it fails 
to see the seams and dirty shoes of the costumed mask of the 
severed qualities projected onto the beloved-object. Locked into 
a scenario or dance of crush-allure, the lover-object seems to be 
controlled by something beyond itself.
In discussing this phenomenon of the allure, Harman shifts 
through many words that imply a magical aspect to the effects 
on the lover-object in a state of the crush-allure: “bewitching,” 
“fascinating,” and “sorcery,” all indicating the condition of being 
“under the spell,” which is a perfect description of the condition 
of the lover-object in a performance of crush-allure. And Mor-
ton agrees: “To think this way is to begin to work out an object-
oriented view of causality. If things are intrinsically withdrawn, 
irreducible to their perception or relations or uses, they can only 
25 Ibid., 133.
26 Ibid., 136–38.
27 Timothy Morton, “Introduction: Objects in the Mirror are Closer than 
They Appear,” Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor: 
Open Humanities Press, 2013), 19.
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affect each other in a strange region out in front of them, a re-
gion of traces and footprints: the aesthetic dimension.”28 That 
“strange region,” outlines the mask itself; positioned in the cent-
er of the stage — in the “hot spot” of the stage lights, where its 
identity as the “traces and footprints” of its aesthetic, marks the 
blocking of the dance of the crush allure. Harman also notes this 
phenomenon of notes within a costumed presence that shields 
its identity with an applied mask: “Sensual objects are always 
completely present, they simply are not present in naked form, 
but instead are clothed in notes stolen from the other, contigu-
ous sensual objects.”29 This dance of clothed sensual note-ob-
jects twirling in the center of the stage is indeed a masquerade. 
However as Morton suggests, “Things are there, but they are 
not there.”30 Indeed. It is the anxious ambiguity of the paradox 
between of a sense of unity of the notes of the beloved-object, 
sharing the stage with the projected and severed qualities of 
the mask, that pivots both the real and the face of desire in the 
crush, as in a state of crush-allure, the lover-object is obsessed 
with the intricacies of the beloved-object’s self. And through the 
revelation of desire, this obsessive need to perceive and attract 
the beloved-object, creates the “fool’-lover-object — a histori-
cally present character of comedic drama — who we watch in 
cruel relief that it is not we who are bewitched.
Yet the term that is also linked to bewitchery that seems to be 
most handy for Harman, is charm. This term and his adoption 
of it appear in his chapter on “humor,” as one of the two “mecha-
nisms” within which he understands allure to operate. “Within 
the realm of allure,” says Harman, “there is a difference between 
humor, which feels superior to its object, and charm, which feels 
enchanted by it.”31 Charm is defined as: “a trait that fascinates, 
allures, or delights,” but also “a practice or expression believed to 
28 Ibid.
29 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 200.
30 Morton, Realist Magic, 16.
31 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 142.
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have magic power.”32 These two notes oscillate not only between 
a fascinating aesthetic and magic, but also between comedy and 
tragedy, a concept long ago associated with dramatic perfor-
mance. The hilarity of the pathetic performance of the jolted-
puppet-lover-object within the play of the crush-allure against 
the tragedy of impossibility and loss signifies the very kernel of 
humor, and is all part of the dramatic action embedded within 
the crush-allure’s scenario. It is this special prismatic effect and 
affect of these severed qualities and notes that dance center stage 
within Morton’s “aesthetic dimension” that characterize and 
place the charming jolted puppet within the realm of humor. As 
an aspect within the special case of the crush-allure — this be-
comes a sturdy foundation: as crushes are generally understood 
to be “charming” (as long as it is not happening to you), and “co-
medic,” in addition to being “pathetic.” These are the very roots 
of “pathos”; toggling these states in rapid repetitive emotional 
volleys for the lover-object. Harman describes it as “a kind of 
magnetic force that realigns our nervous systems. There is often 
an ambivalence between comedy and this sort of charm, with-
out their being the same thing. One moment I laugh […] and 
the next I am captivated by the sorcery of its being.”33 
Yet for the jolted puppet, who stands center stage within the 
masquerade, now deep in the thrall of the masked-beloved-
object, a further humiliation arises with the classic theatrical 
trick of the hilarious-because-uncontrollable gigantic codpiece 
of revealed, naked, erotic desire which is firmly attached to the 
jolted puppet’s costume — for all to see and for the jolted puppet 
to suffer. This is a very particular note of the crush-allure: that of 
embarrassment. Embarrassment parses the rotating play of trag-
edy and comedy, juxtaposing a wicked exposure of desire, with 
the charm and sincerity that is the pathos of the lover-object 
as fool. Harman explains this as a mode of vicarious causation:
32 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “charm,” http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/charm.
33 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 137.
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Humans do not really want to be recognized as free and dignified 
agents. Instead […] [they] would rather be recognized as stock 
characters […]. To be recognized solely as a bare consciousness is 
actually the root of all embarrassment. It is nakedness as such […]. 
Humiliation strips a lowly central agent of its socially recognized 
powers, leaving only the hapless striving ego on stage […].34
However, for the lover-object, there is also another specificity 
to the crush allure, a set of conditions and notes that create the 
very profile of the crush, enjoining the tragicomedy and acti-
vating the heat of the crush-allure machine: it is “play.” Ludic-
ity, “resides primarily in peoples’ relations and interactions […] 
whether intra-personal [or] inter-personal […] [play’s] varying 
manifestations gain their ludic character because of the initial 
pact established between individuals, which invests the behav-
ior of the participants with this character.”35 A concept made 
famous by the book, Homo Ludens (1938), written by Johan 
Huizinga, “refers not to a set of specific activities, but to a con-
text, a set of principles around which personal and collective 
experience is meaningfully engaged.”36 This set of contextual 
notes provides the motivations for the intense engagements be-
tween severed and masked qualities in dramatic action for the 
lover-object alone: the beloved-object — if playing by the rules 
of crush engagement — is unaware of the drama surrounding 
his/her/their body-object. In fact these rules are, according to 
Huizinga’s formula, essential for the existence of “play” notes 
to be activated. Further, according to these rules, play must lie 
“outside the antithesis of wisdom and folly, and equally outside 
those of truth and falsehood, good and evil.”37 Play explodes the 
34 Ibid., 213.
35 Conceição Lopes, “Ludicity — A Theoretical Term,” Department of Com-
munications and Art, University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal, paragraph 6, 
http://www.tasplay.org/taspfiles/pdfs/lopesludicitypaper.pdf.
36 Francis Hearn, “Toward a Critical Theory of Play,” Telos 30 (December 
1976): 145–60, at 150. 
37 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: Study of the Play Element in Culture (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1980), 3–6.
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binary conditions of the real world by being “free”; that is, by 
being outside the cultural operations of the real world — being 
instead an “aesthetic parallel world” wherein style is constantly 
reterritorialized and reordered according to desire of the player-
objects. As Huizinga suggests play “creates order, is order. Into 
an imperfect world and into the confusion of life it brings a tem-
porary, limited perfection.”38
Yet the most profound note sounded — not only for Huiz-
inga and the “play-notes,” but most deliciously for the lover-
object — despite the agonizing yearnings, the sighs of longing, 
and the inevitable unrequited ending — is that this performance 
must remain secret (with the exception of best friends, of 
course) — if the beloved becomes aware, it is no longer a crush. 
Huizinga considered this secret aspect of exclusivity to be the 
key aspect of play:
The exceptional and special position of play is most tellingly illus-
trated by the fact that it loves to surround itself with an air of secrecy 
[…], This is for us, not for the “others” […]. Inside the circle of the 
game the laws and customs of ordinary life no longer count. We are 
different and do things differently.39
The severed qualities of the quotidian experience are in fact 
in “play,” also masked; as elements — that is, as Harman would 
have it, as “the notes of sensual objects” which in the perfor-
mance of a crush-allure, “coexist side by side rather than fus-
ing together. Numerous elements are present in consciousness 
simultaneously.”40 So mechanisms of the elements from the real 
world are next to — or masked with — the elements of “play,” 
and so that the swiveling or vacillating of societally established 
rules versus the secret flaunting of those rules in “play,” create 
for the player, a sense of fun. It is the fun of this performance of 
38 Ibid., 10.
39 Ibid. 12
40 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 195.
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crush-allure, that is the lived experience of the lover-object, and 
a key attribute of Huizinga’s theory.
But in considering the actual subjective experience of being 
the lover-object — a severely jolted puppet — within this ludic 
state of crush-allure, that hegemony of intensely erotic, poign-
ant, and ridiculous emotion — always seems to be directed and 
controlled by some sort of superior source deep within the lov-
er-object. It is shrouded by darkened mists of notes unknown 
and incomprehensible to the conscious reckoning, to a source 
way in the back of the stage, embedded within the very struc-
tural aspect of the theater itself. Harman describes this presence 
by its methodology:
This invocation of objects is even the typical stratagem of seduc-
ers and manipulators. The seducer mumbles something under his 
breath, refusing to repeat it when she asks him, drawing her ever 
further into the clutches of his sham secret — or perhaps the secret 
is real.41
Ignoring for the moment Harman’s sexist approach, neverthe-
less I have come to believe this seducer/manipulator can be no 
other than that great, elusive, untouchable genius: the “with-
drawn object.” Not that we can ever fully apprehend it, under-
stand it, or even really conceive the content of its objecthood, or 
the character of its being — nevertheless, this is no other than 
the “Grand Guignol” — the “Theatre of the Big Puppet” where; 
People came […] for an experience, not only to see a show. The 
audience […] endured the terror of the shows because they wanted 
to be filled with strong “feelings” of something. Many attended the 
shows to get a feeling of arousal […] there were audience members 
who could not physically handle the brutality of the actions tak-
ing place on stage [as] Frequently, the “special effects” would be too 
41 Ibid., 152.
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realistic and often an audience member would faint and/or vomit 
during performances.42
Right? Is this not what having a crush is like? Harman insists we 
cannot ever apprehend the “great director,” as it is structurally 
impossible to turn around to face what is always on the other 
side of consciousness. Like a Derridean “trace,” the “withdrawn 
object” sits in binary opposition to our pathetic jolted-puppet-
of-a-self, exerting absolute control over our strings, forcing our 
notes and qualities to skip in merry eroticism toward the belov-
ed-object so totally wrong for us. Our adoration for the beloved-
object is illusionary, but truly experienced, yet seemingly out 
of our control. Crushes are overwhelmingly considered to be 
a false love. But for the lover-object it is so agonizingly felt; so 
obsessively real. Morton explains it this way:
If there are only objects, of time and space and causality […] the 
emergent properties of objects—if all these things float “in front of ” 
objects in what is called the aesthetic dimension, in a nontemporal, 
nonlocal space that is not in some beyond but right here, in your 
face—then nothing is going to tell us categorically what counts as 
real and what counts as unreal. Without space, without environ-
ment, without world, objects and their sensual effects crowd togeth-
er like leering figures in a masquerade.43
Precisely. Yet who can understand the reasoning of the with-
drawn puppeteer behind pulling the strings of the fool? It clearly 
emanates from the “withdrawn object” of the lover-object, yet 
as an aspect of the lover-object’s self, how can it be so cruel? 
Harman softens the blow by referring to this dictatorship as be-
ing “a strange sort of interference”44 that occurs “between two 
moments of a thing’s being, one that does not occur at all times 
42 Wikipedia, s.v. “Grand Guignol,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_
Guignol.
43 Morton, Realist Magic, 19.
44 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 143.
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as sincerity does, but one that simply either occurs or fails to 
occur.”45 This enigmatic statement is trying to parse how the 
power of the subterranean withdrawn object directs the process 
of allure, creating the “enchanted experience.” But how to pro-
tect ourselves from this comedy, or how to retain any pride in 
this ridiculous drama — we will never know. 
Yet are there other moments or applications in the subjective 
experience where this same masquerade of crush-allure might 
also appear to cloud our judgment and create an erotic frisson 
within a lover-object? As an “aesthetic dimension,” it might very 
well explain the experience of the viewer/audience/fan in the 
thrall of the work of art. Harman states: “Art is granted a sort of 
magic power, allowing us to confront the impossible depths of 
objects. Or rather, art is only granted the power of seeming to be 
able to do this.”46 Exactly. The “crush” effect of the art-lover-ob-
ject’s attraction toward an art-object acts in an analogous fashion 
as does for the lover-object toward the beloved-object — both 
sets of objects set off a condition of crush-allure, wherein the 
internal aesthetic notes of the art-lover-object’s desire projects a 
squadron of masking qualities as an obscuring veil center stage 
to wrap the art-object in a mask that reflects and resembles the 
art-lover-object’s own specific notes of desire, to append the art-
object — who/which already in some ways resemble certain of 
those referenced qualities of the art-lover-object’s desires. 
As Morton points out, there are other realms of object rela-
tion and causality wherein this dance of the crush-allure with 
its masking notes appears between object relations: “Aesthetic 
events are not limited to interactions between humans or be-
tween humans and painted canvases[…]. When you make or 
study art […]. You are making or studying causality. The aes-
thetic dimension is the causal dimension.”47 In our case, that caus-
al field is the melodramatic stage of the crush-allure. And the 
masking veil projected by the art-lover-object can be explained 
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 105.
47 Morton, Realist Magic, 19.
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this way: “the aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension, 
which in turn means that it is also the vast nonlocal mesh that 
floats ‘in front of ’ objects (ontologically, not physically ‘in front 
of ’).”48 These objects can be both and either inside or outside the 
subject-object.
So it would seem to be that in the center stage area, the gap 
or spatial extension — which is perhaps an easier way to think 
of this phenomenon as a chōrismos, or “irreducible gap”49 as 
Morton as framed it — which is the very realm of this aesthetic 
dimension, and in the case of any condition of allure, also the 
moment of causality. Harman defines this moment as “a spe-
cial and intermittent experience in which the intimate bond be-
tween a thing’s unity and its plurality of notes somehow partially 
disintegrates” and creates a “strange sort of interference between 
two moments of a thing’s being.”50 And it is in the condition of 
the crush-allure, and perhaps even all conditions of allure, that 
the distant hum of the amatory notes invisibly emitted from the 
dark, withdrawn suzerain directing the action, creates unique, 
even quixotic interactions that deliver the magical, if not embar-
rassing, effects of the crush. For the lover-object, it is the effect 
of a loss of control: reddened cheeks, speeding heart rates, and 
the inability to focus on anything but the beloved-object, which 
are signals emanating from the deep directorial authority of the 
Grand Guignol, the withdrawn object. For the condition of the 
crush-allure is indeed the “Theater of the Big Puppet,” and we as 
subject-objects in the moment of the crush-allure, are the jolted 
puppets in the throes of a vicarious — but fun — causation.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 24.
50 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 143.
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(W)omen out/of Time: Metis, Medea, Mahakali
Nandita Biswas Mellamphy
In memory of my father who was a great devotee of the Mad Mother.
Medea, the woman, knows that she is going to die unless she calls 
out to the Other. “For whoever wants me dead, I can be barbaric.” 
Faced with panic, one must be able to recreate another world without 
common measure with the one that is found to be lacking, not just 
return a mediocre blow for blow. “Being barbaric.” “Being Medea.”
— Isabelle Stengers, Souviens-toi que je suis Médée1
By subverting, mocking, or rejecting conventional norms and 
opening onto the realm of the forbidden (the realm of “forbid-
den things”), “kaligraphy” — the inscription/incarnation of Kali, 
goddess of destruction — stretches one’s consciousness beyond the 
conventional and socially sanctioned, thereby “liberat[ing] [it] 
from the inherited, imposed, and probably inhibiting categories 
of proper and improper, good and bad, polluted and pure.”
 — Dan Mellamphy, “Kaligraphy”2 
1 Isabelle Stengers, Souviens-toi que je suis Médée (Paris: Empêcheurs penser 
en rond, 1993), 13. All translations from this text are mine.
2 Dan Mellamphy, “Kaligraphy,” in Serial Killing: A Philosophical Anthology, 
eds. Edia Connole & Gary J. Shipley (London: Schism Press, 2015), 135.
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We are no longer a part of the drama of alienation; we live in 
the ecstasy of communication. And this ecstasy is obscene. The 
obscene is what does away with every mirror, every look, ev-
ery image. The obscene puts an end to every representation. 
— Jean Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication”3
“What if Truth were an Omen?” I ask (with a nod to Ni-
etzsche4 — through a glass, darkly). What if Truth were a Nam-
shub, a Magic Word/Work, the nomen of an omen? Such a truth 
advances here — in this essay — masked as women. Metis, Me-
dea, and Mahakali — first, a Pelasgian Titan, the first wife of 
Zeus and unacknowledged mother of Athena, who was doomed 
to be swallowed up whole and usurped by the head of Olympus; 
second, a foreign priestess of the chthonic Hecate, who (as first 
told in Apollonius of Rhodes’ Argonautika and later immortal-
ized by Euripides and Seneca) helps the Greek Jason retrieve 
the mythic golden fleece, and who eventually murders her entire 
family and escapes back to Colchis; and finally, a fringe Hindu 
goddess first worshipped by criminals and outcastes, a dark de-
ity clothed in severed heads, who drinks the blood of her vic-
tims and resides in the cremation-ground — one who comes to 
be adopted as an incarnation of great time (mahākāla) or death 
itself in Hindu religion.
All three are women who are omens and mothers who are 
others: that is, each is an outsider (foreign, marginal, outcast) 
with regard to the contexts/constructs of civilization (all three 
autochthonous in origin, as we shall see, and portending the 
subversion of propriety), and each brings about the heretical 
vision of a death and destruction of order and civility, mak-
ing it impossible to build an alternate politics from and upon 
3 Jean Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication,” in The Anti-Aesthetic: 
Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (Washington, dc: Bay Press, 
1983), 150.
4 “Suppose that truth is a woman — and why not?” (Friedrich Nietzsche, 
“Preface” to Beyond Good and Evil, eds. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith 




them. Rather than serving as a ground — as archetypes, ideal 
types and/or avatars — of subjectivity or of alternative agency, 
these three (w)omen are strictly speaking abysmal stigmata or 
wounds: 
[T]he puncturing puncta that cut into the context qua con-job of 
culture, revealing the kha of khaos — that gushing gap, oozing ori-
fice, or terribly terrific tear in the fabric of phenomena (phenom-
enal fabrications) which wounds the world “as we know it.” Stable 
forms find themselves fissured, fractured, fragmented, and (via this 
“fragmentation,” “fracturing,” or “fission’) formidably fluid, bleed-
ing beyond their beseeming boundaries.5 
In the following, I suggest that Metis, Medea, and Mahakali 
are all associated with matrices, and all embody the matrix of 
holes — or (w)hole-matrix — that disjunctively conjoins6 a fabric 
or network of relations. Metis’s cunning intelligence (mētis) is 
said to involve the “interlacing of opposite directions” produc-
ing “an enigma in the true sense of the word”7 that constitutes 
“living bond[s]”/double-binds which “bind” and “secure” but 
5 Dan Mellamphy, “Kaligraphy,” 135. 
6 Cf. Heraclitus’s Fragment 10 on “syllapsis” (Heraclitean synthesis): “that 
which is whole and not whole, drawn-together and drawn-asunder, har-
monious and discordant” (http://www.heraclitusfragments.com/B10/index.
html).
7 “It is what the Greeks sometimes call ainigma and sometimes griphos, for an 
enigma is twisted together like a basket or a wheel. In one of his dialogues 
Plutarch writes of the Sphinx twisting together her enigmas or riddles (ain-
igmata kai griphous plekousan), devising the questions which Sophocles 
describes as poikila, shimmering, many-coloured, shifting. The composi-
tion of some of the best known riddles reveals the tangle of forms and the 
shimmering of different colours which give them the disturbing mobility of 
speech which seems constantly vibrating, never for a moment remaining 
the same as it was. […] The answer which allows [Polyeidos] to escape from 
the aporia is the infallible grip with which he catches and binds the shifting 
and mobile words of the riddle” — (Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Ver-
nant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, trans. Janet Lloyd 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978], 303–4); for more on this, see 
Dan Mellamphy, “Between Beckett & Bec: The Mètic Hexis and Flusserian 
Flux of Vampyroteuthis Abductionis,” in Marshall McLuhan and Vilém 
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themselves elude capture.8 Medea too is said to be endowed with 
mētis, the cunning technical intelligence that is itself “net-like” 
and necessitates a knowing how (i.e., “know-how” 9) to manipu-
late the matrix of interlaced oppositions. As living magical nets 
that gain (rather than lose) their power through the paradoxi-
cal contiguity of oppositions (and thus through the eluding and 
exceeding of definition), all three — Metis, Medea and Mahaka-
li — bind and thus mediate, but ultimately remain unbound and 
unmediated themselves (and thus undomesticated and barbaric 
from the point of view of civility and the civitas), proceeding 
by way of oblique rather than linear pathways, by deception, il-
lusion, and contagion rather than by way of logic, law, and le-
gitimacy. Each has been anthropomorphized (that is, made to 
represent woman, gender, sexual politics of varying sorts), but 
each is incorrectly deemed human10 and should instead be con-
Flusser’s Communication + Aesthetic Theories Revisited, eds. Melenti Pan-
dilovski and Tom Kohut (Winnipeg: Video Pool Media Arts Center, 2015).
8 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 
41–42.
9 “Right from the start the passage giving praise to the metis of the Corin-
thians and their inventions, sophismata, seems inseparable from the myth 
telling of Athena’s discovery of an instrument capable of taming a horse 
and making it submit to its rider. But this same form of intelligence is then 
further illustrated by Sisyphus and Medea, the two heroes in Corinthian 
mythology who are most fully endowed with metis. With his artfulness, his 
gift of the gab, his skill in disguising his promises just as he changes the ap-
pearance and colour of the herds which he lures away from his neighbours, 
Sisyphus, the Death-deceiver, emphasises the proportion of malice which 
enters into the intelligence of cunning. As for Medea, the first of a long line 
of women who are experts in the use of poisons, love-philtres, spell-binding 
magic, pharmaka metioenta, she is there to illustrate the importance of the 
part played in the technical intelligence, which is the subject of this twofold 
account, by another, darker, aspect, an element of magic, several features of 
which we have already noted in connection with Athena” (ibid., 189).
10 This is lifted from the final endnote of “Ghost in the Shell-Game: On the 
Mètic Mode of Existence, Inception & Innocence” The Funambulist, Dec. 
3, 2014, n. 35, http://www.thefunambulist.net/2013/12/04/funambulist-pa-
pers-46-ghost-in-the-shell-game-on-the-metic-mode-of-existence-incep-
tion-and-innocence-by-nandita-biswas-mellamphy/#35, where I refer to 
Dan Mellamphy, “The Sorcerer’s Magic Milieu,” Ozone: Journal of Object-
Oriented Ontology 1 (2013), in which he quotes the young Gilles Deleuze 
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sidered inhuman and overhuman: “If Medea had been avenged, 
like us simple mortals, she would have paid the price for her act 
of revenge. She has entered into a contract with humanity and 
the contract has been broken.”11 This is one context in which we 
can understand Medea’s defiant statement that she can be bar-
baric12); “being Medea” means being untamable, unassimilable, 
un-anthropomorph(ize)able — that is, being inhuman and/or 
overhuman. 
[F]our-armed, garlanded with skulls and with disheveled hair, she 
holds a freshly-cut human head and a bloodied scimitar in her left 
hands while making signs for fearlessness, assurance, and the be-
stowing of boons with her right hands. Her neck adorned with a 
garland of severed human heads all dripping blood, a severed head 
hanging from each of her earlobes, she wears a girdle of severed 
human hands round her waist [...] and the smile on her lips glistens 
with blood [...] as her three eyes burn red, glaring like two rising 
suns.”13 
Mahakali, as such, might be the clearest articulation of a pre-
human and overhuman assemblage which is arguably becoming 
emblematic of an emergent planetary-wide “network-centric 
condition”:14 she is always multiple, heterogeneous, and terrify-
ingly in-/over-human.
who himself quotes the translated Giovanni Malfatti di Montereggio (a.k.a. 
Jean Malfatti de Montereggio a.k.a. Johann Malfatti von Monteregio), La 
mathèse, ou: anarchie et hiérarchie de la science, trans. Christien Ostrowski 
(Paris: Editions du Griffon d’Or, 1946), xii:“[doesn’t such a mathesis,] how-
ever, surpass this ‘living human nature’? — [for] it defines itself as [a] collec-
tive and supreme knowledge, [a] universal synthesis, ‘[a] living unity incor-
rectly deemed human.’”
11 Isabelle Stengers, Souviens-toi que je suis Médée, 11. 
12 Ibid., 13.
13 David R. Kinsley, The Sword and the Flute — Kali and Krsna: Dark Visions 
of the Terrible and the Sublime in Hindu Mythology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), 1.
14 Dan Mellamphy and Nandita Biswas Mellamphy (eds.), The Digital Dio-
nysus: Nietzsche and the Network-Centric Condition (Earth: punctum 
books, 2016). 
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So, although all three are personifications and principles of 
ancient, bygone cultures (effroyablement anciennes, in fact15), I 
argue that they are particularly relevant because they conjure 
and evoke an important aspect of the networked future — par-
ticularly, the chthonic16 matrix that is currently manifesting 
itself, corresponding to what Alexander Galloway calls not a 
“hermeneutic” or “iridescent”17 but a “furious” mediation:
After Hermes and Iris, instead of a return to hermeneutics (the 
critical narrative) or a return to phenomenology (the iridescent 
arc), there is a third mode that combines and annihilates the other 
15 Ancien — effroyablement ancien, in the words of Maurice Blanchot, which 
Roger Laporte used as the title for his study of the latter (Paris: Editions Fata 
Morgana, 1987). 
16 From Greek khthonios (“in, under, or beneath the earth,” from khthōn, 
“earth”; pertaining to the Earth; earthy; subterranean), which designates, 
or pertains to, deities or spirits of the underworld, especially in relation to 
Greek religion. The Greek word khthōn is one of several for “earth”; it typi-
cally refers to the interior of the soil rather than to the living surface of the 
land (as gaia or gē does) or to the land as territory (khōra) does (cf. http://
www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=chthonic). The chthonic here is 
distinguished from the gaian, from the Greek Gaia, mother of the Titans, 
personification of “earth” as opposed to heaven, “land” as opposed to sea, 
“land, country, soil” as collateral form of gē (or the Dorian gā), meaning 
“earth,” of unknown origin, perhaps pre-Indo-European. The Roman equiv-
alent earth-goddess was Tellus (see tellurian), sometimes used in English, 
poetically or rhetorically, to designate “Earth personified” or “the Earth as a 
planet” (cf. http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=gaia).
17 “Given the convoluted twists and turns of Hermes’s travels, the text is best 
understood as a problem. Likewise, given the aesthetic gravity of immedi-
ate presence in Iris’s bow, the image is best understood as a poem. Thus, 
whereas hermeneutics engages with the problem of texts, iridescence en-
gages with the poetry of images be they visual or otherwise. Hermeneutics 
views media (of whatever kind, be it text, image, sound, etc.) as if they were 
textual problems needing to be solved. Yet iridescence views these same 
media as if they were poetic images waiting to be experienced. […] The cul-
minating moment of hermeneutics is always a type of mystical revelation, 
a lightning strike. Yet the culminating moment of iridescence is an aurora, 
a blooming, the glow of a sacred presence” (Alexander Galloway, “Love of 
the Middle,” in Alexander Galloway, Eugene Thacker, and McKenzie Wark, 
Excommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and Mediation [Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2013], 46, 55). 
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two. For after Hermes and Iris there is another divine form of pure 
mediation, the distributed network, which finds incarnation in the 
incontinent body of what the Greeks called first the Erinyes and 
later the Eumenides, and the Romans called the Furies. So instead 
of a problem or a poem, today we must confront a system. A third 
divinity must join the group: not a man, not a woman, but a pack 
of animals.18 
The networked condition that is currently manifesting it-
self is becoming more and more furious (“pack animal”-like), 
that is, prehistoric, nonhuman/inhuman, heterogeneous, and 
multiple,19 consequently less and less anthropocentric — i.e., hu-
manistically hermeneutic and descriptively dialectical. 
It has been commonplace — even politically necessary — for 
feminist theorization since the first wave to ground itself in and 
reproduce the conditions for what Baudrillard called “the drama 
of alienation,” that Primal Scene of Sovereign power20 in which 
a primordial heterogeneity is turned into a difference that can 
18 Ibid., 56.
19 “[The Furies] move through contagion. They are called a ‘bloody ravening 
pack’ by Aeschylus, and often described as animals or swarms. The Furies 
are essentially indeterminate in number […]. If Hermes is a self, and Iris is 
a life, the Furies are an ecosystem, a swarm, a cloud” (ibid., 57–58).
20 As an encapsulation of the Primal Scene of Sovereign power, see for ex-
ample Christopher Long’s account of the legacy of Metis: “From its very 
beginnings, patriarchal dominion has always established its authority and 
won legitimacy by a subversion of the feminine that arises out of an im-
plicit recognition of feminine power. Swallowing Metis, Zeus secures the 
stable order of his divine rule; sacrificing Iphigenia, Agamemnon asserts 
his authority as sovereign; denying the Erinyes their vengeance, Athena 
founds the human community that bears her name. Each of these stories 
articulates a dimension of the tragic dialectic of patriarchal dominion: a 
feminine power is subverted in a foundational act of decision designed to 
establish and consolidate patriarchal authority; this act of subversion then 
wins legitimacy by repression as it is designated inevitable and identified 
with the natural order of things” (Christopher Long, “The Daughters of Me-
tis: Patriarchal Dominion and the Politics of the Between,” Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal 28, no. 2 [2007], 67–86, at 67). Versions and variations 
of this basic dialectical scene can be found in various feminist discourses of 
the 20th century. 
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be dualized and disciplined, that is, structured dialectically as 
the antagonistic and agonistic (i.e., alienating and potentially 
transformative) relations between two forces, or identities, or 
parties (e.g., order and chaos, master and slave, self and other, 
male and female, masculine and feminine, patriarchal and ma-
triarchal, hetero and homo, light and dark, inside and outside, 
etc., to name just a few of the dualities that have been in play for 
centuries). Dialectics — the contestation between opponents or 
opposing elements, adopted largely from the inheritance of the 
ancient Greeks — has been the governing metaphor and model 
for human action and communication in all spheres from war, 
policy, and ethics, to poetics, aesthetics, and informatics. 
Mythically, this governing metaphor is not just as a descrip-
tion for relations of exchange in which one element encounters/
relates to another, but more precisely it is an intellectual mecha-
nism for conceptualizing knowledge as the product of a funda-
mental asymmetric relation of domination and subjugation in 
which one element, identified as primary, subjugates and incor-
porates, as well as metabolizes and eliminates, another element 
which it encounters as a “strange externality.” In the Theogony, 
just as order subjugates chaos and patriarchy usurps matriarchy, 
so the victory of the Olympians over the Titans (the old chthonic 
pantheon) is enacted in a Primal Scene of subjugation and in-
corporation that thereafter gets repeated: Zeus swallows his first 
wife, the Oceanid Metis, thereby initiating the entire drama of 
the Olympian pantheon. Metis’s incorporation and domestica-
tion by Zeus is the mythic source for the subsequent usurpa-
tion of the chthonic gods by the new Olympian order; Athena, 
Hermes, Apollo are all said have inherited mētis through Zeus’s 
incorporation of Metis’s powers; and the chthonic Furies are 
also thereafter subjugated and coopted by the goddess Athe-
na — in the name of her father Zeus Pater — and renamed the 
“Eumenides” or “kindly ones.” This is the drama of alienation 
that is literally meant to put that which is off-stage (ob-scena) 
onto center stage, and in so doing justify the gesture of politi-
cal domestication that founds the Sovereign’s power over an 
Other that is initially encountered as unfamiliar, unknown and 
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external, but becomes familiar, known, and internalized. The 
obscenity of Metis is transformed through her subjugation and 
assimilation by Zeus: the strange externality that was Metis, 
now incorporated by Zeus, becomes the catalyst for the birth of 
Athena, and, as such, the precondition for the emergence of the 
quintessential Greek invention, the polis. 
For so long, this basic dialectical model set the scene for the 
incorporation and domestication of the obscene, that uncanny 
other the integration of which founds the scenes and circuits of 
human communication and exchange. The structure of dialec-
tics, like that of the theatrical scene (as well as of the mirror), 
sets up a dynamic — the very drama of alienation according 
to Baudrillard — in which the necessary division and distance 
between two different but related elements (i.e., subject/object) 
is posited, reversed, and overcome. The city thus encounters a 
menacing and ungraspable exteriority, one that makes light of 
and does not submit to the Laws except on its own terms.21 Has 
civilization been able to digest the obscenity of Metis, Medea, 
and Mahakali? 
This drama of alienation and the politics of dialectical subju-
gation, incorporation and transformation no longer adequately 
reflect the (hyper)realities of our current network-centric con-
dition, which, as Baudrillard had suggested, depends no longer 
on a communicative and agonistic model of dialectics, differ-
ence and reconciliation, but rather on a protean, interfacial, and 
reticulated model of contiguity which entails the reversibility 
between identical things: 
The description of this whole intimate universe — projective, imagi-
nary and symbolic — still corresponded to the object’s status as mir-
ror of the subject, and that in turn to the imaginary depths of the 
mirror and “scene”: there is a domestic scene, a scene of interiority, 
a private space-time (correlative, moreover, to a public space).22 […] 
But today the scene and mirror no longer exist; instead, there is a 
21 Stengers, Souviens-toi que je suis Médée, 16–17.
22 Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication,” 145–67.
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screen and network. In place of the reflexive transcendence of mir-
ror and scene, there is a nonreflecting surface, an immanent surface 
where operations unfold the smooth operational surface of com-
munication. […] No more fantasies of power, speed and appropria-
tion linked to the object itself, but instead a tactic of potentialities 
linked to usage: mastery, control and command, an optimalization 
of the play of possibilities offered by the car as vector and vehicle, 
and no longer as object of psychological sanctuary. […] [I]t’s all 
over with speed […]. Now, however, it is an ecological ideal that 
installs itself at every level. No more expenditure, consumption, 
performance, but instead regulation, well-tempered functionality, 
solidarity among all the elements of the same system, control and 
global management of an ensemble.23 
How is it possible to imagine otherness and alterity outside the 
schema of dialectical difference and resistance, and within the 
context of the feedback circuit that is structured like a Möbius 
strip24 — no longer a scene of events but an ob-scene and het-
erogeneous medium/mediation in which, instead of agonisms 
and antagonisms, there are only environmental modulations, 
tendencies, and thresholds? 
Metis, Medea, and Mahakali are best considered in light of 
ob-scenity, the (furious) (w)hole-matrix that both mediates and 
subverts logic, law, and civilized channels, including those of the 
masculine and the patriarchal, but also — of the feminine and 
the maternal. As figures that presage not just doom but total 
destruction, these omens are not mediable/mediatable by logos 
or Olympian logic (the principle of Order); all three are portents 
of dark and occluded, autochthonous, and underground forces; 
23 Ibid., 146.
24 “There is no topology more beautiful than the Möbius strip to designate the 
contiguity of the close and the distant, of interior and exterior, of object and 
subject, of the computer screen and the mental screen of our brain inter-
twined with each other in the same spiral. In the same way, information and 
communication always feed back in a kind of incestuous convolution” (Jean 
Baudrillard, “The Vanishing Point of Communication,” in Jean Baudrillard: 
Fatal Theories, eds. David Clarke et al. [New York: Routledge, 2009], 21). 
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and all three make use of many temporalities, weaving ways in 
and out of various timeframes (kairos, chronos, aiōn), eventu-
ally subverting and destroying any stable framework, framed 
world, or categorical identity through the cunning and magical 
manipulation of the very logic and grammar of that order, using 
and abusing identity by way of so(u)rcery (autochthonous and 
elemental but occulted powers), and (s)witchcraft (the occult 
arts/sciences). 25 These (w)omen who are (m)others, inhuman 
and invincible, derive their omnipotence from subverting and 
flaunting the strictures of consistency and constancy, paternity 
and maternity, marriage and motherhood, literally spilling blood 
in order to bleed these institutions dry. Their occult powers are 
directly linked to metamorphosis and illusion, and accessed 
through magical linguistic manipulations.26 In this sense, each is 
not only associated with the magical forces of speech, manipula-
tion of logos/logic, riddles and enigmas, but also with the power 
of mutation: each is herself the manifestation and concretiza-
tion of (and catalyst for) the enigma, the riddle, the puzzle and 
piège.27 Like the magical forces of language that they summon to 
help their allies and subdue their enemies, Metis, Medea, and 
Mahakali are traps (called “strephomena, as are the puzzles set 
by the gods of metis”) and nets (“which the Greeks call griphoi 
25 Cf. Mellamphy, “The Sorcerer’s Magic Milieu.”
26 Metis is said to be “multiple (pantoie), manycoloured (poikile), shifting 
(aiole)” (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and 
Society, 20). “Medea is said to have cast the glamour: spells that ‘fetter the 
eyes’ — inclusive of 1) magical incantations that bind and unbind ‘curse-
tablets’ (katadesmoi), 2) knowledge of ‘nonstandard forms of speech’ such 
as the voces mysticae, 3) the ability to decipher ‘unrecognizable symbols’ or 
charakteres, as well as 4) abilities to move or change physical objects and 
processes, to change and mix-up ‘physical order and appearance’ — indeed, 
the word grimoire, a secret book of witchcraft and spells containing obscure 
language or illegible writing, is derived from grammaire, of which the word 
glamour is also a derivative” (Amy Wygant, Medea, Magic, and Modernity 
in France [Hampshire: Ashgate Press, 2007], 16).
27 lure, ruse, snare and/or trap (piège is also a pitfall, a portal to an abyss) 
(http://www.en.wiktionary.org/wiki/pi%C3%A8ge).
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[…], the name given to some types of fishing-nets”28). As omens 
that are also enigmas, Metis, Medea, and Mahakali act like 
namshubs:29 spells (destructive codes/code-words/code-works) 
that contaminate and destroy logos itself — not archetypes of 
communication per se but monstrous aberrations that are har-
bingers of total logical and semantic breakdown. All three en-
act what they describe: they are catalysts for and mechanisms 
of total informational apocalypse (what Scott Bakker calls “the 
semantic apocalypse” and Neal Stephenson in Snow Crash the 
“infocalypse”30), wherein language ceases to be hermeneutically 
“communicative” and instead becomes “oracular,” where “lan-
guage changes into an oracle”31 in the words of Michel Leiris32; 
28 “Through her name, Clytaemnestra is connected with metis. In her descrip-
tion of the net which she will use to trap Agamemnon and bind him in 
aporia (Aeschylus, Agamemnon 1382), moreover, she also activates the asso-
ciation of metis with fishing. This illustrates the complexity and adaptability 
of the notion of metis to different contexts” (Evelien Bracke, Of Metis and 
Magic: The Conceptual Transformation of Circe and Medea in Ancient Greek 
Poetry, PhD dissertation, University of Maynooth, 2009, 64–65). 
29 “Namshub is a word from Sumerian,” writes Neal Stephenson in his novel 
Snow Crash: “A nam-shub is a speech with magical force. The closest Eng-
lish equivalent would be ‘incantation,’ but this has a number of incorrect 
connotations. […] The nam-shub of Enki is both a story and an incanta-
tion” — ”A self-fulfilling fiction” (Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash [New York: 
Random House, 2003], 211). 
30 Scott Bakker, “The Semantic Apocalypse,” Speculative Heresy, Nov. 26, 
2008, http://speculativeheresy.wordpress.com/2008/11/26/the-semantic-
apocalypse; Neal Stephenson, “The Infocalypse,” in Snow Crash (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1992), 69, 111, 205, 218. 
31 This magical omniscience is not Olympian — it is not the insight of Zeus’s 
second wife Themis (“patron to the oracles of the earth”), for example — but 
that of Metis, “daughter of Okeanos and Tethys,” oracle of the waters. “The 
divining words of Themis express the necessity, the irrevocability of divine 
decrees which men can do nothing to avoid. When Metis is consulted as an 
oracle she speaks of the future from the point of view of a trial between men 
and gods, seeing it as a subtle and dangerous game where nothing is fixed in 
advance, in which those consulting the gods must know how to time their 
questions opportunely, accepting or rejecting the oracle and even turning 
into their own advantage an answer given by the god in favour of their ad-
versary” (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and 
Society, 127).
32 As quoted in Mellamphy, “Kaligraphy,” 136, n. 31.
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or again, what Galloway would call “iridescent” or “immanent” 
(ex)communication), and then finally infuriated, contagious, 
viral.33 
The challenge, then, is to conceptualize Metis, Medea, and 
Mahakali from the perspective of networks — or more precisely, 
(w)hole-matrices — rather than from that of dialectics (with its 
agonistic political model corresponding to what Galloway de-
scribes within the context of the Hermeneutic and Iridescent 
models of communication and mediation). In their most omi-
nous sense (literally as “omen” rather than as “type[s]”), let us 
think of Metis, Medea and Mahakali as 1) deployments within 
a magical (i.e., contagious and technical) environment and 2) 
architects of contingency or “tensegrity” to use a term coined by 
Buckminster Fuller34 (i.e., networked hole matrices) who/which 
33 Galloway, “Love of the Middle,” 57. 
34 Take, for instance, Fuller’s explanation of the dynamical principles of the 
geodesic dome or what he calls Geodesic Tensegrity, discontinuous-com-
pression, continuous-tension structures which are networked hole matrices 
in the way I have here tried to explore: “If we make microscopic inspec-
tion of a pneumatic balloon, we will find that the balloon skin is full of 
holes between its molecular chains, with a secondary and far smaller space 
continuity of ‘all holes’ or ‘continuous space’ between the remotely-islanded 
energetic components of each molecule’s respective atomic nuclear constel-
lations. All these humanly invisible balloon ‘holes’ are too small for mole-
cules of gas to escape through. Because the balloons skin is full of holes, it is 
really a subvisible spherical netting, rather than a ‘flexibly solid film,’ within 
which the gaseous element molecules are crowded into lesser volume than 
required by their respective energetic, ecological domains, like fish within 
a seiner’s net. The resultants of forces of all these net-frustrated molecular 
actions is angularly outward of the balloon’s geometrical center — each sur-
face molecule of the interior group of pressured gas has a vectorial action 
and reaction pattern identical to a spherical chord. In such enclosure of 
pressured gas, random sizes of molecules, each too large for the spherical 
molecular netting’s hold impinge randomly upon the interior webbing of 
the spherically tensioned net. There are, therefore, more outwardly pressing 
molecules and more inwardly restraining net components than are neces-
sary to the structurally resultant balloon pattern integrity. However, in the 
geodesic, tensional integrity, spherical nets the islands of interior compres-
sional chordal struts impinge in discrete order at the exact vertexes of the 
enclosing finite tensional network. My independent satellite or moon struc-
tures are then the most economical, frequency modulated, dynamic balanc-
146
after the “speculative turn”
themselves function as mechanisms that introduce incalcula-
bility and novelty into a system. The obscenity (that is Metis, 
Medea, and Mahakali) always risks exposing the susceptibility 
of human relations to the fury of Contingency which engen-
ders the very thing that the social order struggles to contain 
and exclude. The obscenity functions, as such, like a catalyst for 
“phase transition, like that between liquid and crystal, a change 
of identity.”35 
To illustrate my point, take Metis for example. From a her-
meneutical and dialectical viewpoint (which, to bring back Ba-
udrillard, revolves around the drama of alienation and trans-
formation), the story of Metis is a narrative about patriarchy, 
gender inequality, feminine power and experientiality. Metis, 
the epitome of cunning wisdom (mētis), described in the The-
ogony as “she who knows most of all the gods and humans,”36 
is represented as the subjugated female/subjugated femininity/
subjugated foreignness and interpreted as being a strange ex-
ternality that must be incorporated in order to constitute Zeus’s 
sovereignty. Only by absorbing her magic “down into his belly”37 
does Zeus succeed in containing her: the masculine absorbs and 
domesticates the feminine. Zeus deploys mētis to consume Me-
tis: he tricks her into turning herself into a fly and then swal-
lows her, but she is already with child. This child, Athena, who 
later comes out of Zeus’s head, will attest that she was begotten 
by no mother but only a father.38 Undigested, Metis is poison 
es between outward bound resultants of force and inward bound resultants 
of force. The exterior tensional net is a finite system successfully binding 
the otherwise randomly entropic infinity of outbound, self-disassociative 
forces” (R. Buckminster Fuller, “Tensegrity” [1961], http://www.RWGray-
Projects.com/rbfnotes/fpapers/tensegrity/tenseg01.html). See also §700 of 
his Synergetics: Explorations in the Geometry of Thinking, http://www.RWG-
rayprojects.com/synergetics/print/pc.pdf. 
35 Stengers, Souviens-toi que je suis Médée, 14. 
36 Long, “The Daughters of Metis,” 68.
37 Ibid., 69.
38 “There is no mother anywhere who gave me birth, and, but for marriage, I 
am always for the male with all my heart, and strongly on my father’s side. 
So, in a case where the wife has killed her husband, lord of the house, her 
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(ominous, unstable, and wreaking havoc); but once digested, 
Zeus tries to not only civilize and politicize her magical force, 
but once domesticated, also gives it royal status as permanent 
and universal.39 And so, cosmic order and sovereign power take 
root only by incorporating/domesticating/transforming Metis/
mētis, she/that who/which would destroy all order and all poli-
tics: the new Olympian order begins with the progeny of Zeus 
and Themis. Themis, not Metis, is the fertile ground from which 
springs the stable, continuous and regulated world of the Olym-
pian gods. The hermeneutic and dialectical are thus revealed to 
also be hierarchical: 
[Themis’s] role is to indicate what is forbidden, what frontiers must 
not be crossed and the hierarchy that must be respected for each in-
dividual to be kept forever within the limits of his own domain and 
status. Metis, on the other hand, intervenes at moments when the 
divine world seems to be still in movement or when the balance of 
the powers which operate within it appears to be momentarily up-
set. […] The cunning of Metis constitutes a threat to any established 
order; her intelligence operates in the realm of what is shifting and 
unexpected in order the better to reverse situations and overturn 
hierarchies which appear unassailable.40 
Thus dialectics cannot fully digest Metis because she cannot 
be fully domesticated by hierarchies (even reversed and trans-
formed ones). Instead of being hierarchical, metic intelligence is 
distributed and duplicitous (the French word duplice connotes 
death shall not mean most to me” (Aeschylus, Eumenides, ll. 736–40, in The 
Classical Greek Reader, eds. Kenneth John Atchity and Rosemary McKenna 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996], 106).
39 “Not content to unite himself to Metis by his first marriage, Zeus made him-
self metic by swallowing her. It was a wise precaution: once she had con-
ceived Athena, Metis would — if Zeus had not forestalled her — have given 
birth to a son stronger than his father, who would have dethroned him just 
as he himself had overthrown his own father. Henceforth, however, there 
can be no metis possible without Zeus or directed against him” (Detienne 
and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 13–14).
40 Ibid., 107–8.
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both duplicity and duplication qua multiplicity): in this case, 
Metis is both poison — the threat to any established order as the 
quote above suggests — as well as possible cure (pharmakon) 
that leads to the establishment of Olympian hierarchical order. 
While Metis, the pharmakon, can be incorporated by Zeus, she 
cannot be allowed to contaminate order, and so must be exclud-
ed and held at bay. 
Indeed, as Sarah Kofman suggested in her study of cunning 
intelligence, the entire foundation of Western thought from 
Plato onward has been firmly anchored to this Olympian sov-
ereign principle which is constituted by the exclusion of cun-
ning intelligence (mētis), “that which proceeds by way of twists 
and turns.”41 Kofman also highlights the connection Plato made 
in The Symposium — following the Orphic tradition — between 
Metis and Eros, whose coupling produced a son, Poros. Poros 
(the root of the English “porous”) can be translated as passage 
or pathway, but it can also be translated as expedient, or a way 
out (the correlative term aporia being translated as “obstacle”). 
Metis, as cunning intelligence, is thus linked to multiplicity, in-
calculability, and the subversion of any limit or hierarchy:
The family tie between Poros and Metis is an undissolvable link be-
tween the path, the pathway, the forging forward, resourcefulness, 
guile, expediency, techne, light and limit (peiras). […] To say that 
poros is a pathway across a liquid expanse is to underline that it 
is never drawn in advance, always erasable, always to be redrawn 
in a novel way. We are talking about poros when it is about open-
ing up a way where there does not exist or cannot exist any way, 
properly speaking; when it is about crossing over an uncrossable, 
unknown, hostile, [and] unlimited world, apeiron, that is impos-
sible to cross from one end to the other; the marine abyss, pontos, it 
41 “Plato, in the name of Truth, would relegate this entire conceptual idea to 
darkness, and condemn its ways of understanding and practical modalities; 
in particular, he would denounce its oblique, vague and uncertain process-
es, opposing them to the one, exact and rigorous science, the philosophical 
episteme, contemplative by nature” (Sarah Kofman, Comment s’en sortir? 
[Paris: Editions Galilée, 1983], 13–14, all translations mine).
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is aporia itself, aporon because it is apeiron: the sea is the unending 
reign of pure movement, the most mobile space, the most changing, 
the most polymorphous, where all heretofore paths that have been 
drawn erase themselves, transforming all navigation into an ever 
novel, dangerous and uncertain exploration.42 
Detienne and Vernant also link mētis with the ruses of the sea, 
especially to the cunning tactics of the octopus and fish.43 Mētis 
is fluid, mobile, ever-masked, and polymorphous; mētis can 
bind elements but also can escape a bond by transforming it-
self. Mētis’s subversive power or sorcery lies in its capacity to 
bind and beguile — that is, to manipulate and transform appear-
ances in order to confront a reality the “polymorphic powers [of 
which] render it almost impossible to seize.”44
Medea is like Metis, multiplicitous and duplicitous, both poi-
son and cure. Medea — sorceress, killer and healer — is also as-
sociated with this form of magic and metic knowledge.45 Medea 
is an outsider, a foreigner from Asia Minor, and although Greek 
women were also associated with magic, the most powerful of 
the mages were said to be non-Greeks46 living on the fringe 
42 Ibid., 16–17.
43 “Shifting speech” or poikiloi logoi — the technical weapon of the sophist 
and the politician — is “many coiled” or periplokai: the twisted “logos of the 
octopus” which ensnares and/or traps its prey, as “strings of words which 
unfold like the coils of the snake, speeches which enmesh their enemies 
like the supple arms of the octopus” (Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intel-
ligence in Greek Culture and Society, 39).
44 Ibid., 5. 
45 Bracke, Of Metis and Magic, 15. “In the earliest Archaic texts, though Circe 
and Medea were deities to some extent associated with what would be con-
strued as ‘magic’ in the Classical period (i.e., thelgein), they were primarily 
represented as goddesses and strongly connected with the entire semantic 
field of metis rather than merely with thelgein. A combination of factors, 
however, led to the decrease of their association with metis in favour of an 
increasing connection with magical terminology in post-Hesiodic Archaic 
and Classical texts” (ibid., 69).
46 “[T]he image of Persians and other Eastern peoples as Others or “barbari-
ans” flourished in, for example, Athenian drama. Stratton argues that “mag-
ic discourse […] emerged at this time as part and parcel of the new dis-
course of barbarism. Mageia — the religion of Athens’s enemy, Persia — now 
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of society.47 Although Hesiod portrays Medea as possessor of 
mētis,48 it is Ovid who describes Medea as “the barbara venefi-
ca, ‘barbarian witch,’ insinuating that Medea practices love-
magic and has cast a spell on Jason.”49 Medea is said to cast the 
“glamor,”50 a spell which deceives the eyes, connoting magical 
beguilement. Glamor, like mētis, is an “absolute weapon”51 that is 
the sorceress’s device for counterfeiting nature (which from the 
sixteenth century onwards comes to be associated with cosmet-
ics, face-painting, and techniques of subverting appearances): 
“appearance is now fashioned along the lines of a power that is 
truly and correctly, if indefinably called ‘magical.’”52 
also acquired associations with various characteristics and practices that 
Athenians regarded as un-Greek and barbaric” (ibid., 54, 25).
47 Ibid., 25.
48 Ibid., 115.
49 Ibid., 28. “Medea’s name, whose origin lies in the Indo-European root 
med-, is related to words meaning both ‘I intend’ or ‘I plan’ or ‘I contrive’ 
and ‘plans’ or ‘schemes’ — deriving from metis, or cunning intelligence, 
but which also has a homonym referring to male genitalia; indeed Medea’s 
name can be translated as “cunning female” or “contriver,” even interpreted 
as an alternative for metis, rendering Medea yet another emanation from 
this category” (ibid., 73–74).
50 “In German, its first meaning is still ‘der Zauber; das Blendwerk’ (‘magic; 
a binding, dazzling, or deceiving’). The word was originally Scottish. Like 
grimoire, it was a corrupt form of ‘grammar’ or ‘grammarye,’ meaning 
learning in general and occult learning in particular. […] When the notori-
ous late fifteenth century witch-hunting manual the Malleus maleficarum 
came to be translated into English by Montague Summers in 1928, ‘glam-
our’ suggested itself as a gloss on the original’s ‘prestigia,’ defined in part I, 
question IX — ‘Whether Witches may work some Prestidigitory Illusions 
so that the Male Organ appears to be entirely removed and separate from 
the Body’ — ‘A glamour is nothing but a certain delusion of the senses, and 
especially of the eyes. And for this reason it is also called a prestige, from 
prestringo, since the sight of the eyes is so fettered that things seem to be 
other than they are. […] The devil can cast a glamour over the senses of 
man. Wherefore there is no difficulty in his concealing the virile member 
by some prestige or glamour.” (Wygant, Medea, Magic, and Modernity in 
France, 18–19).
51 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 13.
52 Wygant, Medea, Magic, and Modernity in France, 25.
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Medea, daughter of the Colchian king Aeëtes (who was him-
self begot of Sun and Ocean) and niece of Circe, is priestess of 
the cult of the Golden Fleece, a magical object upon which the 
political power of the entire kingdom rests, when she meets Ja-
son, a Greek who, with help of Medea’s sorcerous powers, takes 
the golden fleece in order to advance his own claim to the throne 
of his birthplace, Iolcus. Although historical accounts of Medea 
vary widely from earliest mentions in the mythic Argonautika 
to the later Baroque period,53 she is depicted as practicing both 
guile and beguilement, mētis and magic, involving murder and 
rejuvenation. 
At each step Medea’s cunning magic helps Jason and her get 
out of untenable situations.54 Medea is outsider, deceiver, mur-
derer, jealous and jilted wife, and killer of her own children; 
but Medea also possesses Metis’s technē pantoiē or “art of many 
facets,”55 and due to her metic and pharmacological powers, by 
the sixteenth century, her technical powers come to be associ-
53 “[T]here was by no means homogeneity even in the earliest poetic represen-
tations of Medea: she is given different husbands, characteristics, and func-
tions, and is placed in different cities depending on the individual authors” 
agenda” (Bracke, Of Metis and Magic, 118).
54 For example, when, in order to help Jason successfully steal the Golden 
Fleece, Medea tricks her brother (who is in hot pursuit) by pretending to 
surrender while Jason ambushes and kills him. Then she has the body cut 
up into pieces and scattered one by one in the sea to delay their pursuers 
(for she knows that by ancient law, the body must be collected for proper re-
ligious burial). When Jason and Medea return to Iolcus to claim the throne 
from the usurper Pelias (Jason’s uncle), Medea infiltrates the city by disguis-
ing herself as an old woman (that is, she ingests a potion that renders her 
aged and unrecognizable). She then proceeds to convince Pelias that she 
can restore his youthful vigor and then actually persuades Pelias’s daughters 
that they must dismember their father before he can be rejuvenated. Medea, 
herself, took no part in the murder of the king of Iolcus. Later, when Jason 
and Medea must flee from Iolcus to Corinth, Medea successfully concocts 
pharmaka and schemes to get revenge on those who have slighted her, like 
her hosts, the royal family of Corinth (whom she has poisoned and burned 
alive) and her own children.
55 Detienne and Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 18.
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ated with the health and medical arts, as well as with alchemy.56 
Guile and beguilement, mētis and magic — these are the techni-
cal sources for Medea’s (s)witchcraft and of her “so(u)rcery’:57 
the word technē, associated with Hephaesthus’s bonds, is given 
the sense of trick or trap and often can be found alongside the 
word apatē, or “deception”; the consequence of technē being 
ruse — “something that is not what it appears to be.”58 
Medea and Metis both use technical tools such as incanta-
tions and potions, as well as shifting words and logic (poikiloi 
56 “Taken from Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Book VII, the ‘Rejuvenation of Aeson,’ 
[…] was a powerful theme in sixteenth and seventeenth century visual art, 
and was believed to transcribe the struggle of medicine against age, the ety-
mologies which were believed to be related to the names of Medea and her 
father in law Aeson” (Wygant, Medea, Magic, and Modernity in France, 37). 
Medea represents a “‘new convergence between rational understanding and 
occult forces’ that enabled the project of rebirth” (ibid., 42–43). Medea, op-
erator of the great alchemical work, “is at once the alchemist, effecting Ae-
son’s death and his rebirth, and the figure of the alchemical process. Eight-
eenth century commentators are explicit about this. Pernety’s Dictionnaire 
mytho-hermétique observes that ‘la Toison d’or conquise est la poudre de 
projection, et la medicine universelle, de laquelle Médée fit usage pour raje-
unir Eson, pere de Jason son amant [The golden fleece, once conquered, is 
the transforming substance and the universal medicine that Medea used to 
rejuvenate Aeson, the father of Jason, her lover].’ In the Aureum vellus, oder 
Güldenes Vliess, Medea’s rejuvenation of Aeson is cited as a clear example 
of her alchemy, and at the same time, she is identified with the moon, an 
element internal to the alchemical work: ‘Kurz, man that in Opere Philo-
sophico auch so eine Medeam, welche von den Weisen ihre Luna genennt 
wird [In sum, there is also in the alchemical work a Medea, which the al-
chemists call their moon].’ Medea’s figuration as a chemical had by this time 
a certain history. René Alleau described an inscription on a marble plaque, 
dated 1680, in the square Victor-Emmanuel in Rome, left over from the de-
struction of the villa of the marquis Palombara. It reads ‘Pushing open the 
door of the villa, Jason discovers and conquers the precious fleece of Medea,’ 
the first letters of which in the Latin spell vitriolum, vitriol: the secret shin-
ing crystalline body that symbolizes the philosopher’s crude matter. The 
inscription is described as well in a manual of practical alchemy by Eugène 
Canseliet, one of the best-known of the 20th-century French alchemists” 
(Wygant, Medea, Magic, and Modernity in France, 46–47). 
57 Terms taken from Mellamphy, “The Sorcerer’s Magic Milieu.” 




logoi), but in so doing, they also make themselves instruments of 
mētis — that is, catalysts and mechanisms for contingency, ambi-
guity and the heterogeneous operations that bring about incal-
culable modulations within any feedback system of rules and re-
sults. Using so(u)rcery and (s)witchcraft, they make themselves 
into heretical forces that subvert hierarchies, be they spatial or 
temporal. Weaving appearances with shimmering words, they 
are both masters, and servants of time: on the one hand, their 
magical mētis depends on mastering temporal “know-how,”59 
which is also a “knowing when” — that is, the technical mastery 
to switch between and weave in and out of different schemas of 
time (including chronoi or sequential progressive temporali-
ties; kairoi,60 or propitious moments; and aiōnes,61 in the sense 
of whole lifetimes, entire generations, or existent eternities) in 
order to blaze a path or forge a way out of an untenable situa-
tion — and on the other hand, they make themselves servants of 
59 “Over more than ten centuries the same, extremely simple model expresses 
skills, know-how and activities as diverse as weaving, navigation and medi-
cine. From Homer to Oppian practical and cunning intelligence, in all its 
forms, is a permanent feature of the Greek world. Its domain is a veritable 
empire and the man of prudence, of metis, can assume ten different identi-
ties at once. He is embodied in all the principal types of men who go to 
make up Greek society, ranging from the charioteer to the politician and in-
cluding the fisherman, the blacksmith, the orator, the weaver, the pilot, the 
hunter, the sophist, the carpenter and the strategus” (Detienne and Vernant, 
Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 307–8). 
60 “According to some Hippocratic treatises every disease can be cured, if you 
hit upon the right moment (kairos) to apply your remedies. Detienne and 
Vernant describe the significance of kairos in the art of navigation: […] Kai-
ros, associated with Zeus Ourios who represents opportunity, stands for the 
propitious moment with the good pilot must seize, having foreseen from 
afar the opportunity which will arise for him to exercise his techne” (Atwill, 
Rhetoric Reclaimed, 58).
61 From Late Latin aeon, from Greek aiōn, “age, vital force; a period of ex-
istence, a lifetime, a generation; a long space of time,” in plural, “eternity,” 
from PIE root *aiw-, “vital force, life, long life, eternity” (cognates: Sanskrit 
ayu, “life,” Avestan ayu, “age,” Latin aevum, “space of time, eternity,” Gothic 
aiws, “age, eternity,” Old Norse ævi, “lifetime,” German ewig, “everlast-
ing,” Old English as “ever, always’). See http://www.etymonline.com/index.
php?term=eon. 
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and conduits for temporal weaving and switching, the mixing of 
different times and temporalities for the purposes of guile and 
beguilement.62 
Perhaps the most obscene of all three (w)hole-matrices 
is Mahakali — “Great Kali,” mistress of death and destruc-
tion — herself the mask of “Great Time” (mahākāla) and one 
of the most maligned of all the figures of the Hindu pantheon, 
the latter in no small part due to her extreme appearance and 
behavior which goes beyond the normal limits of propriety and 
civility. Like her consort Shiva, she is the omen of horrifying ter-
ror (ghora). Feral and uncontrollable, she is untamable, even de-
monic: “she is dark as a great cloud […]. Her tongue is poised as 
if to lick. She has fearful teeth, sunken eyes, and is smiling. She 
wears a necklace of snakes, the half-moon rests on her forehead, 
she has matted hair, and in engaged in licking a corpse. […] She 
has two hands and has corpses for ear ornaments.”63 Mahakali, 
while bloodthirsty and destructive, is also considered in this 
role (and not in her more beneficent and gentler incarnations) 
as the (chaotic) guardian of the cosmos, her destructive and un-
controllable powers being the very necessary precondition for 
renewal and regeneration. She is heterogeneous and multiple: 
she transforms, splits, or multiplies herself and “tears into her 
enemies with awful glee […] She is the distillation of the furi-
ous, raw, savage power and lust of the frenzied warrior, and as 
such she is truly a terrible being, feared by her enemies, to be 
sure, but a threat to the overall stability of the world itself.”64 
Although she eventually transcends her origins and comes to 
be adopted as an extreme manifestation of the “great goddess” 
in the Hindu pantheon, Mahakali, like Metis and Medea, is most 
often depicted as having indigenous, or non-Aryan origins as-
sociated with tribes relegated to the margins of Indian society, 
a tribal goddess worshipped by hunters and thieves said to live 
62 “Mètic métissage” (Mellamphy, “The Sorcerer’s Magic Milieu”). 
63 David R. Kinsley, Hindu Goddesses: Visions of the Divine Feminine in the 
Hindu Religious Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 
81.
64 Ibid., 144. 
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in cremation grounds (scorning all categories of civilization), 65 
and having early associations to the demoness Nirrti, personifi-
cation of death, destruction and sorrow in the Vedic literature.66 
Later, Kali enters the Hindu pantheon as the terrifying incarna-
tion of the great goddess-warrior, Durga, literally coming out of 
Durga’s head as she steps onto the battlefield.67 The brutality and 
blood-thirstiness of Kali is surpassed only by her jocular con-
tempt for life, which makes her a truly invincible force. Like the 
metic namshub that bedazzles but also lights the way out, Kali 
“blazes like a million rising suns” even in the deepest darkness.68 
The namshub of the great Kali (Mahākālī) breaks all conven-
tion (in Greek, nomos) and all limitation (peiras), burning them 
away in the cremation fires, “the cremation-ground [being] the 
place where the five elements — the pancha mahābhūta — are 
dissolved.”69 
Mahakali both dwells in the obscene place of phenomenal 
dissolution and is herself a force of this primordial chaos. As 
65 “The term Thug — Thuggee — is derived from Hindi word ठग, or thag, 
which means ‘thief.’ Related words are the verb thugna, ‘to deceive,’ from 
Sanskrit sthaga, ‘cunning, sly, fraudulent,’ from sthagati, ‘he conceals.’ This 
term for a particular kind of murder and robbery of travellers is popular in 
South Asia and particularly in India. […] The Thuggee trace their origin 
to the [mythical] battle of Kali against Raktabija; however, their founda-
tion-myth departs from Brahminical versions of the Puranas. The Thuggee 
consider themselves to be children of Kali, created out of her sweat” (Mel-
lamphy, “Kaligraphy,” n. 20).
66 Kinsley, Hindu Goddesses, 84–85, 87–88.
67 As Kinsley notes, “the first demon heroes sent forth to battle her are Canda 
and Munda. When they approach Durga with drawn swords and bent bows, 
she becomes furious, her face becoming dark as ink. Suddenly there springs 
forth from her brow the terrible goddess Kali, armed with sword and noose. 
[…] She fills the four quarters with her terrifying roar and leaps eagerly 
into the fray. She flings demons into her mouth and crushes them in her 
jaws. […] Laughing and howling loudly, she approaches Canda and Munda, 
grasps them by the hair, and in one furious instant decapitates them both 
with her mighty sword. Returning to Durga with two heads, she laughs jok-
ingly and presents them to the Goddess as a gift” (ibid., 91).
68 David R. Kinsley, Tantric Visions of the Divine Feminine: The Ten Mahav-
idyas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 23.
69 Ibid., 88.
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this primordial cosmic force of dissolution, the omen of great 
time (mahākāla) and harbinger of the end of time (kālīyuga, 
the age of destruction corresponding to the Greek age of iron), 
Mahakali is also known as Mistress of Time, and called the 
“Mad Mother”70 to her disciples, a mother who is freed from 
all worldly attachment (especially to her children). The weaving 
that is order (the Greek kosmos) “comes to an end in Kali’s wild, 
unbound, flowing hair.”71 She is the force “who wears all things 
down”; “she consumes all things. Her appetite is unquenchable, 
and she is utterly undiscriminating. All things and all beings 
must yield to relentless, pitiless grinding down by the Mistress 
of Time.”72 Like the great alchemical Fire that both destroys 
and transforms, as well as illuminates the path of the adept, the 
namshub of Mahakali73 involves a great pyrotechnē: “setting fire 
to — and/or upon — existents, Kali reveals the existence beyond 
it, in all its paradoxical confliction, conflagration, contradiction, 
embracing both its aporia and its porosity: its absolute and ab-
solutely aggressive ambiguity.”74 
There is no escape from the web of Great Time (mahākāla), a 
Time which comes before and goes beyond the human, the geo-
logical, and even the astrological; a Time which both dissolves 
and holds together all conceptions of time. No alternate politics, 
agencies, identities can be forged from this source because it is, 
rather, the progenitor of all things:
At the dissolution of things, it is Kala [Time] Who will devour all, 
and by reason of this He is called Mahakala [an epithet of Shiva], 
70 From the Gospel of Ramakrishna: “Crazy is my Father, crazy my Moth-
er — and I, their son, am crazy too! Shyama [the dark one, meaning Kali] is 
my Mother’s name. My Father strikes His cheeks and makes a hollow sound: 
Ba-ba-bom! Ba-ba-bom! And my Mother, drunk and reeling, falls across my 
Father’s body! Shyama’s streaming tresses hang in vast disorder; bees are 
swarming numberless about Her crimson Lotus feet. Listen, as She dances, 
how Her Ankles ring!” (Kinsley, Hindu Goddesses, 136).
71 Kinsley, Tantric Visions of the Divine Feminine, 84.
72 Kinsley, Hindu Goddesses, 140.




and since You devourest Mahakala Himself, it is You who are the 
Supreme Primordial Kalika. Because You devour Kala, You are Kali, 
the original form of all things, and because You are the Origin of 
and devour all things You are called the Adya [primordial] Kali. Re-
suming after Dissolution Your own form, dark and formless, You 
alone remain as One ineffable and inconceivable. Though having 
a form, yet are You formless; though Yourself without beginning, 
multiform by the power of Maya [illusion], You are the Beginning of 
all, Creatrix, Protectress, and Destructress that You are.75 
Metis, Medea, and Mahakali are the architects of this paradoxi-
cality and themselves aporetic architectures that ultimately do 
not respect or uphold any of the arguments that historically 
make up feminist critique. And though each has been used in 
countless ways to revalue just that — an alternative feminism, an 
alternate politics — I have argued that all are (w)hole-matrices 
and obscenities that cannot be completely incorporated within a 
hermeneutic and dialectical schema (without somehow missing 
the “point” — the punctum and the (w)hole-matrix — that each 
veritably is). Each is an exception to the norm and rule of the 
polis, but each is also the master and servant of the matrix of 
contingency, contiguity and paradoxicality; as such, each is es-
pecially suited for thinking about and through the paradoxes of 
the Age of Destruction (the fourth age of kālīyuga), which will 
intensify and culminate in our age of digital networks. 
75 Kinsley, Hindu Goddesses, 123 (translation slightly modified).
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“Girls Welcome!!!”:  
Speculative Realism, Object-Oriented Ontology,  
and Queer Theory 
Michael O’Rourke1
Word of new intellectual developments tends to travel indirectly, 
like gossip. Soon, more and more people feel the need to know 
what the real story is: they want manifestos, bibliographies, 
explanations. When a journal does a special issue or commis-
sions an editorial comment, it is often responding to this need. 
We have been invited to pin the queer theory tail on the donkey. 
But here we cannot but stay and make a pause, and stand half 
amazed at this poor donkey’s present condition. Queer Theory 
has already incited a vast labor of metacommentary, a virtual 
industry: special issues, sections of journals, omnibus reviews, 
anthologies, and dictionary entries. Yet the term itself is less than 
five years old. Why do people feel the need to introduce, anato-
mize, and theorize something that can barely be said yet to exist. 
 —  Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, 
“What does Queer Theory Teach us about X?”2
1 This article was originally published in Speculations II (2011): 275–312. 
2 Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “What Does Queer Theory Teach Us 
about X?,” PmlA 110, nos. 1/3 (1995): 343–49, at 343. 
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Ecological criticism and queer theory seem incompatible, but if they 
met, there would be a fantastic explosion. How shall we accomplish 
this perverse, Frankensteinian meme splice? I’ll propose some meth-
ods and frameworks for a field that doesn’t quite exist — queer ecology 
 — Timothy Morton, “Queer Ecology”3
Frankensteinian Meme Splice (or how hot are queer theory and 
speculative realism?) 
I begin with two epigraphs, both of which were guest columns 
written for, commissioned especially by, PMLA. Although they 
are separated by fifteen years, they both make some strikingly 
similar points which are relevant for someone attempting to 
chart the potential connections or intimacies between queer 
theory and speculative realism (and in this position piece I’m 
placing quite a strong emphasis on object-oriented ontology 
which is just one offshoot of speculative realist thinking). The 
first thing we might emphasize is the need to pin things down, 
to say what exactly queer theory is and does and to be entirely 
clear about what speculative realism is and what precisely it is 
that speculative realists do. Yet, perhaps the power and virtue of 
both queer theory and speculative realism, what makes them so 
compatible, is that neither is a delimitable field. Part of the at-
3 Timothy Morton, “Queer Ecology,” PmlA 125, no. 2 (March 2010): 273–82. If 
you are persuaded by my argument that SR and OOO theorists have always 
been interested in queer theories and committed to antiheteronormative 
projects, then one could look to Morton’s earlier piece “Thinking Ecology: 
The Mesh, the Strange Stranger and the Beautiful Soul” in Collapse VI (Fal-
mouth: Urbanomic, 2010), 195–223, where he says that “Desire is inescap-
able in ecological existence. Yet environmentalism as currently formulated 
tries to transcend the contingency of desire, claiming that its desires if any 
are natural. Organicism partakes of environmentalist chastity. ‘Nature lov-
ing’ is supposedly chaste […] and is thus slave to masculine heteronor-
mativity, a performance that erases the trace of performance” (214). It is 
important to note that both of these articles appeared before Morton’s now 
famous conversion to object-oriented ontology. See “All you need is love” 




traction of both is their very undefinability, their provisionality, 
and, most importantly, their openness. 
Let’s spend a little time with the guest column written by 
Berlant and Warner, a very rich essay which sadly isn’t often 
read or cited nowadays. In 1995 queer theory was arguably at 
its peak (at least in the United States) and people were calling 
for definitions, even though, as Berlant and Warner point out, it 
was barely five years old as a term and a field of inquiry. Queer 
then was, as they say, “hot.”4 Right now speculative realism is 
“hot” and the sheer pace (largely thanks to the blogosphere) 
with which it has evolved, developed, and extended its pincers 
into and across disciplines, is nothing short of astonishing. If the 
“birth” of queer theory can be dated to 1990 at a conference at 
the University of California, Santa Cruz where the term was first 
introduced by Teresa de Lauretis,5 then we can locate the “ori-
gin” of the term speculative realism to a workshop which took 
place at Goldsmiths, University of London in April 2007.6 The 
perception that queer was “hot” for Berlant and Warner arises 
from “the distortions of the star system, which allows a small 
number of names to stand in for an evolving culture.”7 This has 
also happened with speculative realism and its splinter faction 
object-oriented ontology where, in both cases, four “star” names 
stand in for a rapidly evolving field. The “four horsemen of the 
philosophicus”8 who are associated with the founding of specu-
lative realism (despite their many differences and divergent in-
terests) are Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, Ray Brassi-
4 Berlant and Warner, “Queer Theory,” 343.
5 Teresa de Lauretis, “Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities. An Intro-  
duction,” differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 3, no. 2 (1991): 
iii–xviii. 
6 The proceedings of that event can be found in Collapse III (Falmouth: Ur-
banomic, 2007), which includes the texts from Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton 
Grant, Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, and questions and answers 
from the audience. Alberto Toscano spoke at the second event (in place of 
Meillassoux) but is not generally associated with SR. 
7 Berlant and Warner, “Queer Theory,” 343. 
8 “Diversifying Speculative Realisms,” Archive Fire, http://www.archivefire. 
net/2010/06/speculative-realisms-and.html.
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er, and Iain Hamilton Grant. And the quartet of object-oriented 
ontologists are Harman, Ian Bogost, Timothy Morton, and Levi 
Bryant. But, as with early queer theory, “most practitioners of 
the new queer commentary [speculative commentary] are not 
faculty members but graduate students.”9 The accelerated pace 
with which speculative thinking has grown and impacted upon 
other fields (both inside and outside the academy and institu-
tionalized disciplines) has largely been because of the blogo-
sphere and the work of graduate students such as Ben Woodard 
(who blogs at Naught Thought), Paul Ennis (who blogs at An-
other Heidegger Blog), Taylor Adkins (who blogs at Speculative 
Heresy), Nick Srnicek (who blogs at The Accursed Share), and 
others. Again, as with queer theory, this “association with the 
star system and with graduate students makes this work the ob-
ject of envy, resentment and suspicion. As often happens, what 
makes some people queasy others call sexy.”10 As we shall see, 
it is largely the association of speculative realism (and object-
oriented ontology) with four male philosophers which has made 
those calling for a queering of speculative thought and a diver-
sification of its interests to become queasy. In a recent Facebook 
thread on the lack of women in speculative realism, one com-
menter referred to SR and OOO as a “sausage fest.” One could 
argue, in paranoid fashion, somewhat queasily, that speculative 
realism is unfriendly to those working in gender studies, criti-
cal sexuality studies, neovitalist and neomaterialist feminisms, 
and queer theory. But, in this paper, in a more reparative frame 
of mind, I want to suggest that speculative realism and triple-
O theory (as Timothy Morton has recently dubbed object-ori-
ented ontology) have always already been interested in and at-
tuned to issues pertaining to gender, sexuality, feminism, and 
queerness. One could go even further and say that the “perverse, 
Frankensteinian meme splice” Timothy Morton dreams of has 
already been accomplished (but that doesn’t mean that the work 
is done, far from it). 




Undefining Speculative Realism 
Berlant and Warner write that, in their view, “it is not useful 
to consider queer theory a thing, especially one dignified by 
capital letters. We wonder whether queer commentary might 
not more accurately describe the things linked by the rubric, 
most of which are not theory.”11 Even though SR and OOO are al-
most always dignified by capital letters (I prefer not to capitalize 
them in this essay), they too “cannot be assimilated to a single 
discourse, let alone a propositional program”12 and I share Ber-
lant and Warner’s desire “not to define, purify, puncture, sani-
tize, or otherwise entail the emerging queer [speculative realist] 
commentary”13 or to fix a “seal of approval or disapproval”14 on 
anyone’s claims to queerness or to speculative realism. Further-
more, I agree with them that we ought to “prevent the reduc-
tion” of speculative realism or object oriented ontology to a 
“speciality” or a “metatheory” and that we ought to fight vigor-
ously to “frustrate the already audible assertions that queer the-
ory [speculative realism] has only academic — which is to say, 
dead — politics.”15 For me, much of speculative thinking’s allure 
is its openness, its promissory nature, and that much of what 
goes under its name has been “radically anticipatory, trying to 
bring a [non-correlationist, non-anthropocentric, even queer] 
world into being.”16 Because of this very provisionality, and an 
attendant welcomeness to its own revisability, any attempt to 
“summarize it now will be violently partial.”17 But we might see 
some value in the violently partial accounts, the meme splicings, 
the short-lived promiscuous encounters I’ll be trying to stage 
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So, what follows is “a kind of anti-encyclopedia entry.”18 If, for 
Berlant and Warner, “Queer Theory is not the theory of anything 
in particular, and has no precise bibliographic shape,”19 then I 
would like to suggest — with a willful disingenuousness since 
after all SR does have a working bibliographical shape which one 
can easily constitute20 — that speculative realism and its tenta-
cled offshoots is not the theory of anything in particular either. 
We might, to paraphrase Morton, say that speculative realism is 
the theory of everything.21 If we turn speculative realism into a 
capital-T Theory, we risk forgetting the differences between the 
various figures associated with it and the variegated contexts in 
which they work. As Berlant and Warner caution, “Queer com-
mentary [and speculative realist commentary] takes on varied 
shapes, risks, ambitions, and ambivalences in various contexts”22 
and if we try to pin the tail on the donkey by imagining a con-
text (theory) in which queer or speculative realism has “a stable 
referential content and pragmatic force”23 then we are in dan-
ger of forgetting the “multiple localities”24 of speculative realist 
theory and practice. No one corpus of work (Harman’s, for ex-
ample) or no one particular project should be made to stand in 
for the whole movement, or what Paul Ennis has recently called 
the “culture” of speculative realism.25
18 Ibid., 344.
19 Ibid.
20 The Speculative Realism pathfinder maintained by Eric Phetteplace 
is a wonderful resource: http://courseweb.lis.illinois.edu/~phettep1/ 
SRPathfinder. html. But it itself is permanently under revision, a construc-
tion site, as he adds new names, terms, blogs, books. 
21 Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Orient-
ed Ontology,” Qui Parle 19, no. 2 (2011): 163–90. Tellingly, he refers there to 
“the effervescent philosophical movement known as ‘speculative realism’ 
[note the inverted commas]” as “cool” by which we might understand him 
to mean “hot” in Berlant and Warner’s sense. 
22 Berlant and Warner, “Queer Theory,” 344. 
23 Ibid., 344.
24 Ibid., 345
25 See Paul J. Ennis, “The Speculative Terrain”: http://ucd-ie.academia. edu/
PaulJohnEnnis/Papers/380565/The_Speculative_Terrain [Paul J. Ennis no 
longer maintains his Academia.edu profile, but the reader may consult his 
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If speculative commentary were simply reduced to being the 
province of one particular thinker, then its multiple localities 
would be worryingly narrowed and its localities would become 
merely “parochial” like “little ornaments appliquéd over real 
politics or real intellectual work. They [would] carry the odor 
of the luxuriant.”26 If the work of Harman, or Bryant, or Meillas-
soux is made into a metonym for speculative theory or specu-
lative culture itself, and if they are held to be exemplary cases 
(either for good or for bad) then what we lose is the original 
impetus behind speculative realism and queer theory in the first 
place: “the wrenching sense of recontextualization it gave.”27 
And we would leave speculative realism open to charges of po-
litical uselessness and glacialization, “the infection of general 
culture by narrow interest.”28 
But let us, at least provisionally, disambiguate, to use a Wiki-
ism that J. Hillis Miller is rather fond of. Speculative realism de-
scribes the work of a very disparate group of scholars (Quentin 
Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Har-
man) reanimating some of “the most radical philosophical prob-
lematics” through a “fresh reappropriation of the philosophical 
tradition and through an openness to its outside.”29 The term 
was coined by Ray Brassier, organizer of the first symposium 
on speculative realism, the proceedings of which appear in Col-
lapse III. However, Speculative realism is generally considered 
“a useful umbrella term, chosen precisely because it was vague 
enough to encompass a variety of fundamentally heterogene-
ous philosophical research programmes” as Brassier admits in 
a recent interview.30 These philosophies, while at once radically 
book Continental_Realism (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011) — Ed.]. Ennis 
shares my conviction that speculative realism is alive and well and exists 
but that it is irreducible to one single definition. 
26 Berlant and Warner, “Queer Theory,” 345. 
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 349
29 Robin Mackay writes this on the jacket for volume II of Collapse which fea-
tures essays from Brassier, Meillassoux, and Harman. 
30 Ray Brassier and Bram Ieven, “Against an Aesthetics of Noise,” Transitzone, 
Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.ny-web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.html.
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different from one another, could be said to find some coher-
ence in their opposition to correlationist philosophies. To quote 
the Ray Brassier interview again, 
the only thing that unites us is antipathy to what Quentin Meil-
lassoux calls “correlationism” — the doctrine, especially prevalent 
among “Continental” philosophers, that humans and world cannot 
be conceived in isolation from one another — a “correlationist” is 
any philosopher who insists that the human–world correlate is phi-
losophy’s sole legitimate concern. 
The Wikipedia entry for speculative realism offers some further 
shared ground: 
While often in disagreement over basic philosophical issues, the 
speculative realist thinkers have a shared resistance to philosophies 
of human finitude inspired by the tradition of Immanuel Kant. 
What unites the four core members of the movement is an attempt 
to overcome both “correlationism” as well as “philosophies of ac-
cess.” In After Finitude, Meillassoux defines correlationism as “the 
idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation 
between thinking and being, and never to either term considered 
apart from the other.” Philosophies of access are any of those phi-
losophies which privilege the human being over other entities. Both 
ideas represent forms of anthropocentrism. All four of the core 
thinkers within Speculative Realism work to overturn these forms 
of philosophy which privilege the human being, favoring distinct 
forms of realism against the dominant forms of idealism in much of 
contemporary philosophy.31 
A “foundational text” for speculative realism, then, is Quentin 
Meillassoux’s After Finitude, a text which boldly insists on the 
31 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_realism. Again we should say 
that the Wikipedia entry is constantly being revised. According to the Spec-
ulative Realism pathfinder, Michael Austin (who blogs at Complete Lies) 
frequently updates this page. 
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“necessity of contingency”32 and critiques the post-Kantian pri-
macy of, as Robin Mackay puts it, the “relation of conscious-
ness to the world — however that may be construed — over any 
supposed objectivity of ‘things themselves.’”33 Meillassoux calls 
his own non-correlationist philosophy a speculative material-
ism. One strong critic of Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, in his Ni-
hil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, yokes revisionary 
naturalism in Anglo/American analytic philosophy to specula-
tive realism in the continental French tradition.34 He terms his 
own approach as “transcendental realism” or “transcendental 
nihilism”35 (a position he at least partially shares with critical re-
alist Roy Bhaskar) while the British philosopher Iain Hamilton 
Grant works with a post-Schellingian materialism to produce 
a speculative nature philosophy that some call “neo-vitalism.”36 
Graham Harman, heavily influenced by the Actor–Network 
Theory of Bruno Latour, has long been advancing an object-
oriented philosophy, emphasizing “vicarious causation” which 
turns toward objects and demands a humanitarian politics at-
tuned to the objects themselves.37 So, despite their many dif-
32 Quentin Meillassoux, Afrer Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008). 
33 Robin Mackay, “Editorial Introduction,” Collapse II (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 
2007), 4. 
34 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
35 See Bram Ieven’s “Transcendental Realism, Speculative Materialism and 
Radical Aesthetics,” paper presented at Duke University’s Speculative Aes- 
thetics working group, which interestingly is presided over by the feminist 
scholars Priscilla Wald and N. Katherine Hayles and the queer theorist Zach 
Blas. See the program and texts here: http://fhi.duke.edu/projects/interdis-
ciplinary-working-groups/speculative-aesthetics.
36 See especially Iain Hamilton Grant’s Philosophies of Nature after Schelling 
(London: Continuum, 2006). 
37 See Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2002), Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and 
the Carpentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), Prince of Networks: 
Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne: Re. Press, 2009), Towards Spec-
ulative Realism: Essays and Lectures (Winchester: Zer0 books, 2010), and 
Circus Philosophicus (Winchester: Zer0 Books, 2010). For the best way into 
Latourian Actor–Network Theory see Bruno Latour, Reassembling the So-
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ferences these four thinkers have been most closely associated 
with the development of what has come to be called “speculative 
realism,” a term Brassier thinks is now “singularly unhelpful.”38 
And this should remind us that Teresa de Lauretis, who coined 
the term queer theory in 1990 dismissed it four years later as 
a “vacuous creature of the publishing industry.”39 Perhaps the 
most “cool” offshoot of speculative realism has been object-ori-
ented philosophy (the term is Harman’s and dates quite some 
way back to 1999) and its twin object-oriented ontology (the 
term was coined by Levi Bryant). Again the four main thinkers 
associated with this splinter group (Harman, Bryant, Morton, 
and Bogost) are very different: Bryant has a uniquely Lacanian 
take on the democracy of objects, Morton works on ecology, 
and Bogost writes about video game theory and what he calls 
“alien phenomenology.” Ben Woodard has wondered about the 
“regnant” status of OOO/OOP compared to the many other vari-
ants of speculative realism. He asks: 
OOO/OOP will no doubt continue to grow and I often wonder why 
(besides having multiple prolific internet presences) it is the strang-
est/strongest of the SR factions. I think the best explanation is that 
the approach and even name of OOP reeks (justifiably) of novelty 
and this is only supported by the fact that Harman and others take 
what they need from philosophers and move on. This is not an at-
tack but a high form of praise. For instance, it would be hard to call 
any user of OOO/OOP Heideggerian, Whiteheadian or even Latou-
rian (though the latter would be the most probable) whereas Grant 
could easily be labeled Schellingian, Brassier Laruelleian (though 
cial: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
38 Brassier and Ieven, “Aesthetics of Noise.” 
39 Teresa de Lauretis, “Habit Changes,” in Feminism Meets Queer Theory, eds. 
Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 316. 
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less and less so over time) and Meillassoux Cartesian, Badiouian or, 
against his will but accurate I think, Hegelian40 
For the remainder of this position paper, however, I want to fo-
cus on OOO because those associated with it, particularly Bry-
ant, Morton and Bogost, have been at the forefront of the (often 
virulent) debates about queer theory, object-oriented feminism 
and speculative realism.41 I want to turn now to that brouhaha 
40 See Ben Woodard, “Speculative 2010,” http://naughtthought.wordpress. 
com/2010/01/08/speculative-2010/. Levi Bryant, who blogs at Larval Sub-
jects, disagrees and says: “I have a somewhat different theory. While the 
strong internet presence of OOO/OOP certainly doesn’t hurt, this is an effect 
rather than a cause. In my view a successful philosophy has to create work 
for others and for other disciplines outside of the philosophy. This work is 
not simply of the commentary variety, but of the variety that allows others 
to engage in genuine research projects according to — I hate the word, but 
have to use it — a paradigm.” See “New Intellectual Trends,” http://larvals-
ubjects.wordpress.com/2010/01/12/new-intellectual-trends/.
41 Another figure associated with OOO (but from a critical Whiteheadian an-
gle) is Steven Shaviro who has written a great deal about both sexuality and 
queer theory. He is also one of the leading lights in the nascent field of Gaga 
Studies where unexpected interventions have been made into OOO debates. 
To take just a couple of examples: Firstly, Judith Jack Halberstam has de-
scribed Lady Gaga’s Telephone video with its “phones, headsets, hearing, 
receivers and objects that become subjects, glasses that smoke, food that 
bites” as “an episode in Object Oriented Philosophy […] whether the phi-
losophy in question is drawn from Žižek on speed, Ronell on crack or Meil-
lassoux on ecstasy, this video obviously chains a good few ideas to a few very 
good bodies and puts thought into motion.” See “You Cannot Gaga Gaga,” 
http:// bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2010/03/17/you-cannot-gaga-gaga-by-
jack-halberstam/. Secondly, Kristopher Cannon has described the bulge in 
Gaga’s crotch at the AMA awards from the point of view of the cloth itself: 
“I think that this example is one which could also bridge several discus-
sions — ranging from gender (and feminism) to sex/ed behavior and objects 
to art and fashion and avant-garde aesthetics. The object we would see here 
is the ever-so-subtle (penis-shaped) bulge, appearing when she bends — a 
bulge afforded by the way her belts, strap(-on?)s, and/or stitched seams 
align — a bulge she gets because of the clothing she wears. Not only might 
this be a moment (a la OOO) where the clothing becomes hard because of 
the way Gaga wears it, but it is also a moment where Gaga gets a hard-
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about queer theory and the putative non-politics of speculative 
realism which raged across the blogosphere in 2010. 
Queering Speculative Realism 
Everything populating the desolate wastes of the unconscious 
is lesbian; difference sprawled upon zero, multiplicity strewn 
across positive vulvic space. Masculinity is nothing but a shoddy 
bunkhole from death. Socio-historically phallus and castration 
might be serious enough, but cosmologically they merely dis-
tract from zero; staking out a meticulously constructed poverty 
and organizing its logical displacement. If deconstruction spent 
less time playing with its willy maybe it could cross the line. 
 — Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation42 
During his live-blogging at Object-Oriented Philosophy of the 
“Metaphysics and Things” conference held in Claremont in De-
cember 2010, Graham Harman recounts a question and answer 
session between Isabelle Stengers, Donna Haraway, and the au-
dience.43 He says approvingly that Haraway “agrees with Latour 
that nothing should be allowed to explain anything else away. 
And certain forms of correlationism make precisely this error 
[Haraway has clearly read Meillassoux].” She says that: 
42 Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihil-
ism (London: Routledge, 1990). 
43 Stengers is the only woman included in the landmark volume The Specula-
tive Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism edited by Harman, Bryant, 
and Nick Srnicek (Melbourne: re.press, 2010). Harman explains the reasons 
for this here: “The collection also has great national and generational di-
versity. Unfortunately, it admittedly has horrible gender diversity (Isabelle 
Stengers is the only woman in the collection). To that my only answer is: we 
tried to do better. The invitation list and the contributors list do not entirely 
overlap. Sometimes people are just too busy, which of course is as good a 





Speculative realism is a term I’m still learning to use in a sentence, 
as if in a school assignment. Speculative realism is the new kid on 
the block that has adopted a label for itself, which may sound mean, 
but all kinds of interesting things are going on under that label and 
so she may want to live on that block. Not enough girls in specula-
tive realism which makes her mad, but she’s still curious and se-
duced by it [Note: Girls Welcome!!!].44
Harman concludes that “overall Haraway [is] a bit more con-
descending than necessary about speculative realism (most of 
us really like her stuff), but she does sound interested.” It is true 
that Haraway sees speculative realism as a new kid on the block 
but she is far from condescending. In his own live blog notes 
for her keynote paper at the same conference Harman himself 
quotes her as referring to “‘the openness or dare of what has 
been called speculative realism.’ Wow, SR is really in the lexi-
con now” shortly before asserting that “we now have techni-
cal–biological capabilities to generate new organisms without 
heteronormativity, in ways that queer theory has never dreamed 
of.”45 While Haraway is right to say that SR is a new kid on the 
block she is equally correct that its appearance on the scene is 
an invitation, or a dare even, to queer theory to go beyond itself. 
What she is disappointed by is the fact that so few girls seem to 
have been invited along for the ride.46 Harman reassures her that 
44 Graham Harman, “Question Period: Stengers and Haraway on Speculative Re-
alism,” http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/12/03/question-period/.
45 Graham Harman, “Donna Haraway Responds to Stengers,” 
http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/12/03/haraway-response-to-
stengers/. 
46 Paul Reid-Bowen has blogged about Haraway and object-oriented ontol-
ogy and is pleasantly surprized by how many “parallels and resources there 
are between her work and OOP,” especially the Latourian aspects of her 
writing on cyborgs. See “Haraway and Object Oriented Ontology,” http://
paganmetaphysics.blogspot.com/2010/01/haraway-and-object-oriented-
ontology.html. Perhaps the ideal location for staging an encounter between 
Haraway and SR/OOP would be to revisit her first book (not often read these 
days) from 1976, Crystals, Fabrics and Fields: Metaphors at Shape Embryos 
(Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2004). 
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girls are indeed welcome (his exclamation gives this paper its 
title) and we shall see that quite a few girls have (always) already 
accepted that invitation. 
If this all sounds rather cosy in December 2010, then we 
need to go back to a furious argument which took place be-
tween Chris Vitale (who blogs at Networkologies), Levi Bryant, 
Michael (who blogs at Archive Fire), and Ian Bogost in June and 
July of 2010 about the question of “Queering Speculative Real-
ism.” While the arguments were often heated and personal in 
nature they did have the effect of putting gender, sexuality, and 
queer theory very firmly on the speculative realist agenda (as 
well as forefronting the very politicality of speculative realism 
too). 
The trouble started out with Vitale’s highlighting the absence 
of gender and queerness in SR/OOO and how this blunts, in his 
opinion, the political edge of both. He wrote: 
To what extent do we still need, or continually need, to queer phi-
losophy? Let me be clear on what I mean by this. To what extent do 
we still need, or continually need, to work against the normative 
tendency of philosophy to be a predominantly white, male, hetero-
sexual, middle-to-upper middle class discipline? Why is or has this 
been the case? What are the implications, and even philosophical 
implications, of this? 
Let’s even look at the Speculative Realist movement, or the blog-
gers associated with it. Am I the only one who is “gay” or “queer”? 
Is there anyone who doesn’t get white privilege on a regular basis? 
Even though I’m Sicilian–American, I get white privilege on a con-
tinual basis. Are there any women who regularly blog on philoso-
phy, speculative realism (I can only think of Nina Power, and yet 
she doesn’t really deal with issues related to speculative realism that 
much...)? And let me be clear about this: I don’t think it’s a sin to be 
born a man, or to be hetero, or to have whitish skin. But I do think it’s 
important that if you get a certain type of social privilege, you fight 
against it. And that means, I think, trying to dissect the way this pro-
duces epistemological privilege of various sorts. So, I do think that if 
the speculative realist movement is predominantly white, male, het-
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ero, we need to not only ask ourselves why this might be, but how it 
impacts our thought, and what we can do about this.47
Bryant responds by saying that he finds Vitale’s worries “ad-
mirable” but pointedly rejoinders that “Vitale knows next to 
nothing about the sexual preferences or backgrounds of the 
various figures in the SR movement (assuming it can be called 
a movement).”48 While I sympathize with Vitale’s concerns too, 
I would side with Bryant here because queer is as much of a 
portmanteau term as speculative realism and is a non-gender 
specific rubric which is pitched against normativity, what Mi-
chael Warner calls regimes of the normal,49 rather than hetero-
sexuality. Queerness is a positionality, a posture of opposition to 
identitarian regimes, rather than a statement about sexuality of 
the kind Vitale makes.50 Bryant goes on to question Vitale’s iden-
tity politics and claims that “the overwhelming desire to label or 
subsume ourselves under a particular identity, can be seen as 
a symptom of how contemporary capital functions. The prob-
lem is that this symptom, like all symptoms, obfuscates or veils 
the social relations that generate the symptom. The point here 
is that we shouldn’t concern ourselves with questions of iden-
tity, but that we should raise questions about how this particular 
form of politics might very well function to perpetuate the very 
structure that generates these crises in the first place.” Queer-
ness, as Bryant quite cogently asserts, is about a disintrication 
from heteronormative and hegemonic regimes. If we insist on 
beginning queering speculative realism by labeling ourselves as 
“gay” or “queer” (or wanting to know about the sexual orienta-
47 Chris Vitale, “Queering Speculative Realism,” http://networkologies. 
wordpress.com/2010/06/08/queering-speculative-realism/. 
48 Levi Bryant, “Vitale on SR and Politics,” http://larvalsubjects.wordpress. 
com/2010/06/29/vitale-on-sr-and-politics/. 
49 Michael Warner, “Introduction” to Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics 
and Social Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 1993), xxvi. 
50 Vitale makes similar claims about privilege and identity in his long post 
“Queer Mediations: Thoughts on Queer Media Theory,” although he is not 
addressing SR there. See http://networkologies.wordpress.com/2009/12/07/  
queer-mediations-thoughts-on-queer-media-theory/. 
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tions of those who practice it) as Vitale does, then we are very 
much on the wrong track. 
Bryant takes particular exception to a response post from 
Michael at the blog Archive Fire to the original Vitale entry. Mi-
chael writes: 
I want to briefly address his specific question with regards to “queer-
ing speculative realism.” 
Overall, I believe we will begin to see a lot more diversity creep 
into the general thrust of Speculative Realism (SR) when it begins to 
get picked up by artists, radicals and other non-institutional intellec-
tuals. That is to say, the issue of queering and engendering diversity 
is more a problem with institutionalized intellectuality as such than 
with SR specifically. Academia in general is still very much a white-
boys club. The issues of privilege, access and univocality — and even 
aesthetic–ideological preference and distinctions — are deep class 
issues at the heart of Western society and deeply embedded within 
our institutional education systems. And I don’t think we can expect 
SR to diversify and become overtly political if it remains entangled 
in the academic/blogging/philosophy assemblage. 
In less words, we can’t expect SR to treat the symptom without its 
adherents (for lack of a better word) first, or also attacking the root 
causes of a much larger dis-ease at the core of their disciplines. SR 
will simply perpetuate the problems existent within the institutions 
that SR thinkers and bloggers are entangled with. Again, diversity 
will come when SR is “contaminated” from outside the academy and 
taken up by non-philosophical modes of intellectuality.51
Bryant is insulted most by the insinuation that speculative real-
ism is an ivory tower discourse practiced by those in power-
ful academic positions and that its ideas don’t travel very far 
beyond the confines of the academy. He responds (and again I 
agree with him, if not caring much for his tone) that OOO is an 




open discipline, a dare in Haraway’s terms, and that he ardently 
hopes it will create “projects for other people”: 
OOO is among the most open philosophical movements that’s ever 
existed. On the one hand, OOO has generated a large inter-disciplin-
ary interest from people both inside and outside the academy. Not 
only has OOO drawn interest from rhetoricians, anthropologists, 
media theorists, literary theorists, biologists, and even a handful of 
physicists, it has also drawn the interest of artists, activists, femi-
nists, and so on. In the forthcoming collection edited by Ian Bogost 
and I, Object-Oriented Ontology, there will be an article by the per-
formance artist and feminist Katherine Behar, as well as contribu-
tions from media theorists, literary theorists, technology theorists 
and others. On the other hand, through the medium of blogs, we 
have opened the doors to the participation of anyone who comes 
along, regardless of whether they are in academia or not. On this 
blog alone there are regular interactions between computer pro-
grammers, office workers, poets, environmentalists, novelists, co-
medians, and a host of others outside the academy. Michael can go 
fuck himself with his suggestion that somehow we’re trapped within 
the ivory tower walls of the academy, ignoring anyone who is out-
side the academy or from another discipline. I, at least, interact with 
such people every day.52
Bryant confesses earlier in the same post that he finds Vitale’s 
question as to what OOO has “to say about race, class, and gen-
der?” irritating. But, as Vitale points out in a further response 
to Bryant, he then himself goes on to produce a brilliant OOO 
reading of American History X which is responsive to questions 
of race.53 Strangely, however, Vitale does not pick up on the very 
last part of Bryant’s post where he utilizes Luhmannian systems 
theory to describe the way Spivak’s notion of the subaltern flags 
52 Bryant, “Vitale on SR and Politics.” [The book referenced above, to be edited 
by Bryant and Bogost, “Object-Oriented Ontology,” was never (or has not 
yet been) published. — Ed.]
53 Vitale, “SR and Politics: Response to Levi and Ian,” http://networkologies. 
wordpress.com/2010/06/30/sr-and-politics-response-to-levi-and-ian/. 
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blind spots in any hegemonic system (be that race, class, gender, 
or sexuality). “Resituated in terms of object-oriented ontology,” 
Bryant says, “the subaltern is a system in the environment of 
another system that nonetheless belongs to the unmarked space 
of that system within which it is entangled.” What Bryant is here 
calling the subaltern could just as easily refer to the queer, and 
is “something like the politics of the part-of-no-part described 
by Rancière.”54 
Before coming back to Bryant let us take a closer look at 
Vitale’s “Queering Speculative Realism” post. He argues there 
that “Speculative Realism, for whatever we think of this name, 
is mostly a movement which works to bring speculation and 
science into a greater rapprochement. But what are the politi-
cal implications of what we’re doing?”55 He goes on to state that 
speculative realism is far too concerned with the ontological 
(philosophical research) rather than the ontic (the messy stuff of 
actually existing arrangements in culture and politics), a charge 
that has often been leveled against Judith Butler we might add, 
and that: 
Epistemology and ontology, the current focus of speculative re-
alism, aren’t enough. We need a politics and an ethics from this 
movement, yes? Does SR have something to say about race, gen-
der, sexuality, or global capitalism? Something that comes from a 
particularly SR ap- proach to the world? It’s my sense that unless 
philosophy develops all these sides of itself, it isn’t complete. Must 
philosophy be complete this way? My sense is that it should be. I’m 
54 For more on Rancière’s politics of the miscount and queer theory see Mi-
chael O’Rourke and Sam Chambers, “Jacques Rancière on the Shores of 
Queer Theory,” borderlands 8, no. 2 (2009): http://www.borderlands.net.au/ 
vol8no2_2009/chambersorourke_intro.htm. 
55 Harman writes, albeit in a different context, that “there’s certainly a lot 
more potential in OOF [Object Oriented Feminism] than there is in the ‘All-
Things-Shall-Be-Destroyed-By-Science’ wing of SR, which drags its jugger-
naut through cities, forests, museums, and zoos, crushing all entities and 
leaving in their wake only the powder of mathematical structure.” See “Levi 




not sure if my own work does this, but I think it is a challenge to 
myself that I need to make sure I at least work to fulfill.56 
While he concedes that speculative realist thought comes “in 
many varieties,” Vitale is concerned that (and he doesn’t ex-
culpate himself here) “we” underplay “the politico-social sides 
of philosophy in the speculative realist movement as it stands 
now.” Ian Bogost replies in an equally irascible fashion to Vitale 
and Archive Fire by saying that 
the argument generally goes like this: philosophies need to include 
political and ethical positions to be complete. Privileges (like race, 
gender, and class) make it easy to ignore certain assumptions, and 
the whiteness and maleness and heterosexism of philosophy writ 
large automatically infects speculative realism, for it is a product of 
institutions propped up on those privileges. 
But for Bogost OOO is always already political insofar as his ap-
proach, his turn to objects, “is itself part of the path towards a 
solution, of paying attention to wordly things of all sorts, from 
ferns to floppy disks to frogs to Fiat 500s.” So, for Bogost, “politi-
cal and ethical positions in philosophy and theory […] are thus, 
I would argue, fucked (to use a term that is truly populist).”57
However, Bryant is far more sanguine about the political and 
ethical (and queer) potentialities of SR in posts written before 
and after the Vitale flare-up. 
Let’s start with the blog post written after the argument (in 
August 2010) over the masculinism of speculative realism be-
fore circling back to the earlier post (which might have obviated 
the whole debate in the first place).58 Here Bryant talks about 
mess as something we abhor in our research practices, a term 
he takes from the social scientist John Law, who in his book 
56 Vitale, “Queering Speculative Realism.” 
57 Ian Bogost, “I am not a Marxist,” http://www.bogost.com/blog/i_am_
not_a_ marxist.shtml. 
58 Levi Bryant, “Unit Operations,” http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/ 
08/03/unit-operations/. 
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After Method: Mess in Social Science Research makes a case for 
“quieter and more generous methods.” 
Bryant writes: 
What we abhor, to use John Law’s apt term, is a mess. Everywhere 
we think in terms of relations between form and content, form and 
matter, where one key term functions as the ultimate form (which 
for Aristotle was the active principle and associated with masculin-
ity) and where all else is treated as matter awaiting form (which for 
Aristotle was the passive term and was associated with femininity). 
In short, our theoretical framework tends to be one massive meta-
phor for fucking and the sexual relationship. Of course, it’s always 
a fucking where the men are on top in the form of an active form 
inseminating a passive matter. And again, that active form can be 
the signifier, signs, economics, the social, form, categories, reason, 
etc. What’s important for masculinist ontology is that form always 
be straight and one. I’ll leave it to the reader to make the appropriate 
phallic jokes here.59
What Bryant is arguing for is a spreading or diversification of 
approaches to method and similarly Law argues for “symmetry” 
as opposed to a phallic ontology/methodology and he calls for 
a wide ranges of metaphors for both imagining and respond-
ing to our worlds (he calls these “method assemblages”). The 
political stakes of this are that these methods call forth worlds, 
helping us to both imagine and take responsibility for them (this 
seems to me to be the very political underpinning of the work of 
all four main OOO theorists). Among Law’s metaphors for im-
agining and taking responsibility for our worlds are “localities, 
specificities, enactments, multiplicities, fractionalities, goods, 
resonances, gatherings, forms of crafting, processes of weaving, 
spirals, vortices, indefinitenesses, condensates, dances, imagi-
naries, passions, interferences.”60
59 Ibid.
60 John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research (London: Rout-
ledge, 2004), 156. 
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Moving on from his discussion of our abhorrence for mess in 
favor of a phallic univocity, Bryant says this: 
What the masculinist passion for ground abhors, however, is the 
idea of a multiplicity of heterogeneous actors acting in relation to-
gether. It is not economics that determines all else. It is not biology 
that determines all else. It is not neurology that determines all else. 
It is not signs and signifiers that determines all else. It is not cows 
and roads that determine all else. It is not history that determines 
all else. No, the world is populated by chairs, cows, neurons, signs, 
signifiers, narratives, discourses, neutrons, chemical reactions, 
weather patterns, roads, etc., all mutually perturbing one another 
in a mesh. In other words, we have all sorts of negative and positive 
feedback relations between these different spheres functioning as 
resonators for one another.61 
We might take from this that speculative realism and queer the-
ory are in a dance of relation with each other, are enmeshed and 
mutually perturb each other. As Bryant goes on to write: “What 
we have here is a mesh of non-linearities without ground. What 
we have here are all sorts of agencies and objects feeding back 
on one another, modifying one another, perturbing one another, 
translating one another.” And this choreography involves cas-
trating a certain Lacanianism: 
What I’ve tried to formulate is an ontology without phallus in the 
Lacanian sense of the term; or rather an ontology where phallus is 
recognized properly as the masquerade that it is (here an analysis of 
projective identification in the portrayal of woman as masquerade 
is an appropriate critique of psychoanalysis). The point is not that 
the signifier and fantasy do not play a role, but rather that we must 
see the role that these things play as a role among other actors in a 
complex network of feedback relations. An ontology without phal-
61 Bryant, “Unit Operations.” 
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lus is an ontology where there is no fundamental interpretant, no 
ground of all else, no final explanatory term.62
Bryant then shifts from discussing the phallus to a “review” of 
Ian Bogost’s book Unit Operations and his alien phenomenology 
of objects. He explains that 
in Unit Operations, Ian [Bogost] contrasts unit and system. As Ian 
writes, “Unit operations are modes of meaning-making that privi-
lege discrete, disconnected actions over deterministic, progressive 
systems. […] I contend that unit operations represent a shift away 
from system operations, although neither strategy is permanently 
detached from the other” (3). This asemiotic understanding of unit 
operations hinges on the fact that “the unit can always explode the 
constraints of system, or that systems are always occasional, local 
stabilities from which units can escape to create a new surprise.”63
The last sentence could just as well describe Bryant’s own un-
derstanding of subalternity and second order systems discussed 
earlier. 
Bryant wants to focus in on the operation part of unit opera-
tions and how this leads to messy creativeness and amongstness 
rather than phallic univocity. He explains that 
In his early work (I suspect we’ll find that he’s of a different view 
once Alien Phenomenology comes out), Bogost is deeply influenced 
by Badiou’s concept of the count-as-one (which has been a longtime 
fascination of mine as well). The count-as-one is, in Badiou, an op-
eration that transforms an inconsistent multiplicity into a consistent 
multiplicity, literally counting it as one, or transforming it into a 
unit. The count-as-one is an operation, something that takes place, 






Bryant goes on shortly after to say that 
In short, unit operations produce, they generate a new entity, 
whereas system operations re-produce, they iterate an already ex-
isting pattern or object. This, really, is what is to be thought in the 
mesh of exo-relations among the heterogeneous actors populating 
the heteroverse of flat ontology: What are those exo-relations that 
reproduce existing units and relations and what are the operations 
that produce entirely new entities or agents? And if we are to think 
this, we must think a complex interplay of a variety of different 
types of entities, how they contribute to the production of new enti-
ties, and must avoid our phallocentric inclinations that would erect 
only a single ground of being […] we must think processes of unit-
izing without abandoning objects.65
What we might glean from this is that queer theory’s unit op-
erations produce rather than reproduce, that there is not one 
“single ground” of queer theory, OOO, or SR, not one single in-
terpretation of what they are or what they do. Instead they are 
caught in a mesh, are always in relation to each other and in a 
gravitational mobility toward each other, and that this mess or 
mesh of “exo-relations” produces a new kind of theoretical crea-
tivity where the concrete concepts of OOO and SR can be put to 
work with and amongst queer theories and concepts. 
Now, let us return to an earlier post by Bryant from January 
2010 where he anticipates many of Vitale’s charges against SR 
and OOO and rehearses some of these later arguments.66 On this 
occasion he is responding to a post from Paul Reid-Bowen, who 
blogs at Pagan Metaphysics, who was arguing for a realist ontol-
ogy and a feminist metaphysics in the work of Christine Bat-
tersby, Donna Haraway, and Luce Irigaray.67 Bryant forthrightly 
65 Ibid.
66 Levi Bryant, “Feminist Metaphysics as Object-Oriented Ontology — OOO/ 
OOP Round-Up,” http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/01/22/feminist- 
metaphysics-as-object-oriented-ontology-ooooop-round-up/. 
67 Paul Reid-Bowen, “Foreshadowing Dundee,” http://paganmetaphysics. 
blogspot.com/2010/01/foreshadowing-dundee.html. 
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states that he is unconvinced by a feminist metaphysics (since 
for him there is just metaphysics) but he does admit that Reid-
Bowen is “on to something here.” And what Bryant suggests he 
is on to is precisely what preempts some of Vitale’s later criti-
cisms of SR/OOP. It is worth reproducing in full: 
In the world of cultural studies and the humanities, I think there 
have been a number of privileged sites that have been directed to-
wards bucking the primacy of anti-realist or correlationist thought 
than other disciplines by virtue of the nature of the objects that 
constitute their object of investigation. These theorists have not, of 
course, in most cases baldly stated their work as a debate between 
realism and anti-realism, but their work has nonetheless inevitably 
led them to thinking being in such a way that it is not simply a dis-
course, language, or a correlation with the human. 
Paradoxically, these privileged sites have largely been marginal-
ized in the world of academia and the humanities; no doubt because 
of the hegemony of anti-realist thought or the status of correlation-
ism as the establishment position. Among these privileged sites I 
would include environmental philosophy and thought, science 
and technology studies, critical animal theory, geographical stud-
ies, writing technology studies, media studies, queer theory, and, 
of course, feminist philosophy and thought. I am sure that there 
are many others that don’t immediately come to mind for me. If 
these have been privileged sites for the development of significant 
conceptual innovations in the field of realist ontology, then this is 
because all of these sites of investigation force encounters with real 
and nonhuman objects and actors that cannot be reduced to corre-
lates of human thought, language, perception, or use but that have 
to be approached in their own autonomous being to properly be 
thought.68




After perhaps somewhat unfairly setting Judith Butler’s work to 
one side because, for him, she places far too much emphasis on 
discursivity,69 he argues that 
feminist thought (and here I am not even beginning to do justice to 
the richness and sophistication of this thought and what has arisen 
out of those inquiries) forces an encounter with the real of the bio-
logical body and the difference it introduces into the world, the real 
of the sexed body, that exceeds the being of the phenomenological 
lived body and the discursive body, while somehow still being inter-
twined with these other two bodies […] the forgetting of the real is 
always a masculine gesture.70
The most crucial point Bryant makes here, however, is that 
queer theory, among the other “privileged sites” he mentions 
above, is, although being a marginalized site of realist thought, 
“in so many respects, ground-zero for object-oriented ontology.” 
This is a remarkable assertion: no OOO without queer theory, no 
SR without queer theory. 
OOF: Object-Oriented Feminism 
One of the newest kids on the OOO block is object-oriented 
feminism, another of Bryant’s privileged if marginalized sites for 
realist thought where the “‘really real’ is placed on neither the 
side of the natural, nor the human.” Graham Harman humbly 
admits that he “wouldn’t know how to go about constructing”71 
an object-oriented feminism but Ian Bogost has blogged the 
proceedings of a conference as well as his response to all six pa-
69 There is a fascinating moment in Undoing Gender where Butler promises to 
write in the future about “the place of sharp machines” and “the technology 
of the knife in debates about intersexuality and transsexuality alike”: Undo-
ing Gender (London: Routledge, 2004), 64. But she never has, at least to my 
knowledge, written about this. 
70 Bryant, “Feminist Metaphysics as Object-Oriented Ontology.” 
71 Graham Harman, “Object-Oriented Feminism,” http://doctorzamalek2. 
wordpress.com/2010/10/30/object-oriented-feminism/. 
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pers on this very topic held in Indianopolis in October 2010. 
The two panels, organized by Katherine Behar, whom Bryant 
mentioned in his response to Vitale above, took up the question, 
“what would a program for object-oriented feminism (OOF) 
entail?”72 Drawing on Bill Brown’s “Thing Theory,”73 Wendy 
Hui Kyong Chun used “softwarification” as a way into recon-
figuring the relationship between subjects and objects, linking 
software’s “historical emergence as invisibly visible (or visibly 
invisible) object” to gendered “hierarchies embedded in its va-
pory structure.” Patricia Ticineto Clough, whose earlier work 
on Deleuze and affect was already making these object-oriented 
moves, tried to rethink “the relationship of language and a sub-
ject” while also bringing to the fore “questions about bodies, de-
sires, phantasms.” In the brilliantly titled “Facing Necrophilia, or 
‘Botox Ethics,’” Katherine Behar picked up Catherine Malabou’s 
notion of plasticity, the ways in which it is able to receive or cre-
ate form and is situated between the extreme points of taking 
and annihilating form, to queer the relationship between living 
and dead objects:74
72 The panels was held at the 2010 Society for Literature and the Arts Confer-
ence. The first panel dealt with general responses to the organizer’s question 
and the second panel focused in on the theme of the body. There were two 
responses from Katherine Hayles and Bogost. You can read all six abstracts 
and Bogost’s response here: Ian Bogost, “Object Oriented Feminism,” http://
www.bogost.com/blog/object-oriented_feminism_1.shtml. 
73 Bill Brown has somewhat apologetically developed “thing theory” in such 
a way that its necessity becomes visible and we could add it to Bryant’s list 
of privileged if marginalized sites for realist thinking which falls out with 
the correlationist circle: “Is there something perverse, if not archly insist-
ent, about complicating things with theory? Do we really need anything 
like thing theory the way we need narrative theory or cultural theory, queer 
theory or discourse theory? Why not let things alone?” In Bill Brown (ed.), 
Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 1. 
74 Malabou’s name is rarely invoked in speculative realist (or indeed in queer 
theoretical) circles but her idea of plasticity is attractive precisely because 
it is an agent of disobedience, a refusal to submit to a model. See her What 
Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans. Sebastian Rand (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008). 
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Just as Object-Oriented Feminism incorporates human and nonhu-
man objects, it must extend between living objects and dead ones. 
This paper explores how self-objectifying practitioners of body art 
and plastic surgery incorporate inertness and deadness within the 
living self. First we discuss body art and plastic surgery through 
Catherine Malabou’s concept of brain plasticity, the constitution of 
oneself through passive reception and active annihilation of form. 
Malabou associates plasticity’s destructive aspect with plastic explo-
sives and its malleable aspect with sculpture and plastic surgery. Yet 
seen from under the knife, plastic surgery and body art seem to 
make plastic objects in Malabou’s full sense of the term. The plastic 
art object of surgery kills off its old self to sculpt a new one. This 
brings us to Botox, the snicker-worthy subject at the heart of this 
paper. In Botox use, optional injections of Botulinum toxin tem-
porarily deaden the face, Emmanuel Levinas’ primary site of liv-
ing encounter. With Botox, living objects elect to become a little 
less lively. Botox represents an important ethical gesture: a face-first 
plunge for living objects to meet dead objects halfway, to locate and 
enhance what is inert in the living, and extend toward inaccessible 
deadness with necrophiliac love and compassion. “Botox ethics” 
hints at how Object-Oriented Feminism might subtly shift object-
oriented terms. Resistance to being known twists into resistance to 
alienation. Concern with qualities of things reconstitutes as con-
cern for qualities of relations. And, speculation on the real becomes 
performance of the real. Botox ethics experientially transforms em-
pathy for dead counterparts into comingled sympathy. Setting aside 
aesthetic allure, Botox ethics shoots up.75
This powerful argument (or parts of it) were already implicit 
in an early attempt (from October 2008) by Ben Woodard to 
think speculative realism in relation to the object and ethics.76 
75 Bogost, “Object Oriented Feminism.”
76 Ben Woodard, “The Phallicized Face: Towards an Objectifying Eth-
ics or the (Real) Object of Science,” https://naughtthought.wordpress.
com/2008/10/27/the-phallicized-face-towards-an-objectifying-ethics-or-
the-real-object-of-science/. In his abstract on feminist metaphysics men-
tioned above Paul Reid-Bowen confesses that “the irony and/or perversity 
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Woodard’s assertion, and this should bring to mind Bryant’s ar-
gument about feminist thought and the biological body, is that 
“the philosophical paradigm of speculative realism can serve to 
elucidate an ethics of the Real object.” For Woodard, Levinas 
“sweeps the phallus under the rug of the face” and he suggests 
that “the object, as a form of immanence” must be “brought into 
psychoanalysis and opposed to the formal object, the object as 
concept.” In a typically Schellingian account of slime dynam-
ics, Woodard turns to Iain Hamilton’s Grant’s nature philosophy 
to argue that “post-Kantian philosophies predominantly ignore 
the inorganic focusing instead on the opposition of number and 
animal, epitomized in the contrast between Deleuze and Badi-
ou.” As Woodard understands it, “inorganicity as the self con-
struction of matter, as an ontological protoplasm — the slime of 
being — provides the very possibility of all philosophy.” Behar’s 
face-first plunge for “living objects to meet dead objects half-
way” obliquely references Karen Barad’s work on “agential real-
ism,” the way bodies intra-act, dynamically and causally.77 It also 
of proposing this alliance [between objects and objectification], given the 
history and weight of feminist analyses of sexual objectification, is not lost 
on me. However, I contend that an Object Oriented Ontology does not run 
afoul of ethical, political and social feminist critiques of objectification.” 
Graham Harman comments on this by reminding us that the objects of 
OOP have “nothing to do with objectification. In fact, they are what resist 
all objectification. To objectify someone or something is to limit it, to re-
duce it […] by contrast, object-oriented philosophy is by definition an anti-
reductionist philosophy. It holds that all things must be taken on their own 
terms. The reason for complaints about ‘objectification’ is that a false split 
is made between people and maybe animals who cannot be objectified, and 
inanimate objects which can. My thesis, by contrast, is that even inanimate 
objects should not and cannot be objectified.” See http://doctorzamalek2.
wordpress.com/2010/01/22/levi-on-reid-bowen-on-feminism-and-ooo/. 
77 See Karen Barad, “Queer Causation and the Ethics of Mattering,” in Queer- 
ing the Non/Human, eds. Noreen Giffney and Myra Hird (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2008), 311–38; and “Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological 
Relations of Inheritance: Dis/continuities, SpaceTime Enfoldings, and Jus-
tice-to-Come,” Derrida Today 3, no. 2 (2010): 240–68. In my preface, “The 
Open,” to Giffney and Hird’s Queering the Non/Human (xix–xx), I made a 
fairly early reference to the potential enmeshments of speculative realism 
and queer theory: “If for Haraway and many of the authors collected here 
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calls to mind Reza Negarestani’s opening up of “the moment 
of nucleation with nigredo” and the mathesis of decay and pu-
trefaction.78 The meeting between queer theory and speculative 
realism involves a mutual blackening, a “necrophilic intimacy,” 
a meeting of necrotizing forces: “if the intelligibility of the world 
must thus imply a ‘face to face’ coupling of the soul with the 
body qua dead, then intelligibility is the epiphenomenon of a 
necrophilic intimacy, a problematic collusion with the rotting 
double which brings about the possibility of intelligibility with-
in an inert cosmos.”79 Queer theory and speculative realism/
object-oriented ontology are not so much open to, as opened by 
each other, in what Bogost calls “carpentry, doing philosophy by 
making things.”80 
The rest of the papers on the OOF panel turned their atten-
tion to the body. Anne Pollock’s “Heart Feminism” asks what 
the question has been ‘if we have never been human, then where do we 
begin?’ then answers have been forthcoming in other fields: Bruno Latour’s 
Actor Network Theory has been at the forefront of technoscientific atten-
tion to (if not queering as such) the non-human, Bill Brown’s and Sherry 
Turkle’s probing of things and ‘evocative objects’ has foregrounded our in-
timacy with the objects we live with in generative ways, Graham Harman’s 
speculative realism has inaugurated a philosophy turned toward objects 
and consistently urged us towards a humanitarian politics a uned to the 
objects themselves, while Quentin Meillassoux’s non-correlationism argues 
that there can be no necessary relations between things in a vision of the 
world a er finitude, a world without humans.” 
78 Reza Negarestani, “The Corpse Bride: Thinking with Nigredo,” Collapse IV 
(Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2008), 129–61. 
79 Ibid., 134–35. See also his “Death as a Perversion: Openness and Germinal 
Death,” http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=396. In my preface “TwO 
(Theory without Organs)” to David V. Ruffolo’s Post-Queer Politics (Farn-
ham: Ashgate, 2009), x, I make a connection between post-queer politics 
and Negarestani’s polytics: “We might, borrowing from Reza Negarestani in 
Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials [Melbourne: Re.Press, 
2008], call this a ‘polytics’ of anomalous or unnatural participation with the 
outside, a set of ‘schizotrategies’ for openness and insurgency.” 
80 Bogost, “Object Oriented Feminism.” This kind of mutual blackening is 
what has motivated much of the recent Black Metal Theory which shares 
some important overlaps with speculative realist thought. 
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“starting from the heart might offer for feminism,”81 Adam Za-
retsky began to formulate an Object-Oriented Bioethics (OOB) 
and Frenchy Lunning, in a paper on the corset, reflected on the 
“anamorphic entangled fields of the feminine and the fetish.” 
Ian Bogost’s extemporized response is interesting since it takes 
us back to where we began: “I had the expectation that today’s 
speakers would define ‘object-oriented feminism.’ That they 
would pin it down, that they would domesticate it, if you want.” 
But OOF is as undomesticatable as queer theory or speculative 
realism. It refuses to be pinned down, anatomized, given a pre-
cise shape. Instead, Bogost tells us “we saw a fascinating explo-
ration around a theme. A tour of sorts, a kind of Heideggerian 
pastoral stroll on which aspects of object-oriented ontology 
were introduced to aspects of feminist theory.” We might sup-
plement Bogost’s observation by saying that aspects of feminist 
theory were also introduced to aspects of object-oriented ontol-
ogy in a mutual illumination. As he himself writes in response 
to Pollock, “going into the body also means going outside of 
it, like a Möbius strip or a Klein bottle.” And this idea extends 
beyond the biological body because, for Bogost, we have been 
shown “the value of looking for” Meillassoux’s “great outdoors” 
inside as well as outside. Object-oriented feminism is, and again 
this should remind us of Bryant and Barad, “a perturbation of 
81 With the exception of Peter Gratton (see his course syllabus here: http:// 
web.me.com/grattonpeter/2010_Speculative_Realism/Speculative_ 
Realism.html), the philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy has been largely absent 
from speculative realist discourse which is strange given his attention to 
the sense of all beings-in-the-world, from the human to the animal to the 
inorganic. The best place to start on Nancy and “heart feminism” however 
would be his essay “The Heart of Things” in The Birth to Presence, trans. Bri-
an Holmes and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 167–88. 
Jacques Derrida has been equally neglected (frequently ugly debates about 
Derrida have flared up from time to time in the SR blogosphere in the past 
year) in both SR and OOO thinking despite some claims that his philoso-
phy anticipates some central OOO concepts. Again, if one simply wanted to 
start with “heart feminism” you could look to Derrida’s book On Touching: 
Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizarry (Stanford: California University 
Press, 2005), where he ruminates on Nancy’s heart transplant, technicity, 
and sexual difference. 
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human and world.” Like Butler’s iterability, this agential realism 
or materialism, which brackets things-in-phenomena, allows 
for new articulations, new configurations, for what Luciana Par-
isi calls “affective relations,” a community constituted through 
Barad’s posthuman performativity.82 Such an ethico-politics 
(and the queering of the normativities of both queer theory and 
speculative realism themselves) depends on what Agamben calls 
“the open,” a process which does not follow some preconceived 
teleological program. There can be no program for what queer 
82 Luciana Parisi, “The Nanoengineering of Desire,” in Giffney and Hird, 
Queering the Non/Human, 283–310. Parisi’s work is heavily influenced by 
the blackened Deleuzoguattarianism of Nick Land and her book Abstract 
Sex: Philosophy, Bio-Technology and the Mutations of Desire maps a complex 
web of intricate relations between humans and non/humans. In an inter-
view with Matthew Fuller she explains that: “Abstract Sex addresses human 
stratification on three levels. The biophysical, the biocultural and the bio-
digital amalgamation of layers composing a constellation of bodies within 
bodies, each grappled within the previous and the next formation — a sort 
of positive feedback upon each other cutting across specific time scales. In 
other words, these levels of stratification constitute for Abstract Sex the en-
dosymbiotic dynamics of organization of matter — a sort of antigenealogi-
cal process of becoming that suspends the teleology of evolution and the 
anthropocentrism of life. From this standpoint, the modalities of human 
optimism, rooted in the net substantial distinction between the good and 
the evil and the distinct belief in negative forces, fail to explain the continual 
collision and coexistence of the distinct layers. Following the law of moral-
ity, human optimism would never come to terms with its own paradoxes 
of construction and destruction. And if it does it is soon turned into an 
existential crisis giving in to the full force of negating power and thus all 
becomes intolerable. Once we are forced to engage with the way layers col-
lide in the human species — the way some biophysical and biocultural sedi-
mentations rub against each other under certain pressures and in their turn 
the way they are rubbed against by the biodigital mutations of sensory per-
ception for example — then the moral stances of optimism and pessimism 
make no longer sense. Indeed we need to leap towards a plane debunked 
of ultimate moral judgement. A plane full of practice and contingent ac-
tivities, where we nd ourselves plunged in a field of relation — interdepen-
dent ecologies of forces (a ractors, pressures, thresholds), which trigger in 
us modifications that resonate across all scales of organization.” See http://
www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0410/msg00054.html. 
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theory or speculative realism or object oriented approaches do. 
They are not means to an end but rather means “without end.”83 
Naught Thought: On Ben Woodard’s Queer Speculative Realism 
If for Bogost one of the promising aspects of OOF is that it looks 
for the great outdoors inside as well as outside, then we might 
not see Ben Woodard’s nihilist speculative realism as an ally 
for object-oriented feminisms or queer theories. Indeed, in 
his most recent work Woodard has cautioned that philosophy 
can only ever return to the “great outdoors” if it “leaves behind 
the dead loop of the human skull.”84 That said, Woodard’s es-
says on his Naught Thought blog have consistently led the way 
when it comes to queering speculative realism and to advancing 
the politics of a queered speculative realism. We have already 
seen his discussion of the “phallicization of ethics” but we might 
also consider his various writings on gender, sexuality, psycho-
analysis, anorexia, and trauma as clearing a ground for queer 
speculations.85 I will isolate just a few exemplary posts. As Bry-
ant has reminded us, it is masculinism which forgets the real of 
the biological body and it is feminist thought which remembers 
it. One figure who has been largely forgotten by the speculative 
83 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2004) and Means Without End: Notes on 
Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
84 Ben Woodard, “Mad Speculation and Absolute Inhumanism: Lovecraft, Li-
gotti and the Weirding of Philosophy,” continent 1, no. 1 (2011): 3–13, http://
www.continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/14.
85 Woodard has engaged with the queer theories of Lauren Berlant on fetal 
citizenship, Ann Cvetkovich on affect, and Lee Edelman on reproductive 
futurism in a number of posts. For example see “Migrations of Trauma,” 
http://naughtthought.wordpress.com/2008/01/19/migrations-of-trauma/ 
and “Trauma’s Transmogrifications,” http://naughtthought.wordpress. 
com/2007/10/27/traumas-transmogrifications/. Three other names one 
associates with speculative realism, Dominic Fox (who blogs at Poetix), 
Mark Fisher (who blogs at K-Punk), and Nina Power (who blogs at Infinite 
Thought), have also critiqued Edelman’s book No Future: Queer Theory and 
the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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realists is Katerina Kolozova and Woodard returns her to her 
proper place in his post “Meshing the Real and the Transcen-
dental or Katerina Kolozova.”86 He tells us that “jumping from 
Judith Butler, to Rosi Braidotti, to Drucilla Cornell, to Derrida, 
to Lacan (with thinkers such as Badiou, Derrida, and Deleuze 
sprinkled throughout) Kolozova formulates a breathtakingly lu-
cid and powerfully political, theoretical and social system.” One 
of the reasons why Kolozova has not been prominent in SR dis-
cussions is that speculative realism “has been more than slightly 
ambiguous as to its relation to psychoanalysis.” Bryant and Ne-
garestani are two very obvious counter-examples but Woodard 
cites Brassier’s limp deployments of the term “unconscious” and 
its near absence in the texts of other speculative realists as evi-
dence. But Kolozova’s psychoanalytically inflected, Laruellian 
non-philosophical system, is clearly a prime, if again shunted 
to the margins, site for realist and non-correlationist thinking 
about the body, sexual difference, and identity: 
If, as Kolozova suggests, the body is the nearest bearer of the Real 
of our being, how do we articulate a politics which is different from 
the tired attempts of identity politics? If we carry the real with us, 
and our experiences can touch upon the real, what is to separate a 
politics of the embodied Real versus an identity politics? The differ-
ence that Kolozova ends on is that since identity is always a failure 
to grasp the Real and sense the World, as experiential, is what forces 
and faces the Real of such materialism, we can only remind our-
selves that such a world is not-All, that the World can never grasp 
identity as such let alone any singular human in their automatic sol-
itude. The strength here is that Kolozova seems bolder than Badiou 
in dismissing the pre-Evental non-subject and more optimistic than 
Transcendental Materialism in that not only can the subject think 
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the gap that it is but that the gap does the thinking, that the Real 
itself desires to be transcendental to, in a sense, be political.87
Shortly before this post on Kolozova’s politics, Woodard had 
worked though a provisional speculative realist politics (in June 
2008, two years exactly before Vitale’s post on the lack of politi-
cal engagement of SR), wisely rejecting Lee Edelman’s No Future 
and its misleading politics of the Real along the way.88 Woodard 
gently argues that the “End of Time” section of Brassier’s Nihil 
Unbound “leans towards what might be a politics, in that, jump-
ing from Freud’s theory of the drive as repetition, there is an 
inherent will-to-know in humans that is, contrary to most of the 
universe, negentropic.” The question he proceeds to ask is: “how 
does one account for the genesis of the multitude in a non-vi-
talist way, in a philosophically realist way, that does not occlude 
the possibility of politics?” He partially answers that speculative 
realism “provides a step in the right direction in that it illustrates 
the radicality of thought by ‘immanentizing’ the transcendental 
by binding it to the object.” But the full answer he moves to-
wards is that 
the implicit politics in Speculative Realism is found in its return to 
slime as the trace of life, that the smudge of materiality cannot be 
idealized away, not even in the most basic form of relation itself, in 
the notion of currency and exchange. This zero point of being is, in 
a sense, a paradoxically deanthropomorphized bio-politics — that 
matter matters in that it can think itself as such without recourse to 
the reflective structures of ethics or democracy. Speculative Real-
ism exposes that the zombic hunger of Hardt and Negri’s multitude 
is a form of thinking and not a form of being. The psychoanalytic 
contribution here is that capital, while inhabiting the drive’s mode 
87 Ibid.
88 Ben Woodard, “Heaps of Slime or Towards a Speculative Realist Politics,” 
http://naughtthought.wordpress.com/2008/06/20/heaps-of-slime-or- 
towards-a-speculative-realist-politics/. In their interviews with Woodard in 
The Speculative Turn both Žižek and Badiou argue that speculative realism 
lacks political purchase. 
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of iteration, is still subject to alteration. In thinking capital as object 
we highlight the objects around it as possibly dissociable from it 
such as democracy and the social. 
Conclusion: Some Sightings and Speculations 
In Circus Philosophicus, Graham Harman asks us to imagine 
a “giant ferris wheel” with thousands “of separate cars, each of 
them loaded with various objects.”89 This final section paints a 
picture of several ferris wheels, each one containing glimpses 
of encounters between queer theory and speculative thought, 
which readers can then pause and fix in their minds as they con-
tinue to wheel around. 
Ferris Wheel #1: Neomaterialist Feminism
This wheel would contain texts by various thinkers associ-
ated with (a mostly Deleuzian) neomaterialist or neovitalist 
feminism which has been sensitive to the nonhuman, the in-
organic and the vibrancy of matter. This would include theo-
rists such as Stengers,90 Elizabeth Grosz,91 Rosi Braidotti,92 Ma-
nuel de Landa,93 Myra Hird,94 and Claire Colebrook.95 It would 
also hold Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of 
89 Harman, Circus Philosophicus, 1.
90 Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics 1, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
91 Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 
92 Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics (Cambridge: Polity, 
2006). 
93 Manuel DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic 
Reason (London: Continuum, 2011). For a queering of DeLanda’s work, see 
Jeff Lord’s review of A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History here: http://
www.situation.ru/app/j_art_1036.htm 
94 Myra Hird, Sex, Gender and Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004). Hird is 
heavily influenced by Harman’s work. Her recent issue of Parallax (16, no. 1, 
2010) on the life of the gift contains Harman’s essay “Asymmetrical Causa- 
tion: Influence without Recompense.” 
95 Claire Colebrook, “How Queer Can You Go? Theory, Normality and Nor- 
mativity,” in Giffney and Hird, Queering the Non/Human, 17–34. Cole-
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Things which rethinks the partition of the sensible (in Rancière’s 
terms), where matter is seen as inert and human beings are un-
derstood as vibrant. She turns the “figures of ‘life’ and ‘matter’ 
around and around, worrying them until they start to seem 
strange […] [and] in the space created by this estrangement, a 
vital materiality [of thunder storms, stem cells, fish oils, metal, 
trash, electricity] can start to take shape.”96
Ferris Wheel #2: The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic
This wheel takes its name from Mario Perniola’s book Sex Ap-
peal of the Inorganic which strangely hasn’t exerted much of 
an influence on speculative realism.97 In it we would discover 
figures and texts desiring a re-cycling of the world, a world re-
encountered in which each singular being is exposed to an ex-
istence they share with other beings (from shells, to hammers, 
to clouds, to crystals, to storms). The wonder involved in this 
encounter which shakes all our anthropocentric certainties, is 
we might say, after Sara Ahmed, a “queer phenomenology.”’ In 
Ahmed’s terms, a reorientation toward the world and its objects 
(tables and pebbles are among her gorgeous examples), such a 
making strange, is what “allows the familiar to dance with life 
again.”98 Among the other texts housed here would be those 
which return an agential dynamism to the non-living, the in-
animate and the inert: Bernard Stiegler’s Technics and Time 
which queers the distinction between man and animal by min-
ing the paradox between the human invention of the technical 
brook’s emerging work on extinction might be useful for those thinking 
about politics and nature after Brassier and Woodard. 
96 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2010), vii. Jonathan Goldberg’s recent 
thinking around Lucretian physics is pertinent here too. See, for one exam-
ple, The Seeds of Things: Theorizing Sexuality and Materiality in Renaissance 
Representations (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009). 
97 Mario Perniola, Sex Appeal of the Inorganic (London: Continuum, 2004). 
98 Sara Ahmed, Queer Orientations: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 164. Ahmed has been highly 
critical of the masculinism of OOO. 
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and the technical invention of the human;99 Nikki Sullivan and 
Sam Murray’s Somatechnics which plasticizes, intertwines and 
enfolds man and animal, human and object;100 Jeffrey Jerome 
Cohen’s “Stories of Stone,” a geochoreographesis in which he 
explores the life of stone, allowing it to breathe and speak as it 
“confounds the boundary between organic and inorganic, art 
and nature, human and mineral.”101 It would also include Shan-
non Bell’s Fast Feminism, a philo-porno-political machine in 
which she fucks Stelarc’s six-legged walking robot and tissue-
engineers a male phallus, a female phallus, and a Bataillean big 
toe in a “bioreactor where they formed into a neo-organ.”102 Also 
here we would discover Dinesh Wadiwel’s essay “Sex and the 
Lubricative Ethic” where in the fisting scene a whole range of 
“nonhuman material objects are also important entities with-
in networks of erotic production. A sling, a piece of lingerie, a 
99 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Rich-
ard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2008). 
100 Nikki Sullivan and Sam Murray (eds.), Somatechnics: Queering the Tech- 
nologisation of Bodies (Farnham: Ashgate Press, 2009). In my preface to the 
book, “Originary Somatechnicity,” I wrote that they “disclose that there is 
not just an originary technicity but also an originary somaticisation of the 
technical object. Their queer intervention, the space they open for us in a 
deft disoriginating move, is to begin to think an origina somatechnicity” 
(xiii). 
101 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Stories of Stone,” postmedieval: a journal of medieval 
cultural studies 1, nos. 1/2 (2010): 56–63. Medieval Studies has proved to be 
a particularly fertile site for speculative realist thinking. Two other essays in 
the inaugural issue of postmedieval by Michael Witmore (“We Have Never 
Not Been Inhuman”) and Julian Yates (“It’s (for) You; or, the Tele-t-r/opical 
Post-Human”) engage with Meillassoux and Harman. In her response essay, 
the feminist N. Katherine Hayles picks up on this and also references both 
Harman and Bogost when she writes that “alien phenomenologists gather 
information about tools to understand them not as accessories to human 
culture but as subjects that perceive and act in the world” (Hayles, “Posthu- 
man Ambivalence,” 266). 
102 Shannon Bell, Fast Feminism (New York: Autonomedia, 2010), 183. 
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whip or a vibrator may all play significant if not indispensable 
roles in enabling an erotic scene to happen.”103
Ferris Wheel #3: Persons and Things
This wheel gets its name from Barbara Johnson’s Persons and 
Things which isn’t often remembered when speculative realists 
and object-oriented ontologists are reconfiguring relations be-
tween subjects and objects.104 Bracha Ettinger’s post-Lacanian 
work on the matrixial belongs here too.105 It shares much on 
the level of style with Negarestani’s psychoanalytic territopic 
materialisms;106 her matrixiality may have affinities with Iain 
Hamilton Grant’s dark chemistry of ur-slime;107 and she makes 
it clear how Meillassoux’s hyperchaos also refers to the absolute 
contingency of gender. 
Ferris Wheel #4: Object-Oriented Maternity
Ettinger could also take her place in this wheel alongside Lisa 
Baraitser’s Maternal Encounters where she theorizes maternal 
“stuff,” the many objects which encumber the mother’s body. 
These “maternal objects” are variously figured by Baraitser as 
Latourian “actants” or Harmanian “tool-beings.” And these 
tool-beings include clothes, blankets, quilts, bottles, teats, milk 
powder, sterilizers, breast pumps, feeding spoons and bowls, 
juice bottles and bibs, pacifiers, mobiles, rattles, nappies, wipes, 
changing mats, creams, powders, cribs, cots, baskets, baby mon-
103 Dinesh Wadiwel, “Sex and the Lubricative Ethic,” in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Queer Theory, eds. Noreen Giffney and Michael O’Rourke 
(Farnham: Ashgate Press, 2009), 492. 
104 Barbara Johnson, Persons and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2008). 
105 Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, The Matrixial Borderspace (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2006). 
106 Reza Negarestani, “On the Revolutionary Earth: A Dialectic in Terri- 
topic Materialism,” http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/downloads/conference-dark- 
materialism-paper.pdf. 
107 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Being and Slime: The Mathematics of Protoplasm 




itors, mobiles, prams, buggies, carry cots, slings, back packs, car 
seats and so ever infinitely on.108
Ferris Wheel #5: Here Comes Everything!
The ferris wheels of speculative realism, object-oriented ontol-
ogy, and queer theory have been shown to be interlocking or 
each perhaps as tiny wheels imagined inside each other. If Bry-
ant hopes that speculative realism and OOO will create projects 
for others, then what we need to ensure is that the wheels keep 
spinning and that we never try to pin things down. If we refuse to 
spell out a programmatic content for speculative thought, then it 
will always retain the power to wrench frames and whenever and 
wherever queer theory (or better queer theories) and specula-
tive realism (or better speculative realisms) meet, that “fantastic 
explosion”109 promises an irreducible openness to everything. 
108 Lisa Baraitser, Maternal Encounters: The Ethics of Interruption (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 126.
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